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Abstract
This dissertation explores the determinants of government growth in the
American states. Understanding the causes o f public sector growth is important as the
administration of government programs is increasingly devolved to the states. Past
research has typically been on national-level growth. However, the variety in state
institutional structures, resource bases, and population needs makes for an ideal
“comparative laboratory.” With some exceptions, state-level studies have had a public
finance approach that often exclude relevant political and demographic factors that can
lead to increased public sector size.
My analysis of state government growth tests thirteen models covering both
traditional political explanations as well as explanations found in the public finance
literature. I use a pooled cross-sectional time-series research design to determine the
causes of growth in forty-nine states for the years 1946 to 1997. The study
categorizes explanations of government growth as either responsive or excessive.
Responsive explanations suggests that growth is a reflection of the needs and demands
of the population. Excessive explanations are those that posit growth beyond that
demanded by the citizenry. These explanations are tested in a combined model on
both undeflated and deflated state government size.
I find strong support for three responsive explanations: Political Needs, Party
Control, and Political Culture. The analysis indicates weak support for Wagner’s
Law with confirmatory evidence confined to urbanization. Two components of
Wagner’s Law, industrialization and per capita income, are negatively related to
government growth.
vi
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Four excessive explanations gain considerable support: Intergovernmental
Grants, Bureau-Voting, Divided Government, and Unfunded Mandates.

The

analysis indicates that only state government employees have a positive impact on
public sector growth. The results reveal that the effect of divided government on state
government growth is contingent on the lack of state supermajority requirements for
tax increases. There is only weak evidence in favor of the Constituency Size theory.
Overall, my study suggests that state government growth is best explained by
theories that fall within the excessive category. Of the variables correctly signed, the
effects of intergovernmental grants and state employees on government growth are the
two strongest in both the undeflated and deflated model.

vii
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Chapter 1: Introduction
One way to view politics is to see it as the product of competing societal
demands. These competing demands are channeled through government and emerge
as public policy. This perspective sees politics as "the authoritative allocation of
values for a society” (Easton, 1953) or Lasswell’s (1936) “who gets what, when, and
how”. When politics is defined this way, there is an implicit recognition that
government is expected to play a pivotal role in the distribution of a society’s
resources. Governmental policy, thus, may be thought of as a reflection of the
underlying demand for public goods. Whether hospitals or public schools are the
recipients of governmental largesse depends largely on how these competing demands
are prioritized by the government.
Perhaps the most important decision to be made by the public sector concerns
its relative size vis-a-vis the private sector. Politics has often been analyzed in terms
of why spending increased in one category and declined in another. However, any
such spending is contingent upon the existence of a public sector o f sufficient size to
spend in the first place. It may be argued that the relative size of the government is the
single most divisive issue in contemporary American politics, with liberals and
Democrats perceived as expanding the role of the government and conservatives and
Republicans advocating a more limited government. As Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud
(1991, 177-178) note:
The relative size of the public sector has been one o f the most
divisive issues in contemporary American political debate. The
magnitude of government activity and the degree to which the public
sector absorbs resources from the private sector has been an issue that
has divided political liberals and conservatives in the United States,
I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

particularly in the period of government growth since the beginning of
the New Deal era. Contemporary liberals contend that government has
a legitimate, active role in solving a wide range of policy problems
confronting American citizens, and that programs designed to
ameliorate these problems require the expenditure of society's
resources. Conservatives, on the other hand, suggest a much more
limited role of government in solving problems, arguing that "big
government” is inevitably coercive, corrupt, and inefficient, and hence
inferior to the private market as an allocator of society’s resources.
This issue is particularly salient insofar as most policy issues that
structure the dominant liberal-conservative debate in the United States
(and, for that matter, in other Western industrial democracies) can be
subsumed under the broader question of the appropriate size of the
public sector relative to that of the private sector.
As government has continued to grow, it is little wonder that the issue of
government size has spawned an extensive body of research. Scholars have generated
numerous studies o f government growth from the turn of the century, and particularly
since World War II (Berry and Lowery 1987; Borcherding 1977a; Garand 1988a;
1988b; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985; Lowery and Berry 1983; Nutter 1978). A raft of
theories for public sector expansion have emerged and have been empirically tested in
number of governmental contexts (Berry and Lowery 1987; Cameron 1978; Garand
1988a; Husted and Kenny 1997; Kau and Rubin 1981; Larkey, Stolp, and Winer 1981;
Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985; Lowery and Berry 1983; Lybeck 1986; Mann 1980;
Niskanen 1967; Peacock and Wiseman 1967; Saunders 1988; Tarschys 1975; Wagner
1977). Tangentially related studies have analyzed the effect of government size on
such characteristics as economic growth (Conte and Darrat 1988; Jones 1990), state
divorce rates (Garand and Monroe 1991) and citizen’s attitudes toward risk (usually
operationalized as propensity to save) (Greene 1973; Hatzinikolaou 1997;
Hatzinikolaou and Ahking 1995).

2
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The overwhelming majority o f past research has looked at the causes of
government growth at the federal level. However, research at the state level has not
gone neglected. Most notably, Garand's research has tested explanations o f state
government growth from 1945 to 1984 (1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1991; 1993). Using both
time-series and pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, his investigations reveal
general support for what has been called in the literature the bureau voting,
intergovernmental grant, partisan control, and political need models of public sector
growth. Modest support is also found for political culture and Wagner's Law
explanations o f government size.
In this dissertation, I complement this and other state-level analyses in several
ways. First, it extends the period under examination to the fifty-two years from 1946
to 1997, providing an additional twenty-eight years to the work done by Garand
(1993). Second, two additional theories that have garnered support in national-level
investigations of government growth are tested. Both of these theories come from a
public choice perspective and have been little-mentioned in the political science
literature. These economics-based theories include the median income voter model
(Meitzer and Richard 1981; Peltzman 1980; Stigler 1970; Tridimas 1993) and an
explanation that relates legislative structure and constituency size to government
growth (Crain 1979; Gilligan and Matsusuka 1995; Stigler 1976; Thornton and Ulrich
1999).
Two other theories treated in this analysis focus on the effect of political
institutions on the size o f state government. The first of these concerns the effect of
divided government on public sector growth. Some evidence has been found that

3
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links divided government control at the federal level to greater public sector
expenditures (McCubbins 1991). A second explanation links increased spending by
state governments to greater levels of interparty competition. This theory, dating to
V.O. Key (1949), is most closely allied to investigations of state welfare spending
(Broach 1973; Carmines 1974; Dawson and Robinson 1963; Fry and Winters 1970;
Jennings 1979; Lewis-Beck 1977; Wright 1975). However, because one of the
primary sources of government growth is through redistributive programs (Berry and
Lowery 1987; Borcherding 1977a; Mueller 1984; Tiegen 1980), testing such an
explanation would be important for this analysis. An additional explanation tested in
this analysis concerns the role of state statutory and constitutional measures designed
to curb state expenditures. Most notable of these fiscal instruments are initiatives, tax
and expenditure limitations and balanced budget requirements. Past research into the
effect of these prohibitions finds little evidence that they do anything to restrain the
growth in state expenditures, though given that they are designed to do so justifies
their inclusion. Finally, the effect of unfunded federal mandates on state government
growth is tested in this study. Past research on state government growth has not
considered how these mandates have contributed to public sector growth at the state
level.
In addition to these alternative explanations for public sector growth, some
variables in this analysis have been measured differently. Party control models at the
state level have never controlled for the length of time a party has been in power;
substantial impacts for this variable have been found in a study of government growth
in fifteen developed democracies (Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993; see also Swank 1988).

4
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Another point of departure in this study involves the more precise
measurement o f median income voter participation. Past analyses routinely gauge the
effect of increased participation by lower income voters through the use of turnout
levels. The following analysis takes advantage of median income voter turnout data
measured at the county-level. This county-level data has been aggregated to the state
level.
Along with improvements in variable measurement, two of the government
growth theories tested herein, Wagner’s Law and bureau voting, benefit from the
inclusion of theoretically important variables previously unavailable due to data
limitations. Data is now available for state manufacturing income, an important factor
in measuring industrialization, a major component of Wagner’s Law. Also, the effect
o f state, local, and federal employees on state public sector growth provides for a
more complete test of the bureau voting model.
One may ask whether investigation of government growth is not more
appropriate at the national level. Public sector growth at the national level is welldocumented, its scope is universal within the country, the federal government has
access to more coercive policy instruments, and it is, generally speaking, more visible
than the fifty subnational governments of the United States.
State level analysis of government growth is important for several reasons.
First, states have different institutional structures, resource bases, and population
needs. These differences provide a “comparative laboratory” through which the
importance of a variety of environmental and structural explanations can be tested.
This variation between state contexts provides for an optimal testing o f the relative

5
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explanatory power o f the competing models of government growth tested at the
national level. Moreover, the average growth of all state public sectors has leveled
off recently. This leveling off of state government growth is a boon to this study, as it
means that there will be more variation among the examined variables across states
within this time period. If all state governments were growing, it would be much
harder to disentangle the relative effects of the competing models of government
growth examined in this study.1
Second, much of the research done at the state level in the recent past has had a
more explicitly public finance or economic approach. This research has
unquestionably extended our knowledge base as to the determinants of subnational
government growth. However, the economic orientation of this research has led to a
neglect of the more political explanations of public sector growth. For instance, party
control and divided government have received relatively little attention (though see
Alt and Lowery 1994; Clingermayer and Wood 1995; and Garand and Kapeluck
2000).

Third, there has been a rebirth of interest in state politics and policy. Research
into the causes o f state government growth provides a rich backdrop to further
understanding of the contextual factors driving the political systems of the fifty states.
Identification of significant models of state public sector growth is essential to
explanations of differing policy outputs among the states.
Fourth and most importantly, the ongoing devolution of power from the federal
government implies an increased importance of state-level policy contexts. This
1Though states could be growing at different rates.
6
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devolution, which began with the revenue sharing programs of Nixon and Reagan, has
proceeded apace to the present. Not only does increased state responsibility for the
administration of government programs result in a wider distribution of potential
public sector output, it also means that the determinants of overall public sector
expenditures may be more closely linked to the political contexts present at the state
level. This represents a sharp difference from the past in which overall growth
patterns were more closely linked to national level policy outcomes.
The framework that guides the following analysis recognizes that growth in the
public sector can be the result of two broad sets of processes (Buchanan 1977; Lowery
and Berry 1983). First, government growth can be responsive to the demands of
citizens. Responsive models of government growth see increases in public sector size
as the result of decisions made by the populace within a democracy. If a majority of
the public desires increased public expenditures, then government should grow in
response. From a normative standpoint, a democratic government should increase in
size if such growth reflects the majority of the population. In such models, the
institutions of government through which decisions affecting the size of government
are made are neutral in regard to whether the choice is to expand or reduce the public
sector.
On the other hand, government growth can be excessive. Excessive
government growth occurs when the public sector increases in size beyond that
desired by the majority of the citizenry. Government growth in a democracy that is
over and above that wished for by the majority of the population belies the tenets of
democratic theory. Thus, if the excessive models of government growth examined in

7
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this study contribute a great deal to state public sector size, we have reason to believe
that democratic control of state government has been undermined.
From a normative perspective, government size in a democracy should be due
to the preferences of the citizenry. Hence, the thesis of my study is that public sector
size should be explained primarily by responsive theories of state government growth.
1suggest that because state government operates much closer to the citizenry than the
federal government, state policy choices, as reflected in the size of government, should
reflect the policy demands and needs of the state’s population. An increase in the size
of state government should reflect a desire by a state’s citizens for an increased
provision of public goods and services. Given the close proximity between the elected
and the governed, state government should be more responsive to the electorate. The
level of control exercised by the citizen over his or her state government is greater
than the control exercised at the national level. Not only is the likelihood greater that
the average citizen can access his or her state representative more easily than his or her
federal representative, but the issues decided at the state level often have a much more
tangible impact than those decided at the national level. Since state-level decision
making permits more citizen participation and concerns issues that have a more
immediate impact, policies that affect the size of state government, it is proposed, are
subject to increased oversight than those affecting the size of the federal government.
Therefore, increases in state government growth should be the result of government
responsiveness rather than a duplicitous effort on the part of government institutions to
increase the size o f government beyond that desired by the citizen.

8
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Issues in Previous Research on Government Growth
While there is an enormous amount of research on government growth, there
has been no final word on the subject Debates still occur among scholars as to the
relative importance of particular explanations o f government growth, though the
research has moved toward the incorporation of a number of explanatory models
versus a single comprehensive meta-theory. This general agreement on how to
approach the issue of government growth, however, does not extend to all facets of the
research agenda. In the following section, I examine three of the most important
disagreements, all of which will be addressed in one way or another in the empirical
sections of the paper.

Cross-Sectional vs. Longitudinal Models
Past analysis of government growth is marked by debate over whether to use a
cross-sectional or longitudinal approach to studying government growth. A number of
studies utilize a cross-sectional design to model a process that occurs over time
(Cameron 1978; Fisher 1964; Mitchell, Owen, and Feiock 1985; Wagner 1976). The
hazards associated with the use of cross-sectional designs to analyze dynamic policy
process are well-documented (Garand and Monroe 1991; Gray 1976).
Three problems in particular stand out when a cross-sectional design is used to
study public sector growth. First, growth in government occurs over time. If one
were studying or comparing government size at a single point in time, such a research
strategy might be appropriate. Longitudinal research on the causes of government

9
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growth that incorporates temporal variation in response to environmental factors is
preferable to the snapshot of the size o f government provided by cross-sectional
studies.
Another pitfall of cross-sectional designs is that they typically rely on averages
calculated over a number of years. Such temporal aggregation may conceal
covariation between government size and the relevant explanatory variables that may
prove useful in making causal inferences about the processes behind growth in the
public sector. For example, a study by Cameron (1978) o f the changes in public sector
expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GOP) in eighteen developed
countries from 1960 to 197S relies on such a cross-sectional approach. His analysis
centers on the average increases over the sixteen-year period as a function of
explanatory variables, which are also aggregated over this same period. The
consequence of this research design is that it is impossible to determine whether the
results obtained can be attributed to real relationships or are an artifact of the
aggregation procedure. It may be that covariation among the dependent and
independent variables within the period under analysis would have led to different
results and inferences. In short, cross-sectional designs are useful if the researcher
wants to understand why one political system exhibited more public sector growth
than another for the time in question, however they do not enable the researcher to
examine change in government size within political systems over time. The
development of adequate models o f government growth in the fifty states demands the
specification of a dynamic element best captured by a longitudinal (time-series)
design.

10
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Third, in her study of American state policy outputs, Gray (1976) shows how
varying results can be obtained as a result of using cross-sectional research designs
rather than time-series analysis. These differing results lead to different (and possibly
misleading) inferences about the state policy process. A review o f the government
growth literature reveals similar conflicting findings. For instance, Cameron’s crosssectional analysis indicates substantial support for his foreign trade dependency model
of government growth. Subsequent longitudinal studies, however, fail to find any
effect for trade dependency on government growth in the United States (Berry and
Lowery 1987; Lowery and Berry 1983). Indeed, their results paint the opposite
picture, with increased foreign trade dependency leading to a decline in government
size.
This having been said, pure longitudinal research designs have their own
disadvantages. In longitudinal designs, government growth is depicted as a function
o f explanatory variables that are gathered within one political unit over time. This
approach is satisfactory if one is interested only in one particular political system,
however, it prevents the researcher from drawing strong conclusions regarding
changes in public sector size across political systems. O f course, government growth
is particular to specific political systems, and can be modeled longitudinally within
one political system. However, comparative research has as one o f its primary goals
the explanation of behavior and outcomes that occur across political systems. So
while knowing the factors behind government growth in, say, California, is important,
it is also important to understand why California has a larger government than, say,
New Hampshire.

11
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What the preceding paragraphs imply is that it is important for one studying
the size o f government and its growth over time to explain a full range of crosssectional and longitudinal covariation between government size and the independent
variable that (supposedly) explains government size. The development of pooled
cross-sectional time-series designs is an innovation that permits one to explain over
time and across-system variation in the size of the public sector.

Aggregation Across Levels of Government
A second issue pertains to the fact that a number of previous analyses of public
sector growth in federal political systems measure government size by using total
government expenditures as a proportion of total national economic output. For
example, in their studies of public sector growth, both Lowery and Berry (1983, 1987)
and Lewis-Beck and Rice (1985) aggregate local, state, and federal spending as a
proportion o f national economic output. This aggregation, some argue, can be traced
to the comparative origins of the growth in government literature, which as Lowery
and Berry (1983,90) note, necessarily had to adjust for the very different government
structures of the industrial democracies.” This approach is beneficial as it takes into
account the total extractive nature o f the public sector within the overall national
economic and political system. Indeed, it is practically unavoidable in research
comparing federal and nonfederal regimes. It may also be argued that it is a proper
approach for analysis of federal systems, which, like the United States, have
significant intergovernmental exchange of both financial resources and governmental
responsibility. This interdependence suggests that patterns o f government size for
different government levels may be less distinct than one might expect, and thus

12
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should be studied as a whole.
Nonetheless, analysis that uses data aggregated over several governmental
levels has several drawbacks. First, combining expenditure data across governmental
levels may conceal unique patterns of public sector growth for the various levels of
government. Aggregation of governmental expenditure prevents the researcher from
knowing whether increased size is attributable to either public sector growth at the
local, state, national, or some combination of all three levels. For example, Dye and
MacManus (1990) show that growth in the public sector from 19S2 to 1984 is largely
attributable to increased federal spending, which when compared to state and local
sector spending shows little sign of leveling off. Another disaggregated analysis shows
that the reverse was true in the late nineteenth century (Borcherding 1977b). Dye and
MacManus also find that the predictive power of their government growth models is
contingent on whether state and local expenditures are examined together or
separately. These examples suggest that it is important to focus in on whether and why
growth in the size o f government is observed within each specific level.
Second, certain models of public sector growth are specifically aimed at
explaining growth at a particular level of government. To take one example, the
intergovernmental transfer model of government growth implicitly assumes that one
level receives benefits from another level. In this analysis of state government growth,
it is the state that is the benefactor of intergovernmental grants; thus to test the theory
of intergovernmental grants requires a disaggregation of public sector growth.
A third argument in favor of disaggregating public sector growth by level of
government is related to the one discussed above. Studies that use aggregated public

13
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sector size data run the risk o f attributing government growth to factors that apply only
to one level of government. For instance, the theory of partisan control suggests that
government control by parties more amenable to an activist government (e.g. the
Democratic Party) will result in a larger public sector. By conflating all levels of
government expenditure, the researcher then has to justify at what government level is
party control to be measured. In this example, the decision to gauge party control at
the national level would fail to acknowledge that much of public sector growth could
be attributed to decisions made at the state and local level. These decisions are
beyond the control of national policymakers.
Finally, it may be argued that the best strategy for studying the size of the
public sector is to concentrate on the particular levels of government within which
political and economic decisions relevant to the size of the public sector are made.
The consideration of the effects of policy made in other levels of government can be
included as separate variables within the scope o f a public sector growth analysis that
focuses on a specific level of government. In other words, if state public sector
growth is highly dependent on, say, national level decisions regarding the awarding of
intergovernmental grants, state government growth models could incorporate variables
that represent such decisions. In essence, in order to achieve a broader understanding
of government growth, it is necessary to examine government growth patterns and
their causes using data disaggregated for the different levels of government under
consideration.

14
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The Price Deflator Issue
One final issue that marks a division within the government growth literature is
the question of differing inflation rates between the public and private sector. The
origin o f this dispute comes from an article published in the late 1960s that
convincingly argued that the inflation rate for government would be higher than that
experienced by the private sector (Baumol 1967). The key to understanding this
difference lies in the differing productivity levels of the two sectors. Baumol argued
that sectors o f the economy could be thought of as either progressive or nonprogressive with progressive sectors enjoying a greater rate of productivity. The
implication is that the product cost in the progressive sector will decline as
productivity gains are made. However, non-progressive sectors will experience everincreasing costs per unit. These progressive sectors are characterized by
“innovations, capital accumulation, and economies of large scale [which] all make for
a cumulative rise in output per man hour” (Baumol 1967, 416). The public sector, on
the other hand, belongs in the non-progressive category because of its relative inability
to increase productivity. This proposed gap in productivity between the two sectors is
based on three premises. First, public sector activities are primarily labor intensive.2
Second, advances in technology have a negligible effect on the quantity of labor

2 Some studies claim that the public sector is actually more capital-intensive than the
private sector (Orzechowski 1974; Tullock 1977,285-87), though as Berry and
Lowery point out (1984b), the high level o f aggregation in such studies makes an
accurate appraisal o f the results is difficult Moreover, some have argued that
technological advances have translated into better service not to reductions (Bradford,
Malt and Oates 1969).
15
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needed to provide government services.3 Third, without market mechanisms that
ensure competitiveness, bureaucracy has little motivation to improve efficiency or
productivity. If Baumol’s hypothesis is true, it suggests that the undeflated cost of
public sector goods and services will increase relative to costs in the more productive
private sector. Moreover, because government must compete with the private sector
for labor, wages for government employees must also rise (Beck 1979).
In essence, Baumol argues that the private sector is better able to enjoy the
fruits o f productivity than the public sector because it relies more on capital than labor.
For example, a factory that begins using a more automated production process may
increase the output of automobiles from a hundred a day to two hundred. The factory
has now doubled its output and will be earning considerably more profit. Some of this
profit translates into increased wages. The government worker, however, is employed
in a more labor-intensive job. For instance, there is little the government can do to
increase the productivity of the social worker without compromising the quality of the
service. Government, however, must pay social workers enough to prevent them from
leaving to work at the automobile plant. Thus, government expenditures on labor
must increase in order to retain its employees, even though there is no accompanying
increase in productivity. This means that government will have a higher inflation rate
3 Support for this premise is weakened because of the advent of the computer.
However, it may be argued that computer-based productivity gains experienced by the
private sector far outstrip those enjoyed in the public sector. The classic example is
the teacher. A teacher’s ability to teach more students through the use of distance
learning techniques results in greater efficiency; however, the quality of education
suffers as the pupil to teacher ratio increases. Since government output is largely
service-oriented, efficiency gains provided through computer applications are often
limited by the need for more personalized attention that is the hallmark of the service
sector.
16
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than the private sector, particularly since the bulk o f government activities are laborintensive (e.g. education, welfare, health services). It is the deflator that “corrects”
for this private sector-public sector disparity in inflation by accounting for that part of
government expenditure increase due to the productivity advantage enjoyed by the
private sector.
It is this differential inflation rate between the public and private sector that has
led to different conclusions regarding the increasing size o f the public sector.
Controlling for public sector price inflation, several scholars have found little to no
evidence o f ongoing governmental growth (Beck 1976,1979; Dubin 1977; Ott 1980).
An analysis of growth in state government reveals that almost half of the increase in
the public sector can be attributed to what has come to be called “Baumol’s Disease”
(Garand 1991). Another study finds that during the post-war period from 1945 to
1984, the mean inflation rate for the private sector (GNP) was 4.6%, while the
inflation rates for the federal and state and local government sectors were 5.3 and
6.0% respectively. Given the relevance of this variable, many researchers have taken
it into account in iheir investigations o f government growth (Beck 1976,1981; Berry
and Lowery 1984a; 1984b; Borcherding 1985; Garand 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1991;
Ladd 1978; Lowery and Berry 1983; 1987).
What are the consequences of ignoring the deflator issue? If the size of
government is measured in terms of the ratio o f government spending to the size of the
total economy, it is likely that an undeflated government size measure will be
contaminated by the different inflation rates that characterize the two sectors of the

17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

economy. Since public sector inflation exceeds private sector inflation, government
size can be expected to grow regardless of whether there is a real accompanying
increase in the scope of government activity. As Lowery and Berry (1983, 680) point
out, measures of the size of the public sector based on the ratio of government
expenditures to total economic output may grow for two reasons: “(1) the scope of
government activity may broaden (i.e., government may increase the amounts and
types of goods and services it provides), and (2) the cost o f providing a constant level
of goods and services may rise relative to the prices of goods and services in the
private sector.”
A second consequence of using undeflated measures of government growth is
that the empirical findings have been found to differ from those using deflated
measures. Berry and Lowery (1984a) have found that the choice o f whether to use an
deflated measure of government size has a considerable impact on the results of
empirical tests of public sector growth models, with the level of empirical support for
various explanations contingent on the decision to use a deflated or undeflated
measure of government size. Research at the state level confirms Berry and Lowery’s
national level conclusion, though differences in the results are not as stark. (Garand
1989).4
In this dissertation, 1 sidestep the problem of using a deflated measure in the
measurement of the dependent variable by testing the various theories using both
deflated and undeflated measures of state government growth. While this paper is
4 A national level analysis also fails to find important differences when using either
deflated or nondeflated measure o f size; however, this study is not strictly comparable
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ultimately concerned with the increasing scope of government, as measured by its
share o f total economic output, any explanation of government growth is incomplete
without accounting for the uncontrollable dimension caused by the differential
inflation rates of the public and private sectors. Whereas most studies have modeled
government growth using either a deflated or an undeflated measure, this analysis will
use both operationalizations of the dependent variable.
The decision to model government growth using the undeflated measure is
based on the importance of appreciating the total extractive component of the public
sector. A preliminary adjustment to control for differing inflation rates will tend to
mask the overall trend o f increased government size. In the words of Musgrave and
Musgrave (1980, 149), “the unadjusted ratio gives a better picture of the public sector
share in the value o f the total output, and of the share of private income which has to
be paid into the public sector through taxation.”
There is one final issue within the price deflator debate that deserves attention.
This concerns the two broad categories of government spending: transfers and final
consumption expenditures. Transfers refer to the redistributive aspect of government
expenditures, whereas capital outlays, wages, and purchases belong in the final
consumption category. An example of a transfer expenditure would be Medicare
spending, whereas a B-l bomber would fall into the final consumption category. A
question emerges: should transfer payments be counted as adding to government
growth? This question has become more important as government budget allocations
are increasingly moving from purchases to transfers (Shariff 1978). The argument for
as government expenditures are disaggregated into a number of policy categories
19
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exclusion is that such expenditures do not entail the permanent movement of resources
from the private to the public sector, rather it is redistributed to transfer program
beneficiaries (Brown and Jackson 1978). In this interpretation, including transfer
payments overstates the actual size of government. The opposing viewpoint contends
that this redistribution is financed by taxpayers and regardless of where the money
ends up it no longer is in their hands. As Buchanan and Flowers argue, this “is as
much a real cost as direct outlay for tanks, planes, and paper clips” (1975,40-41).
And at the heart of scholarly (and partisan) interest in the size of the public sector lies
the concern with government power. Thus, ignoring the redistributive capacity of
government is to neglect a substantial exercise of government influence (Lewis-Beck
and Rice 1985).
The discussion thus far of public and private sector price deflators yields two
conclusions pertinent to this study of state government growth. First, government
expenditures are subject to a different inflation rate than private sector expenditures
and this differential should be taken into account. Second, transfers constitute a large
and growing proportion of state expenditures. This transfer spending, though much of
it is returned to the citizen, has a real economic effect on the average citizen. Since
transfer spending does have an economic effect on the citizen, it is included in the
operationalization of the dependent variable.

Summary
Evident from the preceding discussion is that the research program on
government growth is not complete. There remains considerable disagreement among
(Mahler 1992).
20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

scholars regarding (1) the time frame appropriate for analyzing public sector size and
its growth over time, (2) the use o f government size data disaggregated to specific
levels of government in federal systems, instead o f data on public sector size
aggregated across governmental levels, and (3) the use of government size measures
that control for the different inflation rates of the public and private sectors. The
strategy adopted here to analyze the growth of state government (1) utilizes data
collected both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, (2) uses government expenditures
measured at the state level, and (3) tests both deflated and undeflated state government
growth models.
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Chapter 2: Thirteen Models of Public Sector Growth
This section describes the various responsive and excessive theories of
government growth that have attracted attention in the literature. The following 13
theories form the basis of the multivariate analysis tested in this paper. All o f the
following, with the exception of unfunded mandates, have been tested empirically in a
wide variety of political contexts; however, with some exceptions (Garand 1988b;
1993), there has been little effort to develop a broader, more comprehensive model of
government size in the American states that simultaneously takes into account the
effects suggested by a range of government size models. Variables reflecting these
explanations will be included in a comprehensive model of state government size
estimated in a pooled model for the American states for the years 1946 to 1997. A
brief summary of the variables used herein is in Appendix 2.
The dependent variable in this analysis is government size and is measured as
total state government expenditures (including intergovernmental grants) as a
proportion o f total state personal income. In the deflated models, government
expenditures are deflated by the state and local government price deflator, and total
state personal income is deflated by the GDP deflator. Both government expenditures
and total state personal income are left undeflated in the undeflated models.
The government size measure that is undeflated indicates the total extractive
component o f the state public sector. This measure is based on the ratio of real state
government expenditures in year Y to real total state personal income in year Y. This
is what government consumes, regardless of whether the state public sector is doing
more or less with the money it receives. The deflated measure of state government
22
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size, on the other hand, is deflated by the appropriate government price deflator. The
size of state government under this operationalization indicates the degree to which
the scope, or activity of state government has either increased or declined in the states
over the time period under analysis.

Responsive Models of Government Growth
The seven theories discussed below are best characterized as responsive
explanations of state government growth. Responsive theories suggest that growth in
a state’s public sector is due to the demands o f a majority of the citizens. These
demands can be expressed directly, for instance by voting for candidates that promise
increased state expenditures. Government growth can also be the result o f apparent
needs within the population. What is common to either process is that government
size increases (or decreases) in response to the preferences of a majority of the
citizens.

Wagner's Law
Adolph Wagner, a nineteenth century German economist, was one of the first
scholars to speculate on the causes of government growth. His theory, which has
come to be known as Wagner’s Law, is one of the most referred to and tested in the
government growth literature. He proposed that government grew in response to
factors associated with increased industrialization (Wagner 1877). Three primary
factors thought to be related to industrialization are an increase in per capita income,
greater technological advances, and wider political participation (Bhargava 19S3;
Mann 1980). The combination of these factors suggested to Wagner three reasons
why the scope o f government could be expected to expand. First, industrialization
23
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results in a more greatly concentrated population. The resulting urbanization of the
population is associated with externalities that must be addressed by the public sector.
For example, urbanization requires greater outlays on such public goods as law
enforcement, socioeconomic regulation (i.e. welfare, labor-management arbitration),
and pollution control. Second, gains in per capita income are expected to result in an
elastic demand in publicly provided goods and services such as old age insurance,
public education, and health coverage. The term “elasticity” refers to the degree to
which the demand for a product fluctuates due to changes in price and income. Water,
for example, is price inelastic. Regardless of the price per gallon, demand for water
will be inelastic or unchanging. On the other hand, as an individual's income
increases, he or she may be more likely to spend a greater amount on publicly
provided goods and services. In other words, there will not be a one to one
correspondence between income and demand for public goods; rather Wagner
proposed that proportionally more would be demanded of the public sector as incomes
rise.1The last component of Wagner’s Law pertains to the infrastructure requirements
o f an industrial society. As Mann has noted, “the technological needs of an industrial
economy require larger amounts of capital than are forthcoming from the private
sector. Therefore, the state has to provide the necessary capital funds to finance largescale capital expenditures” (1980, 189). This final component is illustrated by the
enormous public expenditure on mass transit, interstates, and public utilities.
1This interpretation o f Wagner’s Law has been the source of some debate, as some
scholars have argued that there has to be some limit or equilibrium point at which
demand for public goods would cease to grow (Alt 1980), for instance, when the
further expansion of government results in a decline in income growth. Moreover, if
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The three implications of the theory that have attracted the most attention
consider the relationship of industrialization, urbanization (or population density) and
rise in per capita income to growth in government. Despite the intuitive appeal of
Wagner’s Law, extensive testing in a variety of political and economic contexts
provides only modest evidence of its empirical validity. Whereas Wagner’s Law
receives some support in Lowery and Berry’s (1983) test of nine theories of
government growth, this support is confined to their measures of industrialization.2 A
subsequent analysis by the authors fails, however, to find a significant relationship
between industrialization and growth in government (Berry and Lowery 1987).
Moreover, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that industrialization is related to a
decline in public sector growth. On the other hand, Rice’s (1986) study of twelve
European nations reveals a modest role for industrialization. His analysis indicates
that Wagner’s Law is primarily operative in “nations with a strong commitment to
social welfare, and these nations appear to be primarily Northern European” (1986,
249). Support for a positive relationship between industrialization and government
growth are also found in longitudinal analyses of the Mexican (Mann 1980) and Greek
(Karavitis 1987) public sectors.

income elasticity exceeds one, “then public spending at some point would exceed
national income (Borcherding 1985).
2 The authors wrongly attribute a negative coefficient for population to evidence
against Wagner’s Law (see also Garand 1988). Controlling for other factors, the
population variable should take a negative sign because of the public sector’s
economy of scale (see Samuelson 1954). For instance, a nation of 25 million with a
military o f 1 million incurs twice the defense cost per capita when compared to a
nation o f 50 million with a similar sized military. Wagner’s Law refers to population
density not to overall population.
25

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A much more tested implication of Wagner’s Law is that an increase in per
capita income bolsters demand for government services. Here again, the evidence is
mixed. Berry and Lowery find a positive and significant relationship—increased per
capita income leads to a larger public sector (1983; 1984).3 Subsequent analysis by
the authors reveals a negative effect (Berry and Lowery 1987). Lewis-Beck and Rice
(1985) operationalize economic affluence as personal savings as a proportion of
personal disposable income, the latter of which, it can be argued, is a reasonable
measure of discretionary income. Their analysis suggests a positive and significant
relationship between their measure of income and growth in the aggregated United
States public sector. Finally, Ferris and West’s (1995) examination of total United
States government size (federal, state, and local) fails to support Wagner’s rising per
capita income relationship to increased government size. When the authors include
transfer expenditures, real government size is inversely related to per capita income.
Turning to the state-level, Garand’s (1988) analysis reveals an overall negative
relationship between per capita income and government growth; only 14 of the 50
states had significant positive coefficients for the income variable. A more recent
analysis by Garand (1993) reveals a strong negative relationship between state
government growth and per capita income when government size is deflated. Other
studies, however, find positive and significant effects for the per capita income
variable (Thornton and Ulrich 1999; Wagner 1976). Husted and Kenny’s (1997)
state-level analysis that separates nonwelfare from welfare spending finds modest
evidence that per capita income increases boost spending on the former though not the
3 The authors find the opposite result when using the undeflated measure of
26
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latter (1997). International studies of government growth provide conflicting results
as well. Cameron’s (1978) analysis of government growth in 18 industrial
democracies shows no relationship between national economic output and increased
government size. Other analyses point to a significant though weak impact for the per
capita income variable on government growth (OECD 1983; Wagner and Weber
1977).
Boix (2001), in a recent analysis of government growth in 65 democratic and
authoritarian countries, makes the argument that the relationship between per capita
income and government growth is nonlinear. And once per capita income becomes
sufficiently high, the marginal return of public investment to the taxpayer declines.
Boix links the relationship between per capita income and public sector expenditures
to the voting incentives before the median income voter. At low levels of income,
pressures for redistribution are low. The return to the citizen in the form of public
goods and services such as roads, an airport, bridges is minimal. These public goods
are unlikely to affect positively the productivity of the citizen. However, once per
capita income reaches a certain threshold, the returns from public investment are
sufficient to warrant an increased level o f taxation. The median income voter supports
a tax level that maximizes their income (through the development of publicly funded
infrastructural improvements or transfers) only to the point where any additional tax
would reduce total economic output. For example, a 100% tax would reduce output to

government growth (Berry and Lowery 1984).
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zero (see 25n4).4 Finally, the demand for public sector investment should taper off at
high levels of per capita income.
To control for this non-linear relationship between per capita income and
government growth, Boix (2001) uses the log value o f real per capita income. He
finds a strong positive effect for per capita income in his cross-sectional time series
analysis. Logged per capita income is a positive factor for government growth in
both democratic and authoritarian regimes.
Finally, urbanization is the implication of Wagner’s theory that has received
the most extensive testing. This measure, along with population density, is intended to
gauge the level of interdependency in an industrial society. This measure of
interdependency, like Wagner’s other hypotheses, has mixed empirical support in the
literature, though one public finance scholar goes as far as to say that its explanatory
contribution is “virtually zero” (Borcherding 1985). Nevertheless, urbanization has a
certain theoretical appeal as a proxy for the societal interdependencies engendered by
industrialism. On the positive side, coefficients for urbanization and population
density are significant and in the hypothesized direction in Greece, Mexico, Sweden
and Norway (Karavitis 1987; Mann 1980; Murray 1981; and Sorenson 1984
respectively). Lybeck’s analysis o f twelve developed economies also suggests that
public sector growth is driven in part by urbanization (1986).

4 This argument is similar to that espoused by the economist Arthur Laffer, with his
famous Laffer Curve. Laffer suggested that tax revenue would increase if tax rates
were reduced. Tax revenues will increase because a reduction in taxes will lead to
increased capital investment. Productivity gains due to such investment translates into
increased profits. And increased profits enlarges the government's tax base.
28
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Research on United States government growth has failed to uncover a link
between population density and public sector growth (Kau and Rubin 1981); however
this may be the fault of the measures chosen. Some have attempted to model
interdependencies as a function of population—higher population should equal
increased government spending (Berry and Lowery 1983; 1984; Garand 1988). But as
Thornton and Ulrich (1999, 594) note, “states with larger populations are expected to
have larger governments but lower levels o f per capita spending because of economies
of scale in the provision of state government services.” This suggests that population
may have a non-linear effect on the size o f government. While state population is an
essential control variable in models of public sector growth, it is no surprise that
population variables are seldom positively signed. Indeed, a positive population
coefficient suggests a more redistributive role for government rather than a provision
of public goods (Mueller and Murrell 1985).5 This redistributive component of
government expenditures is hopefully captured in variables to be discussed later.
Turning to state level analysis, the evidence is clearly weaker for the
interdependency aspect of Wagner’s Law. Some scholars find that population density
(or alternatively urbanization) leads to an increase in welfare spending (Jennings 1980;
Sharkansky 1968). More sophisticated analysis draws the opposite conclusion with
increased urbanization resulting in higher nonwelfare expenditures but exhibiting no
relationship to welfare spending (Husted and Kenny 1997). This finding is attributed
to the higher wages that government must pay to cover the costs of living in a city,
5 Of course, Wagner’s Law has a redistributive component but the main thrust of his
interdependency hypothesis accents the increased demand for publicly provided goods
and services in response to more proximate living conditions.
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while transfer payments “are unaffected by this variation in costs” (78). This
conclusion is questionable on the basis that private sector goods and services are not
offered at a lower cost to the beneficiaries of government transfers. Thus, it would
appear that, if anything, intra-city transfer payments must be comparatively larger than
those made to non-urban recipients. Earlier study of the effect of urbanization on
disaggregated state expenditures bears this out (Fisher 1964). Disaggregation also
points to an increased state expenditure for health care, sewers and sanitation, police
and fire services—interdependencies at the heart of Wagner’s thesis (Borcherding
1985; Fisher 1964). On the other hand, Garand’s (1993) analysis of state government
size reveals a negative relationship for urbanization and population density, though
when controlling for state fixed effects (with state dummy variables), the coefficients
for both variables are positive and significant. Finally, investigations of local
government expenditures reveal mixed results. Wagner’s (1976) analysis of city
government suggests a strong positive effect for urbanization on government size,
while Schneider’s (1988) study of over 500 suburban governments indicates a
negative and insignificant impact for population density on the number of government
workers per capita—arguably a measure of government size (see Rose 1984a; 1984b).
To summarize, Wagner’s Law suggests that government increases in size in
response to the societal changes introduced by industrialization. Industrialization
leads to a more urbanized population. A more concentrated population leads to
externalities such as higher crime and traffic congestion that must be taken care of by
public authorities. Empirical evidence in support of the urbanization component of
Wagner’s Law is strong. Second, per capita income increases associated with
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industrialization, Wagner argues, generate an increased demand for publicly provided
goods and services. The majority of studies point to a modest positive effect for per
capita income, though analysis at the state-level reveals mixed results. Finally,
industrialization requires substantial investment on infrastructure. Expenditures on
interstate systems, ports, and mass transit should increase as a society undergoes
industrialization. Evidence that industrialization is positively related to government
growth is mixed with the preponderance of positive findings confined to international
studies.

Party Control Explanation
One avenue o f research on government activity asserts a role for political
parties in determining public sector expenditures. Governments controlled by parties
of the left are hypothesized to expand the role of the public sector through increased
taxes and expenditures. Conversely, governments controlled by parties of the right are
hypothesized to contract the role of the public sector through a reduction of taxes and
expenditures.
This notion that “politics matters” has come under fire, primarily from Marxist
theorists who argue that government is merely the reflection of the underlying power
relationship between worker and capitalist. Thus to look at parties as a factor in
determining state expenditures is to ignore the fact that they exist to serve the
dominant class in society. In a less radical vein, it has been argued, a la Wagner
(1877), that the societal changes generated through the government are merely a
response to the driving-engine of industrialization. As Castles (1982, 23) notes, both
of these theories point to socioeconomic factors as the primary determinants of public
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sector activity and that “there may be a coincidence of political alignments and the
role of the state, but that is only a consequence o f the fact that both are similarly
situated by such factors as the industrial or class structure.”
Thus, the crucial assumption of the party control thesis is that the parties can
be differentiated as to their policy preferences, which in this context is proposed to
affect the size o f the public sector. The above criticisms notwithstanding, there are
compelling electoral-based reasons why this assumption may fail. Most persuasive is
Downs’ (1957) theory that the parties will move to the center in an effort to acquire
the majority o f votes. If this is the case, party’s policy preferences should be almost
indistinguishable. There is considerable evidence that points to a diminished or
negligible effect of parties on such state policy outputs as welfare spending (Dawson
and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Winters 1976) and tax increases (Berry and Berry
1992).
On the other hand, public expenditures may not diminish should a fiscally
conservative party take power. Instead, the policy preferences of the electoral base
that put the conservative party in office will result in a new direction for public
spending.

For instance, a Republican-held national government may reduce welfare

and education spending at the same time as it increases expenditures on defense. The
spending decrease in one sector is offset by an increase in another. There is no
reduction in overall spending, rather there is a reshuffling of spending priorities.
It is for the reasons cited above that empirical evidence is at best inconclusive
regarding the impact of parties on government growth. Cross-national studies of
industrial democracies reveal mixed results and confirmation of the partisan control
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theory remains qualified. Cameron (1978) suggests that leftist parties do tend to
increase the size of the public sector, though this is contingent on the openness of their
economy to foreign trade. Left-leaning parties in larger nations with less foreign trade
are more successful at increasing the size of government than those in smaller
countries with more open economies. Blais, Blake, and Dion’s (1993) study of IS
liberal democracies indicates that the extent to which parties of the left increase the
size of government is in large part a function of how long they are in power. Rice
(1986) and Lybeck (1986), however find a limited-to-nonexistent role for parties in
affecting the size of the public sector.
Studies of government growth in the United States are similarly inconclusive.
Lewis-Beck and Rice’s (1985) study, which measures Democratic Party strength as an
index derived from the percentage of Democratic Party members in the Senate, House
and governorships, finds some evidence that party matters. However, this is the least
powerful variable in their model of public sector growth. Other studies of national
government growth fail to find any relationship at all (Berry and Lowery 1987;
Lowery and Berry 1983). State-level studies have found both little effect (Garand
1988; Marquette and Hinckley 1981) or substantial impact (Garand 1985; Garand
1993).
The party control theory attributes government growth to ideological
differences between parties of the left and right. Government control by parties of the
left is hypothesized to lead to public sector growth and control by right-leaning parties
will result in a smaller government Evidence is generally weak that partisan control
of government leads to substantial change in public sector growth, though some
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support is found in state level studies (Garand 1988; 1993). There is some indication
that government size is contingent upon the length of time a party has been in power
(Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993).

Interparty Competition
Many scholars have argued that without sufficient party competition, there is
little impetus for government to expand the level o f benefits beyond that of the status
quo. At the core o f this theory is the assumption that the absence of party competition
suggests a lack of electoral representation for lower income voters. Given the
Downsian median voter model discussed in detail below, heightened competition for
political office translates into efforts by candidates and parties to attract support via
the promise of government benefits.
Perhaps next to Wagner’s Law, the role of interparty competition is the most
durable explanation for government growth. According to Key (1949), when
competition between parties increases, it becomes necessary for one of the parties to
appeal to previously unmobilized voters. The greatest number o f potential voters
comes from the ranks of the poor. Hence, parties seeking to gain votes will promise
the expansion of programs designed to alleviate poverty. The success of a party in
gaining office through mobilization of the poor is hypothesized then to increase the
size of the public sector.
Given the redistributive implications of Key’s theory, the role of interparty
competition on state welfare policy has been studied extensively. In general, these
studies point to increased competition as a positive and significant factor in increased
state welfare spending (Broach 1973; Wright 1975), though there is some evidence
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that controlling for state socioeconomic characteristics lessens the role of interparty
competition (Dawson and Robinson 1963). Fry and Winters (1970) analysis, which
controls for a number o f socioeconomic factors, finds interparty competition to have a
negative effect on state welfare expenditures. Other research suggests the importance
of state wealth (DeLeon 1973; Lockard 1959), state legislative professionalism
(Carmines 1974), and the existence o f a class-based party cleavage (Jennings 1979) as
mediating influences between party competition and higher levels of state welfare
spending. Some scholars argue that the cross-sectional research designs employed in
many o f these studies render the results inconclusive. Using time-series analysis,
interparty competition is found to have little effect on state expenditures on welfare
(Gray 1976; Marquette and Hinckley 1981). In short, cross-sectional designs are
useful in explaining the level of state welfare spending but not the change in the level
o f state welfare spending.
Along with interparty competition, some scholars have suggested that as an
election draws near government spending may increase. If politicians (or parties)
believe increased state spending will increase their likelihood o f reelection, then this
increased spending should be more likely to occur before an election. There is less of
an incentive to push for spending increases when the next election is still distant.
Evidence that government spending increases in response to an upcoming election is
well-documented (see Keech 1980 for a theoretical treatment; Kiewiet and McCubbins
1985; Lindbeck 1976; Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1978). A similar, though opposite,
dynamic holds for the adoption of state tax increases (Berry and Berry 1992; 1994;
Mikesell 1978).
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The election proximity theory of government spending does not maintain that
spending increases are contingent on high levels of interparty competition. However,
the presence of heightened party competition and an upcoming election may increase
pressure to boost expenditures. The effect of the interparty competition and election
year interaction on public sector size has received limited attention in the government
growth literature. Exceptions, however, have either found a tenuous relationship
(Cameron 1978), or none at all (Berry and Lowery 1987; Lowery and Berry 1983;
Rice 1986).

Based on a perusal of the literature, there has not been a test of either the

interparty competition or the competition-election year interaction in state-level
analyses o f government growth.
As the level of interparty competition increases, parties will seek votes from
previously immobilized voters. Since these voters are generally from lower income
groups, candidates may promise programs designed to better the condition of such
voters. The establishment of such programs is expected to drive up state expenditures
and increase the size o f state government. Moreover, the effect of interparty
competition on state government growth may increase prior to an election. Support
for this interaction theory is scant. However, there has been no test of this explanation
for government growth at the state level.

Median Income Voter Model
The median income voter model of government growth is closely related to the
interparty competition model. The fundamental difference is that the role o f parties is
downplayed and the focus is more on median income voter participation. This theory
finds its roots in de Tocqueville’s (183S) notion that government growth is a product
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o f the expansion of the voting franchise and the distribution of wealth. A widening of
the franchise is expected to bring in more lower income voters who will in turn elect
candidates in favor of redistribution of income.
The modem version that emerges from the de Tocquevillian tradition suggests
that the size of the public sector is contingent on the relation of the political unit’s
mean per capita income to the income of the decisive voter (Meltzer and Richard
1978; 1981). Given universal suffrage and the democratic requirement of majority
rule, theorists have shown that the decisive voter is the median income voter
(Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957). It is the median income voter and those that fall
below the median income that constitute the largest potential voting block in a
citizenry. Since income distribution is skewed to the left (or on the right side of the
distribution), the median income voter will have less income than the mean voter. In
other words, the majority of citizens have incomes that fall below the mean. The
median income voter, therefore, will have an income that is less than the mean income
in the state. Thus, as the voting privilege is extended to more citizens that fall below
the mean, given that these citizens exercise their voting rights, the more a government
will grow in size due to demands for redistribution.

What prevents a democracy

from becoming completely redistributive is that if taxes become sufficiently high to
reduce incentives to work then total income is lowered and the benefits derived from
redistribution decline. This changes the ratio of mean to median income voters in
society and renews interest in lowering the tax burden and decreasing the size of the
public sector (Meltzer and Richard 1978).
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Critical to the median income voter theory of government growth is the
assumption that government activity consists primarily in redistributing income.6
Some scholars have gone so far as to assert that redistribution is an integral part of all
government spending (Aranson and Ordeshook 1981). Bridges must go either here or
there. The decision as to who gets the contract implies that some will benefit and
others will not. Moreover, as universal suffrage has become the norm in the United
States and in other countries, there has been a corresponding increase in the transfer
portion o f government budgets (Berry and Lowery 1987; Borcherding 1977b; Mueller
1984; Tiegen 1980). This increase in government redistributive activity is suggestive
of the sort of relationship posited by the median income voter explanation of public
sector growth.
Despite the strong theoretical basis of the median income voter model,
empirical evidence is mixed. The indicator usually used to test the median income
voter model is the level of turnout. Increased turnout, in these studies, implies a
greater participation rate for median income voters. In their analysis of OECD
countries, Mueller and Murrell (1986) find a linkage between higher voter turnout and
increased government spending, as do Husted and Kenny (1997) in their time-series
analysis o f American state government spending from 1950 to 1988. The median
income voter model also receives support at the local level. Inman’s (1978) study
finds median family income voter turnout for local school budget initiatives is related
to corresponding education spending increases. On the other hand, Murrell (1985)
6 In essence, the assertion that government exists to redistribute is equivalent to
arguing that all elections are single-issue affairs. Given this assumption, it is the
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finds that voter turnout does not coincide with higher levels of public employment.
Indirect tests of the median income voter relationship that examine the impact of the
spread of the voting franchise on subsequent increases in the public sector have also
failed to find evidence in support of the theory (Brosio and Marchese 1988; Peltzman
1980).
One problem with all of these studies, with the possible exception of Husted
and Kenny (1997), is that they assume that increased turnout means that a higher
proportion of lower income voters are coming to the polls. This is probably true in
most instances. However, the proportion of lower income voters that vote in a series
of elections is not necessarily in direct proportion to the level of turnout over and
above the “normal” turnout. For example, turnout in two election years could be 55%
and 60% respectively. It is impossible to say whether the difference represents an
actual five percent increased participation rate of lower income voters or some
combination of mobilized “above-median” and median income voters. In short, the
median citizen might not be the same thing as the median income voter. Because of
the difficulty of measuring precisely (or at least more accurately) the participation
rates of the median income voter, assessing the strength o f the median income voter
theory is problematic. Husted and Kenny’s (1997) analysis which did find evidence of
a positive relationship between median income voter participation and government
growth represents the best attempt at measuring median income voter turnout among
the studies reviewed here. Their measure is based on county by county turnout rates
weighted by county family median income and aggregated to the state-level.
median voter that is decisive (see Tridimas 1993 for an extensive theoretical treatment
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The median income voter theory suggests that government growth is a function
of the participation rates of voters with incomes that fall below the mean income of the
state. As turnout rates for median income voters increase, reelection-oriented
politicians will seek their votes through the promise of government benefits. This
theory has generally used overall turnout rates as a proxy for median income voter
participation. This measure of median income voter participation has failed to
uncover the proposed relationship in most studies. Husted and Kenny's (1997) more
precise measure o f median income voter turnout, however, yields strong evidence in
favor of the theory.

Fiscal Constraints Explanation
Growth in the size of state government has not only attracted scholarly
attention, but has also resulted in active efforts within state electorates and legislative
bodies to enact institutional mechanisms designed to restrict the size and growth of
state government. This body of statutory and constitutional restraints includes
restrictions on tax and expenditure increases that are generally in the form of fiscal
caps requiring state expenditures to conform to some proportion of the total state
economic output, tax initiatives, line item veto, and balanced budget requirements.7
Much of the force behind the imposition of these limitations on state
government growth came from the 1978 adoption in California of Proposition 13 (Cox

o f this issue).
7 Virtually all states have balanced budget requirements of one form or another. For
many of these states, the requirement o f a balanced budget is built into the state's
constitution and date from the mid 1800’s. There is, however, considerable variation
in the stringency of each state’s requirements (Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations 1986)
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and Lowery 1990). While Proposition 13 focused on property tax cuts, a number of
other states adopted more general restraints on the ability of state government to both
raise and spend money. Much of this effort occurred between 1978 and 1980, though
five additional states adopted such measures between 1981 and 1987 (Shadbegian
1996). In all, there are 18 states that currently have tax and expenditure limitations in
place.
Since these institutional constraints were designed specifically to curb state
government growth, it is surprising that the majority of empirical evidence has failed
to find any relationship between such limitations and the size of the state public sector
(Bails 1990; Cox and Lowery 1990; Eribes and Hall 1981; Howard 1989; Joyce and
Mullins 1991; Kenyon and Benker 1984). Others argue that the focus on state
expenditures is misplaced and that states with limitation measures have experienced a
decline in state revenue (Elder 1992). Moreover, direct participation in state fiscal
matters through use of the voter initiative has been found to lead to less state spending
(Matsusaka 199S). Evident from much of the literature on tax and expenditure
limitations is the absence of a number o f important political and socioeconomic
factors that play a role in the growth of state government.
Several explanations have been offered as to why these fiscal constraints are
unable to effectively restrain state government spending. First, fiscal caps generally
constrain government expenditures to some percentage of the total state economy.
Therefore, the use of fiscal caps does not require a state to decrease spending and
states with at least modest income growth continue to experience government growth
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(Shadbegian 1996).8 However, the presence of fiscal caps does prevent states from
increasing the size of government in comparison to states without such limitations.
Second, in the case of line item veto authority there is evidence to suggest that the
propensity o f a governor to use the power of the item veto is often contingent on
favorable political incentives (Holtz-Eakin 1988). A third explanation argues that
because of the endogenous character of the decision to impose tax and expenditure
limitations in response to “fiscally irresponsible politicians,’' the resulting legislation
will be crafted to “minimize the real world impact of these limitations” (Bails 1982,
129). Suggestive of this dynamic is Garand and Kapeluck’s (2000) analysis of state
budget deficits. They find that tax and expenditure limitations are positively and
significantly related to state budget surpluses when government is under divided
control. This finding suggests that such limitations may only work when there is some
degree o f oversight by partisan opposition. Fourth, state government often
circumvents tax and expenditure limitations through revenue diversification schemes
such as increased user fees and increased tax complexity (Sharp and Elkins 1987) as
well as an increased reliance on debt financing (von Hagen 1991). Finally,
individual-level analysis of Michigan voters on their reasons for voting either for or
against a number of tax limitation proposals suggests that the primary motive for their
support was a desire to exercise control over government as opposed to any effort to
reduce the size o f the public sector (Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld 1980).
In order to curb government growth, voters in many states have approved
constitutional and statutory constraints on spending. With the possible exception of
8 Since government growth in this analysis is operationalized as the ratio o f state
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the voter initiative, these fiscal constraint mechanisms have failed to achieve the
desired effect. The vast majority of studies fail to find a negative relationship between
such constraints and the size of the state public sector. Scholars have argued that these
limitations on state spending are often ineffective because they are generally passed in
states with a history of fiscal irresponsibility. Politicians can bypass revenue
constraints through debt financing or manipulation o f the tax code.

Political Needs Explanation
Meriting some attention in the government growth literature is the role of
certain government service-dependent subgroups within the population that require
additional public sector spending. Government growth is hypothesized to be partly a
function of the number o f people that fall into the high-demand category.

Two such

groups in this category are school-age children and the elderly. A higher proportion of
school-age children in a state places greater demand on education-related
expenditures. Likewise, health-related demands of citizens over 65 are expected to
translate into greater state assistance. Empirical evidence generally confirms the role
o f age distribution as a positive factor in government growth. This has been found in
international studies (Karavitis 1987; Rice 1986; Swank 1988), studies of United
States’ government growth (Berry and Lowery 1984; 1987; Lewis-Beck and Rice
1985), and in state-level public sector growth models (Dye and MacManus 1990;
Ehrenberg 1973). Garand’s (1993) state-level analysis reveals a strong positive effect
for the proportion of under eighteen residents; however, a state’s elderly ratio led to a
decline in state expenditures. Garand and Kapeluck’s (2000) analysis o f state budget
public sector spending to total state income, similar findings may be obtained here.
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surpluses and deficits reveals that states with comparatively larger young and elderly
populations experience smaller surpluses than similarly-situated states.
In addition to age-related political need variables, economic-based factors are
posited to contribute to the demands placed on government. In periods o f relative
economic hardship, more individuals may require governmental assistance than during
periods of robust economic performance. High levels of unemployment and inflation,
as well as weakening state economic performance have been positively related to
public sector expansion in a variety of governmental contexts (Garand 1993; LewisBeck and Rice 1985; Rice 1986). In a similar vein, members of minority groups may
be particularly susceptible to economic hard times. There is some evidence that the
proportion of blacks in a state population increases demand for government services
(Garand 1993). Analysis of budget deficits and surpluses in the states also indicates
that states with relatively large black populations have significantly lower budget
surpluses than other, similarly-situated states (Garand and Kapeluck 2000).
In short, empirical evidence for the political needs explanation of government
growth is strong. Economic variables such as inflation, unemployment and changes in
a state’s economic performance have all been found to exert a positive influence on
state government growth. Support for the economic aspect of the political needs
government growth theory is evident at the international, national, and state levels.
The demographic component of this theory has received limited attention. That which
has been done indicates some evidence that certain state population characteristics
have a generally positive impact on government growth.
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Political Culture Explanation
An additional explanation that has received very little empirical testing in the
government growth literature is the role of a state’s political culture (but see Garand
1993).

It is reasonable to expect that a state with a well-developed liberal tradition

may be less reticent in employing the powers of government to pursue policies that
result in an increase in the overall scope and size of the public sector. In contrast, a
state comprised of relatively conservative citizens will be reluctant to expand the size
o f government.
The relevance of political culture was identified in early empirical work on the
effect of state political systems on public policy (Hofferbert 1968; Sharkansky and
Hofferbert 1969; see also Wildavsky 1985 for a theoretical treatment of political
culture and expenditure growth). Later work that employed more sophisticated
measurement techniques to identify state political culture has demonstrated that states
with more liberal political cultures tend to adopt more liberal public policies (Erikson,
Wright, and Mclver 1989; 1993).

Evidence that a state’s political culture is

instrumental in the growth of its public sector is strong though limited to only one
analysis. Garand (1993) finds state policy liberalism to be positively and significantly
related to state government size.
The political culture explanation of state government growth has received little
attention in the literature. However, given the importance of public opinion on state
legislative output, it seems likely that a state with a more liberal population should be
more likely to embrace a larger, more active government versus a state with a
relatively more conservative citizenry. The one study that has employed a measure of
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a state’s liberalism indicates a positive relationship between the liberalism o f a state’s
policy output and the size of state government.

Excessive Models o f State Government Growth
Excessive models of government growth suggest that government institutions
do not faithfully reflect the wishes and demands of the citizens. Rather, the
institutions of government work to expand its share of the economy beyond that which
is desired by the citizens. The six theories discussed below can be characterized as
excessive explanations of state government growth.

Fiscal Illusion
Fiscal illusion refers to a theory of government growth in which taxpayers
systematically underestimate the amount they are paying in taxes.

Politicians, it is

argued, create an illusionary revenue structure through indirect revenue raising
techniques (Buchanan and Wagner 1977; Downs 1960; Wilensky 1975). The result is
that citizens demand more government than they would if they could accurately assess
the attendant costs.
O f course, the question naturally arises as to why taxpayers underestimate their
tax payments rather than overestimate them. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that
as revenue systems rely on an increasing array of tax instruments (e.g. withholding
taxes, sales tax, corporate tax) this complexity weakens taxpayer perceptions of the
true tax cost. This not only results in error on the part of taxpayer, but it is also
illusionary because the perceptual bias is weighted in one direction—underestimation
of tax burden. This hypothesis rests upon a psychological model of information
processing that suggests “that the degree to which any message is understood varies
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directly with the strength of the particular signal to be received and inversely with the
noise present at the time the signal is transmitted'’ (Buchanan and Wagner 1977, 131).
Relating information process theory to revenue structure, Buchanan and Wagner argue
that indirect taxing has a less profound impact on taxpayer cost perception than does a
simple direct tax. For instance, taxpayer cost perceptions should be more accurate if
they are directly billed for their taxes than if the taxes are withheld before the taxpayer
receives his paycheck.
Despite empirical evidence that taxpayers do underestimate the amount of tax
paid (Buchanan 1967; Goetz 1977; Stubblebine 1963), scholars have questioned the
logic of the fiscal illusion hypothesis. First, fiscal illusion requires an active
manipulation on the part o f reelection-oriented politicians, who through indirect
taxation seek to avoid conflicts between “what citizens want and what they pay”
(Meltsner 1971). Such manipulation can be thwarted by both the incremental nature o f
income tax policy (Witte 1982) and social and economic factors that influence tax
policy decision-making (Bingham, Hawkins, and Herbert 1978). Second, others
(Hansen 1983) have argued that the considerable degree of tax ignorance among
taxpayers suggests that “specific tax structures have little additional impact on
miscalculations of tax burdens” (Lowery and Berry 1987,43). Finally, the theory
suggests that taxpayers demand greater government expenditures yet fail to see (or
downplay) the link with an increased tax burden (Berry and Lowery 1987).9
Perhaps the most contentious issue in the fiscal illusion literature concerns just
what tax instruments are illusionary and which ones are highly visible (Buchanan
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1967). Lowery (1987, 7) writes that “the fiscal illusion construct is difficult to
evaluate given the lack of any agreement on precisely what revenue mechanisms are
illusionary.. .[Virtually every type of revenue mechanism and many major
characteristics of the tax system as a whole have been identified as illusionary.’'
Nevertheless, fiscal illusion remains an integral component in many studies of
government growth (Berry and Lowery 1984a; 1987; Garand 1988a; 1993; Goetz
1977; Lowery and Berry 1983; Pommerehne and Schneider 1978).
Four characteristics in particular have been cited as having illusory effects.
First, withholding provisions, in which taxes are deducted from a taxpayer’s wages,
are seen as altering taxpayer assessments as to their total tax burden. Since the citizen
never sees the money, it is comparatively easier to discount the impact of these taxes
on their take-home pay than it would be if they were presented with a weekly bill.
Indeed, research indicates that citizens are unable to estimate accurately their income
tax payments, the majority of which are collected through withholding mechanisms
(Enrick 1964; Farber 1954; Wagstaff 1965). A second source of fiscal illusion is the
indirect tax. The corporate tax is an ofi-cited example; taxes levied on corporations
translate into higher costs for goods and services. Because it is difficult, if not
infeasible, for the citizen to calculate the tax-related portion of the price the impact of
the corporate tax is effectively concealed (Cameron 1978; Goetz 1977; Wildavsky
1975). A third way for government to obscure the true cost of public sector goods and
services is through deficit financing (Buchanan 1967; Buchanan and Wagner 1977;
Niskanen 1978; Vickrey 1961). When government expenditures are financed through
9 This criticism, however, ignore the real possibility that those demanding greater
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debt, fiscal illusion can result since (1) the costs of borrowing money to finance the
deficit are postponed, and (2) taxpayers are likely to discount the costs o f future taxes
as opposed to current taxes. Lastly, the complexity of a revenue system can lead to
inaccurate and illusionary perceptions of the cost of government (Craig and Heins
1980). Wagner (1976: 51) provides an insightful (if not inciting) illustration of such a
complex revenue system:
But let a government levy simultaneously a sales tax with various
exemptions, a variety of excise taxes, some perhaps collected at the
wholesale level, sundry license fees bearing little or no relation to
services rendered, and a tax on the profits of business corporations.
The formation of an accurate perception regarding the price of public
output would be vastly more difficult under this more complex revenue
structure.
Wagner’s (1976) empirical analysis revealed a strong impact for tax
complexity on municipal expenditures, though a subsequent reanalysis, controlling for
heteroscedasticity, failed to find a significant effect for the same variable (Munley and
Greene 1978). Coneybeare’s (1978) analysis o f 100 countries finds that the more
diverse a country’s tax base the higher the tax revenue. Lybeck’s pooled crosssectional time-series (1986) reveals an impact for fiscal illusion, though Cameron’s
(1978) cross-national study suggests that a reliance on “hidden” taxes led to a decline
in public sector expansion. In his analysis of Greek public sector growth, Karavitis
(1987) finds the ratio of indirect taxes to total tax revenues has a positive effect on
government revenue. Evidence of United States government growth as a function of
fiscal illusion, however, is less clear. O f the four indicators discussed above, only the
tax complexity variable was found significant and in the expected positive direction
government expenditure are not the ones paying the taxes.
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(Berry and Lowery 1987).10 On the other hand, the share o f government revenues
collected through withholding is found to have a negative effect on public sector size
(Berry and Lowery 1984; Berry and Lowery 1987; Lowery and Berry 1983).
Government size is also unaffected by deficit spending levels (Berry and Lowery
1987). It should be noted that the three studies by Berry and Lowery aggregated
national, state, and local government spending, therefore their conclusions are subject
to the caveats discussed in the preceding chapter.
Empirical evidence for the role of fiscal illusion in state-level government
growth studies remains inconclusive. Garand finds the most support for the effect of
withholding taxes (1988). His time series analysis suggests that 48% of the states
have experienced growth in their public sectors due to this component of fiscal
illusion. More modest evidence is found for the complexity of state revenue
structures. A later analysis, utilizing a pooled cross-sectional time series research
design, however, reveals little support for the revenue system complexity explanation
of government growth and an inverse effect for the ratio of personal income tax
receipts to total state revenue (Garand 1993). On the other hand, Dye and
MacManus’s (1990) pooled cross-sectional analysis of state government growth
indicates a positive impact for the same ratio, though the coefficient falls just short of
significance at the .05 level.
10 To the author’s knowledge, there has been no test for the effect o f indirect taxes on
United States’ government growth. Such a measure is used in state-level analyses
(Garand 1988; 1993) and is operationalized as proportion o f state government
revenues collected through corporate income taxes. Given that it is unlikely that a
corporation’s sole customer base resides in the taxing state, the lack o f significance for
this variable should not be taken as evidence against fiscal illusion as a source of
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From this discussion, it is evident that citizens are relatively unaware of their
full tax burden. This disconnect between what citizens think they pay and what they
actually pay constitutes fiscal illusion. Despite the identification of an illusionary
aspect to taxes, it is difficult to determine which taxes are the most illusory. Indeed,
the majority o f taxes have some illusionary component. Nevertheless, four such
revenue mechanisms have received varying degrees of support in the literature. First,
indirect taxes, such as that levied on corporations, are merely passed on to consumers.
Since corporations solicit business outside of state borders, determining the effect of
such taxes on state government growth rates is problematic for this analysis (see
49nl4). Deficit financing and the proportion of tax deducted from a citizen's wages
have both been related to increases in government size. Finally, the degree to which a
government’s revenue sources become more complex (or diversified) has been found
to have a positive relationship with government size.

The Bureau Voting Model
One strand of research on government growth has focused on bureaucratic
behavior. Couched in a rational-choice framework, this explanation attributes
increased public sector size to the self-interested behavior of bureaucrats (Downs
1967). This theory is built largely on Niskanen’s (1971) work on bureau behavior, in
which the bureaucracy has an effective monopoly on the information required for
budgetary decision-making. The bureaucracy is assumed to have an interest in
maximizing their budget. The combination of an information monopoly and the

government growth. Rather, this aspect of the theory should be incorporated in
national level studies.
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dominant goal o f budget-maximization suggests that government spending will exceed
that which could be produced in the market-driven private sector. For instance,
Niskanen’s analysis suggests that whereas a comparable private sector firm will
produce the optimal level of output, the budget-maximizing bureau will supply an
output that is precisely double the optimal amount of output (1971, 175).
Niskanen’s theory o f bureaucratic behavior has come under some criticism.
Bureaucrats may have other interests besides pure budget maximization. For example,
bureaucrats may prefer sufficient discretionary funds, or “slack resources”, over and
above or in conjunction with a larger budget (Migue and Belanger 1974). Reductions
in agency budgets may lead to promotions (Breton and Wintrobe 1975). Bureaucrats
also may face constraints on budget-maximization from executive branch politicians
(Kamlet and Mowery 1983). A third criticism suggests that the congressional
committee that oversees the particular agency is in a superior bargaining position
(Thompson 1973). Bureaucrats failing to produce output at the committee’s preferred
price can be replaced. Thus, budget maximization is dependent on the bureaucrat’s
skill at “misrepresenting the actual expected costs and outputs” (Amadar et al. 1975)
so that legislative committees choose the agency’s preferred budget and production
level. In light of this criticism, attention has focused on congressional oversight
procedures and the role o f high-demand committees as essential determinants of
public sector growth (Miller and Moe 1983).
Finally, evidence that bureaucrats maximize their budgets through their control
of information has proven difficult to test As Borcherding notes, “testing this requires
a competitive budget benchmark and a direct test has so far eluded empiricists in the
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field” (1985, 373).11 Scholars instead have tested the hypothesis indirectly by
examining the elasticity of the demand for public services. If a bureaucracy’s
information monopoly permits it to claim greater demand for government goods and
services than currently provided, then increased costs should bear no relationship to a
decline in agency output. In economic terms, demand for public goods and services
should be inelastic. The majority of empirical tests of this implication have found this
not to be the case (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Borcherding and Deacon 1972;
McGuire 1981; Mushkin 1972; though see Ott 1980 for confirmatory evidence).
Lybeck (1986), on the other hand, makes the sweeping assertion that the
relationship between government employees and government expenditures can never
be disentangled. Because the value of public output is not determined by marketdriven factors, as are private sector goods and services, the value of the output is
indistinguishable from the cost of the inputs. In the context of the bureau behavior
theory as envisioned by Lybeck, increased public sector expenditures are more or less
equivalent to increases in public sector employment. Thus Lybeck (1986, 84) argues
that “when regressing the change in the public sector share o f production on the
change in public employment, one basically has the same variable on both sides.”
Lybeck, however, fails to consider the extent to which government expenditures are
devoted to non-labor purposes. For instance, a rise in welfare payments does not
require additional government workers. Additionally, an increase in government
expenditures may be due to a raise in government wages with no corresponding
increase in public sector personnel.
11 Niskanen also concedes that “no available study, to my knowledge, directly
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Given what seem to be the insurmountable difficulties of testing Niskanen’s
original theory, attention has turned to the role of the self-interested bureaucrat as
voter. Tullock (1972) argues that the growth in public expenditures is a consequence
o f the increase in the ratio of public to private sector employees. It is that proposition
that has garnered the most attention in the government growth literature. Tullock’s
explanation assumes that government employees are self-interested actors who desire
increases in the size of the public sector for their own well-being (Garand, Parkhurst,
and Seoud 1991; Sears and Citrin 1982). The bureau-voting model makes three
specific assumptions:
1. Public employees hold political attitudes that are more supportive of government
spending than those held by other citizens.
2. Bureaucrats are more likely to vote than other citizens.
3. The voting behavior of bureaucrats is significantly different. They are more
supportive o f candidates advocating increased government spending than are other
citizens.
These assumptions find considerable support in a number o f individual-level
studies. Woifinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) study of voter participation finds that 83%
of government workers voted in the 1972 general election versus only 65% of non
governmental workers. Frey and Pommerehne’s (1982) analysis reveals that state
government workers have 13% higher turnout than private sector workers sharing
similar characteristics. A study o f Michigan public school teachers reveals a stronger
preference for increased school spending than non-teachers (Rubinfeld 1977). Using
survey results from the American National Election Study series for 1982,1984, and
1986, Garand et al.’s (1991) study indicates that government workers are 1) more
liberal than their private-sector counterparts, 2) much more likely to vote than other
addresses the oversupply hypothesis” (1975, 624).
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citizens, and 3) support Democratic candidates at a higher rate than non-public sector
employees. Similar results are found in cross-national studies as well (Blake 1991;
Blais, Blake, and Dion 1991). This self-interested behavior is also revealed in Sears
and Citrin’s (1982) study of support for California’s Proposition 13, a 1978 anti-tax
initiative. State government workers were much less likely to support the initiative
than other similarly situated citizens, presumably because public workers sensed the
spending cuts that would follow the passage of Proposition 13 were incompatible with
their self-interest.
Despite consistent evidence of self-interested bureaucratic behavior at the
individual-level, aggregate-level research uncovers mixed support. Nonetheless, the
bureau voting explanation receives more confirmation than many of the other theories
tested in the literature. On the one hand, research by Lowery and Berry (Berry and
Lowery 1984; Berry and Lowery 1987; Lowery and Berry 1983) suggests that the
ratio of public to private sector workers is negatively related to the size of the United
States government. On the other hand, Ferris and West (1995) find public
employment to exercise a positive influence on United States government growth.
Garand (1988) finds considerable support for the bureau voting explanation at the state
level. In 36 of the 50 states, the proportion of state government workers is a positive
and significant factor in his model o f public sector growth. Later research by Garand
(1993) confirms this finding. Dye and MacManus (1990) report similar results in their
analysis of state public sector growth.
As noted in the text, Niskanen’s (1971) original theory of bureaucratic
behavior, positing government growth as a function of a bureau information monopoly
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has metamorphosed into a theory which attributes increases in the public sector to selfinterested voting behavior on the part of the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats, the theory
argues, see an advantage in growing the size of government. Thus, they tend to vote
for candidates that promise increased spending. There is strong evidence that not
only are bureaucrats more supportive of government spending and vote accordingly,
they also turn out to vote at higher rates than their public sector counterparts. Thus,
the core hypothesis of the bureau-voting explanation is that a higher proportion of
government employees in a state will lead to an increase in the size o f the public
sector. Empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is strong, particularly at the
state-level.

The Intergovernmental Grant Explanation
The intergovernmental grant explanation attributes government growth in the
American states to increased levels of federal aid. This may seem like an obvious
consequence—additional fiscal resources should result in a growth o f state
government if growth is measured as state government expenditures as a proportion of
total state income. Fundamental to this interpretation of the role of intergovernmental
grants is the notion that such grants are merely added to internal state fiscal resources
so that an additional federal dollar translates into a corresponding one dollar increase
in state expenditures.
If intergovernmental grants lead to increased state expenditures without a
concomitant increase in state-derived revenue, then it can be concluded that they
perform a replacement function. Federal money takes the place of state funding, with
the savings passed on to the state taxpayer. However, there is considerable debate as
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to whether these grants substitute for state revenue or actually serve to stimulate state
spending. O f course, it is possible that intergovernmental grants do both
simultaneously. The question then becomes to what degree do intergovernmental
grants increase state expenditures over and above the dollar amount of the original
grant.
There is considerable empirical evidence that intergovernmental grants result
in state spending that is higher than what it would have been otherwise (Gramlich
1969; Gramlich 1977; Gramlich and Galper 1973; Kumow 1963; Sacks and Harris
1964; Wilde 1968). This phenomenon has been labeled the “flypaper effect” because
federal money “sticks” with the recipient government rather than resulting in lower
taxes (or a decreased state revenue burden). This effect is not only found in
conditional or matching federal grants, both of which require an investment horn the
grant-recipient government, but also from non-matching grants such as general
revenue sharing and unconditional grants-in-aid. On the other hand, there are a
number of studies that find that intergovernmental grants play more of a replacement
or substitutive role (Borcherding 1977a; Dye and MacManus 1990; Horowitz 1968;
Garand 1988; O’Brien 1971). The coefficient for the intergovernmental grant variable
in these analyses is less than one, which indicates a less than one-to-one
correspondence between federal aid and state spending. Thus, while grants increase
the size of the state public sector, they tend to do so with little increased burden on
state taxpayers.
In sum, intergovernmental grants can have three effects on state government
growth. The influx of federal aid can substitute for state-derived revenue. If this is
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the case, there is no effect of federal grants on government growth. State government
size is unchanged. While state spending does increase, the cost o f such spending is not
borne by the state citizens. On the other hand, intergovernmental grants can stimulate
state spending. For instance, many federal grants require state matching funds or
come with strings attached (conditional grants). This form of intergovernmental aid
serves to stimulate state spending. Finally, the third possible effect of
intergovernmental grants on state government size is that federal aid can both
substitute for state revenue and result in some increased expenditure. Overall, there is
strong empirical evidence that intergovernmental grants result both in a replacement of
state-derived funds and serve as a stimulant for greater state spending.

The Constituency Size Explanation
The constituency size explanation is among one of the more recent
explanations for why government expenditures increase over time. This theory
suggests that the number of constituents per legislator is positively related to
government growth. At the core o f this explanation is the proposition that public bills
become more “expensive” to produce as the number of constituents per legislator
declines. Furthermore, as the production of legislation declines, so will the size of
government. Thornton and Ulrich (1999) undergird their constituency size theory with
three premises. First, the cost of monitoring a representative increases the greater the
number of constituents per legislator. The citizen is less likely to know their
representative or have direct knowledge o f their voting record. Second, as a district
becomes larger there is a greater degree of heterogeneity among the constituents.
District heterogeneity not only makes it difficult for the representative to achieve a
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clear signal from his constituents (Ardoin and Garand 2000), but also makes trading
votes with other representatives less costly. A district with diverse interests is less
likely to present a legislator with a clear majority in favor of a particular bill, thus the
potential for electoral retribution poses less of a threat. Third, smaller constituency
size implies a larger legislature. The larger the legislature the less influential the
individual representative, a result that McCormick and Tollison (1981,33) term the
“small-fish-in-the-pond effect.” Based on these premises, Thornton and Ulrich
(1999) suggest that the cost of a vote to organized interest groups will decline in a
large legislature. However, there will be an increase in cost as well because more
votes must be purchased. Moreover, since larger legislatures will experience greater
turnover than smaller legislatures, this will also increase the price of producing
legislation. And increased legislative costs leads to diminished production.
In short, Thornton and Ulrich (1999, 592) argue that, “smaller constituency
size ... acts as a check on the expansion of government because it makes public bills
more difficult to pass and forces legislators to better represent the interests of their
constituents.” The critical assumption is that citizens will desire less government
spending than elected officials themselves. Two recent studies suggest this
assumption may be warranted. Peltzman’s (1992) analysis indicates that citizens tend
to be more fiscally conservative than their representatives. Other research indicates
that in states with the initiative process, which requires more active participation from
the citizens on fiscal matters, taxes and spending levels are lower (Matsusaka 1995).
Support for the constituency size theory is strong. First, Gilligan and
Matsusaka (1995) find that state expenditure is positively and significantly related to
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the number of seats in the legislature. More direct evidence is found by Thornton and
Ulrich (1999), who measure constituency size as the ratio of constituent population to
legislator. The constituency size in both a state’s House and Senate positively and
significantly impact state government per capita spending. This effect is considerably
stronger for the Senate versus the House; an additional representative results in a
spending reduction of 5.5 million dollars and an additional senator leads to a reduction
o f 40.5 million dollars (Thornton and Ulrich 1999, 597nl5).
In sum, the constituency size theory of state government growth suggests that a
decline in the ratio of senators and house members to constituents is positively related
to public sector size. This explanation is a combination of principal-agent theory and
transaction cost theory. Principal-agent theory suggests that the agent, or legislator, is
subject to less monitoring as the number of principals, or constituents, increase. First,
the cost of monitoring is hypothesized to increase as constituents become more
numerous. Second, legislator perceptions o f the policy preferences o f his or her
constituents declines as additional constituents are added to the district. This lack of
consensus leads to diminished accountability and, it is argued, diminished
accountability enables trading votes with other legislators less costly. Transaction
costs theory, on the other hand, suggests that the cost of producing legislation should
decline as the price of an individual’s vote decreases. The argument is that a smaller
constituency size is related to a larger legislature. A larger legislature suggests
increased costs for interest groups due to the greater number o f votes that must be
“bought”. In addition, the higher turnover rate in a larger legislature should make the
cost to interest groups of “purchasing” votes over time will also increase. And at low
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costs, constituents may be better able to compete with the incentives offered by
interest groups.
There is strong evidence that smaller constituency size is related to a smaller
state public sector. However, this evidence is confined to only one study.

Divided Government
Divided government may also be a factor in state public sector growth. The
hypothesis advanced here is that the conflicting policy aims of a divided state
government delegation lead to increased spending as a result o f political compromise.
The conventional wisdom has held that divided government causes gridlock and
prevents government action (Cutler 1988; Ginsberg and Shefter 1990; Sundquist
1988). However, empirical analysis has failed to link divided government with
diminished legislative output. Mayhew’s (1991) landmark analysis of the effect of
divided or unified control of the federal government on the production of important
legislation reveals no significant differences (though see Kelly 1993). Whether
government is divided or unified seems to make no difference in such diverse political
decision-making areas as treaties (King and Ragsdale 1988), Senate Supreme Court
Justice confirmations (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990; Lemieux and Stewart 1990),
and presidential nominations to executive office (Fiorina 1996).
Briefly stated, the notion that divided government stands in the way of an
activist government is far from certain. The important question for this analysis is
whether the presence of divided government leads to greater government expenditures.
This question has been tested empirically by McCubbins (1991). He argues that
parties in an environment o f divided government control seek compromise to avoid
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policy gridlock. In order to assure increased expenditures on one party's favored
program, the party will agree to increase spending on the other’s preferred program.
This budgetary outcome, in turn, leads to an overall increase in total government
expenditures in times of divided government. Examining divided control o f the
United States House and Senate from 1948 to 1985, McCubbins finds the presence of
split control positively related to congressional appropriations levels.
The evidence that divided control leads to increased spending has led others to
examine the relationship between split control and deficits. While McCubbins (1991)
in the same study finds a significant increase in deficit spending under conditions of a
divided United States legislative branch, divided control of the executive and
legislative branches does not exhibit a similar dynamic. Alt and Stewart (1990) also
find no relationship between divided control and unbalanced budgets at the national
level. Evidence at the state-level is also lacking that divided party control leads to a
significant difference in deficits or debt accumulation. Clingermayer and Wood
(1995) report that the only divided government variable that has an impact suggests
that a Democratic governor with a Republican legislature actually leads to less debt,
and not more debt as the gridlock theory predicts. A recent analysis by Garand and
Kapeluck (2000) also indicates little effect of divided government on state budget
deficits and surpluses. Indeed, divided control of state government actually results in
modestly higher surpluses than states under unified control. Alt and Lowry’s (1994)
study of state budgets from 1968 to 1987 reveals no significant differences between
state governments with either unified or split-branch control in their ability to react to
budget shortfalls (or revenue shocks). However, they do identify disparities between
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the level of spending “preferred” by different party configurations in state
government. State government under complete Democratic control prefers a higher
percentage of per capita income for public spending. The second highest share
belongs to the split legislature configuration, followed closely by the split branch
configuration. The lowest “target” share belongs to a unified Republican
configuration.
One possible reason that divided government has failed to lead to deficit
spending at the state level is due to the prevalence of state balanced budget
requirements. Many o f these were put into effect in the early to mid- 1800s (Heins
1963). Balanced budget requirements, long a source of debate at the national level,
have been instituted in all states, save Vermont. There is, however, significant
variation in the stringency of the provisions. According to the National Association of
State Budget Officers (1992), balanced budget requirements in the 49 states fit into
roughly three classifications. The weakest provision requires that the governor submit
a balanced budget. More stringent is the requirement that balanced budgets must be
passed by the legislature. The strictest provision requires that not only must the budget
be balanced, but also that no deficit is permitted to be carried over into subsequent
years. Categorizing states by the stringency of their balanced budget requirements,
Alt and Lowry (1994) find that states with more restrictive requirements are less likely
to incur ongoing deficits. This finding is also supported by Poterba’s (1994) analysis
of state divided government reaction to revenue shocks.
Two conclusions emerge from the preceding discussion. First, there is a lack
of evidence that divided government at the state level is related to deficit spending.
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This may be due to balanced budget requirements. Second, national-level studies have
linked split control with increased government expenditures. There remains,
however, an option for divided state government under pressure to increase
expenditures for their preferred programs. Spending can increase without running a
deficit if state revenue is increased. One obstacle to minority governors seeking to
pass budgets that will require greater state revenue is assembling a majority of
legislators willing to support such bills. Overcoming this impediment should be partly
a function o f the percent of votes required to pass tax increases. Thus, the presence of
supermajority requirements for passage of tax bills should make achieving
compromise more difficult in a government under split control. It should be
comparatively easier for governors to marshal support for and pass a budget that
requires state revenue increases if they need the support of 50% plus one instead of
two-thirds of the legislatures in both houses. As of 1992, 11 states have supermajority
voting requirements for tax increases.12 Arkansas was the first state (1934) with
supermajority requirements, though they have become steadily more popular (Tolbert
1998).
Thus, the tentative hypothesis offered in this analysis is that prolonged divided
control of state government will lead to growth in the size of the public sector.
Divided government leads to conflicts over the prioritization of spending in different
policy areas and programs. Minimization o f this conflict is achieved through a
compromise resulting in spending increases in programs favored by both opposing
parties-in-govemment. Given the virtual omnipresence of balanced budget
12 These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
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requirements in the states, the degree to which divided state governments are
successful at raising expenditure levels is dependent on the number o f legislators
required to pass a tax increase.

Unfunded Mandates
One final explanation of government growth concerns the role of unfunded
mandates on state government growth. The United States’ federal system has gone
through at least four permutations since the nation’s founding (Inman and Rubinfeld
1997).13 Until the War Between the States, federalism could be characterized as a
system of “dual sovereignty” in which both the national and state governments had
separate responsibilities. Dual sovereignty gave way to "centralizing federalism” that
ushered in an increased, yet still moderate, role for the federal government.
Depression Era policies designed to mitigate the economic hardships faced by many
led to increased federal government influence. Finally, in the mid 1960’s the federal
government turned its attention to issues of civil rights. Beginning with the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the federal government has
taken a more active and coercive role in shaping and prioritizing state-level policy
goals (Scheiber 1969). Passage of civil rights bills was followed by President
Johnson’s series of Great Society programs that directed national government
attention to alleviating conditions o f poverty and inequality in the states. Though
much o f this federal activity was financed through grants-in-aid, there were also a
number o f regulations passed at the federal level that imposed significant costs on
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington.
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state government. The lack o f federal funding for the implementation of these new
regulations gave rise to the term “unfunded mandate.” More recent examples of
unfunded mandates include welfare reform enacted in 1988, the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Brady Bill
o f 1993. The proliferation of unfunded mandates inspired a number of state and local
officials to call for a “National Unfunded Mandates Day” in October o f 1993.
Recognition o f the problem has also prompted national legislation prohibiting the
passage of regulatory laws that impose costs on state and local government without
compensation, though the legislation applies only to future laws.
This explanation of state government growth, it could be argued, belongs in the
responsive category. Citizens are represented at both the federal and state level, hence
federal legislation requiring greater state expenditures is legitimate because people are
promulgating their policy goals in their capacity as federal citizens. However, some
theorists have argued that the interplay o f federalism and legislative incentives
undermines the voter’s ability to reign in government growth. Paul Peterson (1995)
has suggested that the increase in unfunded mandates is linked to the declining
importance of the parties. In an era of dealignment, members of congress have come
under increased electoral pressure. When voters are less concerned about a
candidate’s party affiliation and more concerned about what the legislator has done for
the district, there is a heightened incentive for members o f congress to be responsive
to their constituents. This increased responsiveness has led to more pork barrel
projects and growth in government expenditure. While the modem congressman is
13 Some argue that there have been five phases of federalism in the United States, with
66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

willing to be identified with bringing federal projects and programs into the district, he
or she is reluctant to pass the tax increase required to fund such expenditures.
Moreover, the relative lack o f party discipline prevents the individual member of
congress from being held accountable.

The combination of these factors has led

members o f congress to pass the redistributive burdens on to state and local
governments. In this way, they are credited for providing goods and services to their
constituents but escape blame for the increased taxes required to finance such activity.
It is argued here that since the mid 1960s unfunded federal mandates have
positively impacted the size of state government. As Peterson (1995) suggests, the
increase in unfunded mandates may be a function o f the declining importance of party
affiliation in congress. Legislators want to be identified with bringing federal projects
and programs to their district but are unwilling to raise the taxes required to finance
such endeavors. Because the federal government lacks the resources necessary to fund
many of these expenditures, it simply passes the revenue burden on to state
governments. The consequence is an overall increase in the size of state government

Summary
The preceding review of the government growth literature highlights thirteen
distinct models that explain increases in the size of the public sector. These models
can be classified broadly as either excessive or responsive explanations for
government growth (Buchanan 1977; Lowery and Berry 1983). This classification
relies on a particular model’s assumptions regarding the role of choice in the
institution that is hypothesized to result in a larger public sector. The following
the latest period o f “new federalism” beginning under President Reagan.
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section summarizes the essential facets of the thirteen models by placing them either
in the excessive or responsive category o f government growth. Not included in these
categories is the effect o f the different public and private price deflators. This
government growth explanation is theoretically difficult to classify as either
responsive or excessive. An explanation for government growth that represents an
unavoidable economic dynamic that is due to a market economy is in a class by itself.

Responsive Explanations
Responsive government growth explanations assume that any increase in the
size of the public sector is a reflection of the underlying wants or demands of the
population. The institutions of government through which decisions affecting the size
o f government are made are neutral in regard to whether the choice is to expand or
reduce the public sector. Seven of the models tested in this analysis may be
considered responsive explanations of government growth: Wagner’s Law, party
control, interparty competition, median income voter, tax and expenditure limitations,
political needs, and political culture. Wagner’s Law claims that externalities resulting
from industrialization require an increased role for the public sector. The party control
theory makes the argument that left-leaning parties are more likely to turn to publicsector solutions to societal problems. Parties looking for votes may also promise and
deliver government benefits in the face of increased party competition. The likelihood
o f increased government redistribution, so argues the median income voter theory, is
greater the more disparity there is between the mean income and the median income
among voters. The combination of the practically universal right o f suffrage and the
voting power o f the median income voter suggests that government redistribution will
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occur as the median-mean voter income ratio declines. The political needs
explanation points to government service-dependent groups within a population and
economic downturns as factors driving increases in the size of the public sector. The
political culture of a state may also lead to different attitudes regarding the role of
government. More liberal state political cultures should be more accepting of a large
public sector. Finally, tax and expenditure limitations passed by state government
represent a desire by a state’s citizens to stem the growth of the public sector.

Excessive Explanations
Excessive explanations of government growth interpret increases in the public
sector as a consequence of institutions that expand the size of government beyond that
desired by the public.

There are six explanations tested herein that fall in this

category: fiscal illusion, bureau voting, intergovernmental grants, constituency size,
divided government, and unfunded mandates. Fiscal illusion suggests that taxpayers
systematically underestimate the taxes they pay. Bureau voting theory argues that an
ever-increasing pool of government workers exhibits self-interested voting behavior.
Grants from the federal government, it is proposed, do not necessarily substitute for
state-derived funds. A higher ratio of constituents to representatives leads to an
increased probability of a heterogeneous district and a reduction in the clarity of the
constituency signals. This leads to an unresponsive legislature. Divided government
leads to an inability for state government to pursue a consistent policy vision. The
multiplicity of demands, coupled with balanced budget requirements, leads to an
overall increase in state government expenditures. Government expenditures, in the
absence o f supermajority tax legislation voting requirements, are financed through tax
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increases. Finally, unfunded mandates are the result of federal-level politicians
enacting policies and regulations that place financial burdens on sub-national
governments. Unfunded mandates, it is argued, are the product of the interplay of
federalism and the incentive structure of a dealigned legislative branch. What makes
these six theories excessive is that their effects are not neutral, rather all tend to
expand the size of the public sector regardless o f the actual needs or demands of the
public. Barring a change in the law or the Constitution, the processes underlying these
six models are beyond the control of the citizen.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods
Estimating a Pooled Model o f State Government Size
As noted in the introduction, past research on the size of the public sector in
the American states has used either cross-sectional or longitudinal designs to
determine the empirical validity of competing models of government growth. One
notable exception is Garand’s (1993) analysis o f state government growth. Although
these approaches are not inappropriate, each allows one to examine only one part of
the covariation among the dependent variable (i.e. government size) and a number of
independent variables over a given period. In many instances, variation in a given
dependent variable occurs both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, yet the reliance
on either a cross-sectional or longitudinal research design means that only part of that
variance is subjected to analysis. When data are available across cases and across
time, a pooled cross-sectional and time-series design can be utilized to explore more
fully the relationships of theoretical interest. Pooled models are particularly
appropriate for studying the American states, and have been used in a number of
research settings (e.g. Brace 1989; 1991; 1993; Garand and Monroe 1991; Peterson
and Rom 1989).
Pooled cross-sectional time-series designs involve pooling data from the N
cross-sections and T time points to create a data matrix of N * T cases (Kmenta 1986;
Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985). When pooled data are available, ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression can occasionally be used to estimate the parameters of the
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theoretical model of interest. As Sayrs (1989, 11) notes, the standard pooled OLS
model would be as follows:

Yni = a + XiouBic + Unt

where Y is the dependent variable, measured for the n<b case and the t* time period, X
is the independent variable, a is the intercept term, B is the unstandardized regression
coefficient for the km independent variable, and u is the error term for the nm case and
the to, time period.
Unfortunately, while pooled designs are quite powerful, they often involve two
violations of OLS assumptions concerning the error term. First, because of the
temporal component o f the data, the error terms are not independent over time,
meaning that within each time series errors are often correlated over successive lags.
Although unbiased, OLS coefficients will be inefficient if autocorrelated error terms
are present, with the result being that standard errors will be inflated and traditional
tests for statistical significance will be affected. Second, there is a possibility that
error terms across cross-sections may be heteroscedastic, meaning that the residuals
derived from the OLS estimates will have unequal variances across units. Here again,
to the extent that the error terms derived from a model are heteroscedastic, OLS
coefficients will be unbiased but inefficient.
Correcting for these two potential violations involves a two-step process. First,
one must diagnose the OLS version of the government size model to identify the
existence of autocorrelated and/or heteroscedastic errors. An examination of the
autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) revealed
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strong evidence of first-order autocorrelation for all specifications of the government
growth model. Moreover, examination of the residual variances derived from the OLS
estimates across states and across years revealed that the residual variances were
unequal across both states and years. Overall, it is evident that OLS estimates of the
government growth models were inefficient due to violations of both the serial
independence and homoscedasticity assumptions pertaining to the error term.
In order to correct the OLS estimates for violations o f both serial independence
and homoscedasticity, several alternatives are available. One of the most commonly
used approaches is the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) technique, which
involves including in one’s model a series of state and year dummy variables to
capture the contaminating influences of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and cross
temporal autocorrelated errors. While this is a commonly used technique, the
inclusion of dummy variables representing each state and year reduces significantly
the degrees of freedom available for estimating the parameters of the model. Another
oft-used technique is feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). This procedure
corrects for serial correlation of the errors by first estimating the equation with OLS
and then uses the residuals derived from this estimation to estimate the unit-specific
(in this case the state-year) serial correlation of the errors. These estimates are then
used to turn the model into one with serially independent errors (Beck and Katz 1995,
637). Once cured of serial correlation, the transformed model is re-estimated and the
resulting residuals are then used to estimate the contemporaneous correlation of the
errors and the data is transformed one final time to allow for OLS estimation.
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In this analysis, I rely on OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), a
procedure developed by Beck and Katz (1995). This technique has two advantages
over feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). First, it is more appropriate when the
number of cross-sections approximates the number of years covered in the data set.
Second, OLS in combination with PCSE yields more accurate estimates o f the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients than FGLS. Estimates derived using the
PCSE approach provide a more precise indication of the true variability of the
estimated standard errors.

Data and Measurement for 13 Models
The following section discusses the measurement of the variables used to test
the 13 theories discussed in the preceding review of the government growth literature.
A summary o f the measurement of the variables described below can be found in
Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for the two dependent variables and all independent
variables are presented in Appendix 3. Appendix 4 contains a table of bivariate
correlations between the independent variables used in this analysis. The dependent
variable in the models covered below is either state government expenditures as a
proportion of total state personal income (Undeflated State Government Size) or state
government expenditures deflated by the state and local government deflator (Deflated
State Government Size).

Ideally, this study would want to incorporate state-specific

price deflators. These have recently become available (Berry, Fording, and Hanson
2000) for private sector inflation rates, though they are only available as far back as
1960. Because of this, the following analysis uses national-level price deflators. Price
deflators for state government are based on public sector inflation rates obtained from
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the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The lack of state-specific public sector
inflation rates presents the possibility that for those states enjoying economies better
than the national average, the national-level price deflator will underestimate the
actual public sector inflation rate. Conversely, states with economies that fall below
the national average will be assigned a public sector inflation rate that exceeds their
actual rate. Unfortunately, there are states that consistently fall either below or above
the national average. The consequence of this is that for those states that exceed the
national average, it may be that the deflated size o f their government is actually larger
than the value used in this study. The opposite holds true for those states falling below
the national mean. Unfortunately, there is no adequate solution to this problem.
The population of a state is a control variable used in all the models of state
government growth. As discussed in the previous chapter, states with larger
populations enjoy an economy of scale that can push down costs on certain public
goods. For instance, a country with 1000 residents is better able to finance the
construction of a $100,000 lighthouse than one with only 100 residents. The more
populous country faces a per capita bill of $100 versus $1000 for the smaller
population country. Thus, residents of a more populous state should be better able to
bear the cost of public projects than residents of smaller states. Hence, if the primary
activity o f state government is providing public goods, the population variable should
have a negative coefficient. On the other hand, much o f state government
expenditures could be devoted to redistribution of wealth, through transfer programs
like welfare and public housing. Redistributive efforts by the state government are not
helped by economies o f scale. Therefore, a positive coefficient for population
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suggests a greater role for redistribution. With these issues in mind, the core model of
state government growth is:
Government Expenditures*. ,.j = a + bi(Population,.t.|) + e,,t-i

Responsive Theories o f Government Growth
W agner’s Law
An exhaustive modeling of the processes underlying Wagner’s Law would
require a wide array o f many independent variables representing the full contours of
industrialization, income, population density, and urbanization. A reasonably full
specification o f Wagner’s Law is estimated by Lowery and Berry (1983) and Berry
and Lowery (1984; 1987), and Garand (1988; 1993) estimates for each of the
American states a somewhat circumscribed version of the Lowery and Berry model.
The variables used in these studies are employed below, with some modification and
addition. Following Boix (2001), per capita income is logged to take into account the
possible non-linear relationship to government growth. Second, this study will test for
the effect of industrialization on public sector growth using manufacturing income as a
proxy. The following model is suggested to capture the more salient components of
Wagner’s theory:
Government Expenditures,, n = a + b i(Population^ (.i) +
^(Logged Per Capita Income j. ,.i) + b3 (Population Density ,.) +
b4(Urban Population 1.1) + bsfManufacturingj, t-i) + ej.t-i
where Logged Per Capita Income is an indicator o f state wealth. Population Density is
the state population divided by the number of square miles in the state; Urban
Population is the proportion o f the state population that lives in urban areas as reported
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by the U.S. census; and Manufacturing is manufacturing income as a proportion of
total state income. The coefficients for all four of these variables should be positive
for Wagner’s Law to have empirical support.

Party Control
The party control model suggests that Democratic Party-controlled state
government should result in higher spending than Republican Party-controlled state
government. As discussed in the literature review, evidence that party control of
government effects public sector size is scant. One of the few studies to report a
strong relationship cites the impact of party control over a given number of years
(Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993). Blais, Blake and Dion (1993, 55) make the argument
that “parties matter only in the long haul.” It takes time for government programs to
be established and exert an upward influence on the budget, thus the effect of party
control is only evident after a number o f years.
The following model tests this variation of the party control theory of
government growth. Following the measurement convention set forth by Berry and
Lowery (1987), an index of Democratic Party control of state government is created.
Democratic Party control of the governorship translates into a value of .50, while
Democratic Party control of the Senate and the House is given a value of .25 for each.
The use o f a dummy variable rather than a continuous measure of Democratic Party
strength in the two legislative bodies is warranted, since, as Kiewiet and McCubbins
(1991,187) have held, “The possession of a majority is in and of itself of critical
importance” for the execution of the controlling party’s policy preferences.
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To test for the effect o f how long a state’s party composition has remained
unchanged on state government growth, I incorporate the research design of Blais,
Blake and Dion (1993). A dummy variable is created that distinguishes unchanged
party composition in a state from one that does change. This paper adopts the
threshold of .25 or less fluctuation in the party composition score to classify
unchanging from changing state governments. The variable indicating change equals
zero if a state’s party composition score changes by more than .25 for each of the
previous five years and one if there has been no change. This variable is then used to
create the interaction variable: party composition score for state year * change. For
illustrative purposes, Table I below gives all the possible values for this variable.
This variant of the party control explanation of government growth suggests the
following model:
Government Expenditures,.i = a + bi(Population,. ,.|) +
bifParty Control. t-i) + b3 (Party Tenure, n ) + e ,. ,.i
where Party Control is an index of Democratic Party strength in a given state year.
For instance, a state with a Democratically-controlled governorship and House would
take a value o f .75. Party Tenure is an interaction variable that controls for the impact
o f an unchanging Democratically-controlled state government (in the previous five
years). For instance, if the current party composition score for a state is .50, and has
not fallen below .25 or gone above .75 for the past five years, then this would be
considered an unchanging state government and would be assigned a value o f one
multiplied by the value of Party Control. The value of the interaction would be .50 *
1.00, or .50. To take an extreme case, if both the state’s governorship and both
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Table 1. All Possible Values for the Party Control and Party Tenure
Value of
Party
Tenure

Changed in
the past 5
years?

Value of
Party
Control
Variable

Democratic
Governor

Democratic
Senate

Democratic
House

.50 = Yes

.25 = Yes

.25 = Yes

0 = No

0 = No

1 =N o,
(Sum o f-* ) 0 = No

0 = yes

0

1

0

0

0

0

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

.25

1

.25

0

.25

0

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

.25

1

.25

0

0

.25

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

.50

.50

.50

0

.25

.25

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

.50

1

.50

.50

0

0

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

.75

I

.75

.50

.25

0

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

.75

I

.75

.50

0

.25

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

1

1

1

.50

.25

.25

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)
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branches o f the legislature had been under complete Democratic control for the past
five years, and Democrats also controlled both branches and the governorship in the
current year, the interaction variable would take a value o f l . 1This is the highest value
the variable can take. Because a value of one indicates Democratic hegemony in the
state, it is precisely in this situation that one should expect the most growth in state
government. So to conclude, the coefficients for both variables (Party Control and
Party Tenure) should be positive and significant, if growth in a state’s public sector is
a function of party control of state government.

Interparty Competition
The theory of interparty competition suggests that government will grow as a
result of political parties expanding their pool of potential supporters in the face of
stiff competition for office. In a state with 70% of the vote regularly going to
Democratic candidates, the incentive for the Democratic Party to broaden its base of
support is less than in an electoral environment where the margin o f victory is closer
to zero.
The level of interparty competition is measured by using the absolute value of
the difference between the Democratic vote percentage and 50%. Ideally, this analysis
would employ a variable based on party competition in state-level elections. This

1 Blais, Blake and Dion’s (1993) operationalization o f this variable is admittedly
difficult to understand. Though I have tried to simplify the explanation o f the variable
construction above, it may be useful to read the explanation given by the authors: “An
unchanging government is here defined as one whose party composition (my Party
Control) has remained the same over the previous five years. The “change” variable
takes the value of one whenever that condition is not fulfilled. It should be noted that
I coded my “change” variable to be one if there is “no change”, in order to facilitate
interpretation o f the coefficient
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would involve data on both gubernatorial and state legislative races. Unfortunately,
such data are not available for the entire period. The alternative measure used here
employs state presidential election results. In order to control for certain candidate or
election-specific deviations from a state’s normal presidential election vote, the
variable is measured as an average o f the previous two presidential elections. High
scores for this variable indicate relative safety for the party in power while low scores
indicate a high degree o f interparty competition in a state.
Along with interparty competition, the frequency of elections is also posited to
play a role in increased government spending and state government growth. The
interplay o f an upcoming election and the need for parties in a competitive context to
appeal to unmobilized voters may lead to additional state government spending. To
capture this effect, a dichotomous variable is included to indicate the presence of an
election year. Below is the model to be estimated:
Government Expenditures^ i = a + b i(Population,. M) +
b2 (Interparty Competition n ) + b3 (IPC,t-i * Election Year, t-i) + e j. t.t
where Interparty Competition is the absolute difference between the average
Democratic presidential election margin from the previous two elections and 50%. A
higher value for this variable indicates less party competition. If interparty
competitiveness fosters government growth, Interparty Competition should be
negative and significant If state government growth is contingent on the interplay o f
partisan competition and election timing, then IPC * Election should be negative and
significant. The inclusion of this interaction variable requires some caution in
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interpretation. The coefficient for IPC * Election indicates the difference in the effect
o f competition in election and non-election years.
M edian Incom e Voter M odel
Typically, the median income voter model has used levels o f turnout to
measure median income voter participation. Since the likelihood o f voting is
positively related to income (Franklin 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), increased
turnout translates into increased voting participation o f lower income voters. As
argued in the discussion on the median income voter model, this measurement method
is problematic. Increased turnout does not necessarily entail greater participation of
lower income voters, nor do turnout differences between elections imply precise
differences in the level o f median income voter turnout.
Husted and Kenny (1997) have created a more nuanced measure that better
estimates the income differential between those voting and the general population.
They use turnout, population, and data on median income at the county level to create
a ratio to test the median income voter model of government growth. The
measurement of this variable is as follows: IN C v o t/IN C p o p , where I N C v o t weights
each county’s median family income by the number in the county who voted, and
IN C pop

weights each county’s median family income by the county’s voting-age

population. The county-by-county estimates are then aggregated to the state level.
Essentially, this measure is an estimate of the ratio of the income o f voters to that of
the voting-age population. An increase in turnout among lower income voters should
correspond to an increase in turnout in poor counties. This well lead to a decline in the
ratio IN C v o t/IN C p o p - Thus, as the ratio becomes smaller, this suggests a fall in the
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income of those voting relative to that of the population. Turnout levels come from the
highest level election in each year (i.e. from president, governor, senate, to house).
Voting age population and median family income are interpolated from nearby
censuses, if necessary. This variable will be used to estimate the participation levels
of the median income voter in each election, in each state, from 1951 to 1990.
Regressions using Husted and Kenny’s (1997) median income voter variable are based
on a 46 state sample. Their data set, for various reasons, excludes Alaska, Hawaii,
Minnesota, and Nebraska. These states, with the exception of Alaska, are included in
my analysis. The median income voter participation level then is included in the
following model:
Government Expenditures^,.i = a + bi (Population,, m) +
b2 (Median Income Voter, t-i) + e,.,.|
where Median Income Voter is the estimated participation rate of the median income
voter in a given state election as a proportion of the total voting-age electorate. For
the median income voter explanation of government growth to be supported
empirically, the coefficient for Median Income Voter should be negative and
significant.
Because this data is available for only a part of the period under examination,
this analysis will also employ the conventional level of turnout as well in separate
model estimations. The median income voter participation level using turnout levels is
specified in the following model:
Government Expenditures*.

= a + bi(Population,.,.[) +

b2 (Tumout,t-t) + ej.t-i
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where Turnout is the proportion o f the voting-age population casting votes in the
previous election. If median income voter participation is a factor in state
government growth, then the coefficient for Turnout should be positive and
significant.

Fiscal Constraints
This model of government growth suggests that institutional constraints in the
form of tax and expenditure limitations contributes to a climate of fiscal conservatism.
These limitations should make the expansion of state government more difficult.
Falling somewhat outside the scope of tax and expenditure limitations are voter
initiatives. Voter initiatives, as suggested by the literature, exert restraint on state
government efforts to increase revenue and expenditures. Given this, the following
model of government size is estimated:
Government Expenditures*. t-i = a + bi(Populationj,t.|) +
t>2 (Tax and Expenditure Limitations ,.i) + bj(Initiatives.t-i) + e,.t-i
where Tax and Expenditure Limitations is a binary variable with the value of 1 if a
state has some form of tax and expenditure limitation and 0 otherwise. The effect of
voter initiative is captured with the dichotomous variable Initiatives, which equals 1 if
a state’s voters are able to engage in state initiatives and 0 otherwise. If this model of
state government growth is empirically valid, the coefficients for both Tax and
Expenditure Limitations and Initiatives should be negative and significant.

Political Needs
Some portion of government growth may be a function of the demands placed
on state government by citizens that are dependent on government goods and services.
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The preceding discussion o f the political needs explanation of government growth
suggests that two population subgroups, school-age children and the elderly, fall into
this category. As the ratio o f young and old increase in proportion to the other
citizens, states may face additional costs for education and health care. A third
population subgroup is minorities, who may require more government assistance than
other state citizens. Finally, macroeconomic downturns in the state may prompt
additional government spending on behalf of those hurt by economic hardship.
Unemployment, inflation, and slowing state economic growth are hypothesized to
increase the strain on a state’s citizens and positively impact state spending. These
four need-based factors suggest the following model:
Government Expenditures^. i = a + bi (Population,. t-i) +
b2 (Over 65.n ) + b 3 (Under 18, ,.|) + b4(Black Population. t-i) +
bsfUnemployment.t-i) + b6(Inflation t.|) + ^(Economic Growth.,.|) + e ,.n
where Over 65 is the proportion of a state’s citizens 65 or older, Under 18 is the
proportion of citizens under 18 in a state, and Black Population is the black proportion
of the state’s population. Unemployment is the proportional change in the state
unemployment rate from the previous year (current year / previous year). Inflation is
the proportional change in the state-specific inflation rate in the past year (current year
/ previous year). Economic Growth is the proportional change in a state’s per capita
income from the previous year (current year / previous year). If the political need
explanation of government growth is valid, t>2 , b3, b4, bs and b6 should be positive and
t>7 should be negative.
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Political Culture
This explanation of government growth attributes higher levels of state
spending to cultural predispositions within the electorate. A state with a liberal
political culture is expected to be more receptive to a large public sector. Until
recently, scholars have relied upon demographic factors such as income, racial
composition, and education (e.g. Miller and Stokes 1963), simulated opinion models
based on individual-level data that has been extended to the aggregate district level
(Erikson 1978), results of referenda voting (McCrone and Kuklinski 1979), and state
presidential election returns (LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997) to measure a state’s
political culture. While these different methods are certainly of some utility, the
measurement of state political culture could benefit from large-sample estimates of
state-level political ideology.
Such estimates are now available. Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1989; 1993)
have combined individual responses from a number of ABC News/Washington Post
surveys to construct aggregate-level estimates of state political ideology.
Respondents’ answers to where they place themselves ideologically (i.e. liberal,
moderate, or conservative) are aggregated by state to create a measure of each state’s
political ideology. Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993) have also constructed an
index of a state’s policy liberalism based on the liberalism of policies passed by the
state. These two indicators o f a state’s political ideology are used in the model below
to test the political culture explanation o f government growth:
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Government Expenditures,,!-! = a + bi(Populationi,,.|) +
(^(Opinion Liberalism, (.|) + b3(Policy Liberalism, t-i) + e,,t.|
where Opinion Liberalism is a measure of the liberalism of a state’s citizens, and
Policy Liberalism indicates the liberalism of a state’s policy choices. Empirical
support for the theory of political culture is provided if Opinion Liberalism and Policy
Liberalism are positive and significant.

Excessive Theories o f Government Growth
Fiscal Illusion
Four characteristics of a state revenue system were cited as having illusory
effects: 1) income tax through the withholding provision; 2) indirect taxation through
corporate taxes; 3) the accumulation of state debt; and 4) a complex revenue system.
These characteristics of a state’s revenue system are captured below, save for the
effect of the corporate income tax. This has not been found to have an impact in
previous studies on state government growth (Garand 1993). The problem is probably
rooted in the fact that in-state corporations do not manufacture goods solely for use
within that state, and hence the effect of corporate taxes will be felt by citizens of
other states as well. If fiscal illusion is a factor in government growth, the effect of
corporate taxes should be evident at the national level, but not at the state level.
In order to test the fiscal illusion explanation of state government growth, this
analysis follows the model o f Lowery and Berry (1987), though without the control
for corporate taxation:
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GovemmentExpenditureSi.fi = a + b|(Population,.t.|) +
b2 (IncomeTax,fi) + bj(Revenue Concentration,,.() + b4(Deficit,,.i) + e,.,.i
where Income Tax is the proportion of state revenue derived from personal income
taxes and Revenue Concentration is a variable reflecting the complexity o f the tax
code. This measure of complexity is calculated using Wagner’s (1976) Herfindahl
index of revenue concentration, which assigns scores based on the number o f different
ways a state derives income weighted by the sum obtained through these disparate
revenue sources. Higher scores indicate that state revenue is more highly concentrated
in one or more tax instruments. For instance, a state that received all tax revenue from
a corporate tax would receive a score of 1. A state that received half of its income
from a corporate tax and half from an income tax would get a score o f .5. The formula
for this measure is:
£j«t" (Xj)2
where n equals the number o f revenue sources and x equals the proportion of income
derived from each revenue source. In this study, I used six primary sources of state
revenue: income tax, corporate income tax, charges, fuel taxes, automobile and
operators’ license tax, and general sales tax.
The proposed illusory effect of delayed cost through debt financing is
represented by Deficit. This variable is a state’s deficit as a proportion of current
expenditures. The fiscal illusion explanation of state government debt is supported
empirically if the Income Tax and Deficit coefficients are positive and significant, and
Revenue Concentration is negative and significant.
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Bureau-Voting Model
The bureau-voting model suggests that as the proportion of bureaucrats
increases in the population, their self-interested voting behavior will result in a larger
state public sector. This explanation is tested using the model below:
Government Expenditures*. (.| = a + ^(Population*, m) +
b2 (Federal Employees. ,.i) + b3(State Employees. ,.t) +
b4(Local Employees, t-t) + e,,t.i
where Federal Employees, State Employees, and Local Employees represent the
number o f full-time federal (civilian), state, and local government employees as a
proportion of the state population. Excluded from the rolls of federal government
employees are members of the military, who are overwhelmingly supportive of
conservative candidates (Holsti 2000). Previous empirical work suggests that public
sector workers tend to vote for candidates that support an increased role for
government (Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud 1991). Past analysis has used the number
of state government employees (Garand 1988), though there is no theoretical reason to
expect local government employees to vote differently in local elections versus
national elections. On the other hand, the link between federal employee self-interest
and public sector growth is more tenuous. While federal employees may be more
liberal than their private sector counterparts and may turnout at higher rates, they may
not perceive an increase in state government expenditures as in their self-interest.
Given the competition for publicly provided goods and services that occurs between
the state and federal level, federal employees may be less likely to support state public
sector expansion. If the bureau voting explanation is supported, the coefficient for
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State Employees and Local Employees should be positive and significant. The
expected relationship for Federal Employees is positive. A negative and significant
coefficient would indicate that federal employees see their self-interest fulfilled
through a smaller role for state government.

The Intergovernmental Grant Model
This explanation suggests that federal grants-in-aid contribute to growth in
state government. This may happen three possible ways. First, intergovernmental aid
may substitute for state-derived funds. In this scenario, federal aid would have no
effect on state government expenditures, instead there would be concomitant decrease
in the state taxpayer’s revenue burden. A second possibility is that because of federal
matching funds requirements state expenditures may increase over and above the
amount received from the federal government Such federal funds may also be
earmarked for purposes that the state public sector has had little or no involvement. In
this case, intergovernmental grants should also have a more than one to one
correspondence with increased state expenditure levels. Finally, most research
suggests that the effect o f intergovernmental grants is a combination of substitution (or
replacement) and increased state spending (Dye and MacManus 1990, Garand 1988,
1993). In order to estimate the effect of intergovernmental grants on state government
growth, the following model is specified:
Government Expenditures,, t-i = a + ^(Population;, t-i) +
^(Intergovernmental Grant, ,.i) + e M
where Intergovernmental Grant is federal grants-in-aid to state governments as a
proportion o f total state economic output. If the coefficient for Intergovernmental
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Grant is significant, but close or equal to zero, we can conclude that federal grants
substitute for state funds. A positive and significant coefficient for Intergovernmental
Grant that is 1 or below (yet above 0) suggests a combination of state revenue as well
as an increase in state government expenditures as a result o f the federal grant.2 If
Intergovernmental Grant is positive, significant, and greater than one, then this is
evidence that intergovernmental aid increases state government expenditures over and
above the amount received from the federal government.
Constituency Size
The constituency size model of government growth proposes a relationship
between the number of constituents per legislator and public sector size. The greater
the number of constituents per legislator, the more government is hypothesized to
grow. This straightforward theory of government growth is estimated using the
following model:
Government Expenditures,, n = a + b i( P o p u l a t i o n +
b2 (Senate,t-i) + b3 (House.,.|) + e,.,.|
where Senate is the number of Senate seats divided by the state population and House
is the number o f House seats divided by the state population. Since a higher ratio
indicates comparatively “better” representation, negative and significant coefficients
for both House and Senate lend support to the constituency size theory of government
growth.

2 This interpretation of the Intergovernmental Grant coefficient is possible since the
federal aid is included on both sides of the equation.
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Divided Government
The discussion of divided government in the literature review above suggests
that a history of split-party control is necessary before significant shifts in the size of
state government will occur. The hypothesis is that divided state government
delegations will prefer a compromise that results in greater government spending to a
policy gridlock that may lead to lower expenditures in both parties’ favored policy
areas. This will result in overall increased government size if state government has
been under split control for some time. Moreover, the degree to which a state’s
public sector grows because of divided government is contingent on the presence of
legislative supermajority voting requirements for tax increases.
Rather than test for the effect of divided government in the previous state-year,
I have chosen to base my measure on a history of divided state government. Since
divided government in the majority of states is by virtue of split control o f the
executive and legislative branches (Fiorina 1992), I felt it important to include at least
two gubernatorial administrations so as to allow sufficient variation for this variable.
To determine the effect o f divided government on public sector growth, I use a
variable based on the incidence of divided government in the past five years. An
average based on a five-year period ensures that a state’s executive branch has at least
undergone one intervening election.
Secondly, the hypothesis set forth in the previous chapter was that there may
be a tendency when government is divided for the opposing parties to acquiesce to
each other’s spending preferences so as to achieve a victory for both parties. Lack of
consensus, or gridlock, may lead to reduced funding of programs favored by either
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party. However, if politicians in the context of split control perceive that divided
government is a temporary condition, there may be an advantage to resolutely
opposing the spending preferences of the opposing party. On the other hand, if
divided government is the norm, politicians in either party may be resigned to split
control and be more likely to work toward a consensus resulting in an overall increase
in state expenditures. Toward this end, I have measured divided government as the
proportion o f state-years under split control in the previous five years. An interaction
variable for the presence of supermajority voting requirements is also included in this
model. To estimate the effect o f divided government on state public sector growth,
the following model is specified:
Government Expenditures^ 1.1 = a + b|(Population,.t-i)+
b2 (Divided,t.|) + b3 (Divided * Supermajority, t-i) + ej,t-i
where Divided is the proportion of divided state government delegations (house,
senate, and governor) in the past five years. This computation includes the thenpresent administration. A state-year is considered “divided” if the house, senate, or
governorship of a state is controlled by other than one party.

A positive coefficient

for this variable suggests that divided control results in state government growth. If a
state has no legislative supermajority requirements for raising taxes then the
Supermajority component of the interaction variable is equal to 1. The interaction
variable Divided * Supermajority is equal to the value for the Divided variable
multiplied by 1 if a state has no supermajority voting requirements. Otherwise, the
variable is zero. If a state government is under split control at any time in the previous
five years and there are no supermajority requirements, this variable will be greater

93

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

than zero. A positive and significant coefficient for this variable indicates support for
this perspective of the divided government theory o f state government growth.
Unfunded M andates
The incidence of unfunded mandates, as suggested in the preceding literature
review, began roughly in the mid-1960s (Peterson 1995). It would be ideal if data
were available that estimated the cost of unfunded mandates for each state in each year
of our sample. Efforts to gauge the monetary effect of unfunded mandates, however,
are confined either to the cost of one particular category of federal mandate or pertain
only to cities. For instance, a report by the U.S. Conference of Mayors calculates that
urban areas would have to spend 54 billion dollars over the next five years to meet the
requirements set forth in ten federal mandates.3 No such measure exists for the entire
span of this study, nor for each state. Because of these data limitations, this analysis
uses two dummy variables to uncover the effect of unfunded mandates on state
government growth. First, a dummy variable is created that takes the value of one for
years 1966 onward. Second, a dummy variable is used that takes the value of 1 in
1966,2 in 1967, 3 in 1968, and so on. The reason these two dummy variables are
used is because unfunded mandates may affect state government spending in two ways
(or not at all). After 1965, the trend line for state expenditures could jump a level.
For instance, state expenditures could be 1 billion, 2 billion, and 3 billion dollars in the
previous three years. Then in 1966, because of unfunded mandates passed in 1965,
spending jumps in the next three years to 7 billion, 8 billion, and 9 billion dollars. It is
this relationship that will be captured by the dummy variable.
3 This information comes from Lashutka (1994), and is cited in Peterson (1995).
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Alternatively, in the years following 1965 there may be an increased tendency
for the federal government to pass unfunded mandates. In this case, state budget trend
lines after 1965 should have a steeper slope. An example of this dynamic would be if
the trend in state expenditures was 1 billion, 2 billion, and 3 billion in the three years
prior to 1966, then in the following years spending surged to 5 billion, 7 billion, and 9
billion, and so on. This dynamic will be captured by the counter variable.
O f course, unfunded mandates could contribute to government growth both
through an initial jump in state spending as well as increasing the slope of the state
spending trend line. To estimate the effect of unfunded mandates on state public sector
growth, the following model is estimated:
Government Expenditures*. ,.| = a + bi(Population,.,.i) +
b2( 1965 Dummy. t-i) + b3 (Trend.) + b4( 1965 Counter. ,.|) + e ,. n
If unfunded mandates are a factor in state government growth, then either the 1965
Dummy or 1965 Counter, or both, should be positive and significant. The variable
Trend is coded 1 in 1946, 2 in 1947,3 in 1948, and so on. It is necessary to include
this variable so that the 1965 Counter variable can be compared against a baseline.

Data Considerations
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, some mention should be made of
the methods used to overcome problems with missing data. Many time-series of this
length find gaps in the available data. A second concern is with Alaska and its outlier
status. This brief section discusses the implications o f including Alaska in this
analysis. It also itemizes the variables and states where data was missing and the
solution used in this analysis.
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Alaska Outlier
Alaska poses special problems in state-level analyses of government growth
and state finance studies in general. Because o f the state’s considerable natural
resources, particularly oil, much of the public sector is financed through corporate
taxes and fees. The state even pays its citizens yearly dividends on proceeds derived
from oil-based revenues. The degree to which the public sector is financed by out-ofstate corporations has led Alaskan state government to grow, at least in terms of how
state government growth is operationalized in this study, at a very high rate. For
example, the average proportion of total taxes derived from corporate taxes for Alaska
is . 135 while the other 49 states have an average of .062. This corporate tax
differential does not even take into account the revenue from fees and licenses.
Important for this analysis is the degree to which state government places
burdens on its citizens as the result of either responsive or excessive mechanisms.
Thus in a state like Alaska, which maintains a large public sector (almost twice as
large as the next largest state), estimates of the various models of government growth
examined herein bear little relationship to the actual determinants of Alaska’s state
government size. Preliminary analyses that have included Alaska have less
explanatory power than analysis run with Alaska excluded. This is due primarily to
Alaska’s outlier status on such economic variables measuring revenue system
complexity (Revenue Concentration), proportion of income derived from income taxes
(Income Tax), and the demographic variable population density (Population Density).
Finally, exclusion of Alaska in studies of state government growth is more the norm
than the exception (e.g. Bails 2000; Husted and Kenny 1997; Thornton and Ulrich
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1999; though see Garand 1988; 1993)*. Because of the use o f lagged values for
variables measuring divided government and historical party control, the elimination
of Alaska from the data set results in a loss o f 23 cases.
M issing Data Issues
Many demographic variables were only reported by the U.S. Statistical
Abstract on a decennial basis. This was especially the case in the early years used in
this study. Four variables, all part of the political needs explanation of state
government growth, were reported only every ten years until the mid-1970s. These
variables are urban population, population 65 years of age and older, population under
18 years of age, and the black population. The values for missing data for these
demographic variables were interpolated using the linear interpolation command in
SPSS 10.0 for Windows.
A second problem, common to research on state government, concerns the
states of Nebraska and Minnesota. These states posed special problems for the testing
of the party control, divided government, and constituency size theories of state
government growth. Nebraska has a unicameral and non-partisan legislature.
Minnesota, until 1973, had a non-partisan legislature as well. Rather than exclude
these two states, as many scholars do, this analysis has included the two states by

4 A sense of the outlier status of Alaska is given by Garand’s (1993) analysis of state
government growth. He reports the mean absolute error (MAE) for both his deflated
and undeflated models of state government growth in Table 6. The true government
size ratio for Alaska was .29 in both models and the MAE between this value and his
predicted values for both the deflated and undeflated models was roughly .10. This
MAE is three times the MAE for any of the other 49 states. Hawaii is the state with
the next highest with an MAE of approximately .03. The average MAE for all states
was roughly .01 for all states.
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setting the values for partisanship in the house and senate at the sample mean for
partisanship in the respective legislative chambers. Dummy variables representing
the two states (Minnesota only up to 1972) are then included in the model estimation.
Setting these values to the sample mean prevents these fictitious values from altering
the regression estimates and permits the two states to remain in the data set.
A third difficulty arises when testing the political culture theory of government
growth. The source for state opinion and policy liberalism used in this study come
from Erikson, Wright and Mclver (1993). These data are based on CBS/NYT survey
responses. Unfortunately for Erikson, Wright and Mclver and this analysis, there were
not enough survey responses gathered from Hawaii (and Alaska) to estimate that
state’s mean ideological and policy preferences. Also, the author’s note (1993,20n2)
that their scores for Nevada are “substantively implausible” (p. 20) and opt to exclude
Nevada from their subsequent analyses. In order to include these states in the
following analysis, the scores for these two “problem” states are set to the average
opinion liberalism and policy liberalism values. As explained above, by setting these
states’ ideological scores at the sample mean, the regression coefficients for this
variable are unaffected and Hawaii and Nebraska’s state government growth, as
captured by the other variables for which the state has values, may be included in the
full model.
Finally, a full test of the political needs explanation o f government growth
required unemployment statistics for each state for the M l fifty-two years under
analysis. With the exception of 1950, these were only published from 1960 onward.
Rather than exclude this important variable, the missing unemployment rates for the
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states in this period were modeled using Tobit regression to control for left and right
censoring o f the data (bounds set at 0 and 100). Variables used to predict state
unemployment rates were national unemployment rate, the under 18 and over 65
percentages of the state population, the state’s black population percentage, and the
number o f initial insured unemployment benefits claimed per year per state divided by
state population to predict state-level unemployment rates. State dummy variables
were also used in the regression equation to capture any state-specific relationships.
The coefficients derived from the equation using data that were not missing were then
used to estimate values for the periods in which state unemployment rates were
unavailable. Table 2 below presents the results of the state unemployment Tobit
regression used to model the missing unemployment rate data. Coefficients and
standard errors for state dummy variables are not presented. The excluded state is
Arkansas.
Table 2. Model Estimates for State Unemployment
Variable

b

Standard
E rror

T

Constant

-7.36

(1.33)

-5.534

Initial Uninsured Unemployment Benefits /
State Population

0.030

(0.00)

11.29

National Unemployment Rate

0.817

(0.03)

27.23

Black percentage o f State Population

0.171

(0.03)

5.70

Over 65 Percent of State Population

0.211

(0.05)

4.22

Under 18 Percent of State Population

0.076

(0.02)

3.80

Adjusted R2

.73
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Summary
The various models detailed above will be incorporated into full models of
state government growth that test all 13 theories together. The analysis will be done
using both the undeflated and state and local government-deflated dependent
variables. As discussed, the statistical procedure used to estimate the models is OLS
with Panel Corrected Standard Errors. This technique corrects for autocorrelation,
heteroscedasticity, and for the possibility of correlation between the error terms of
states (contemporaneously correlated errors). There will also be a separate analysis
using Husted and Kenny’s (1997) median income voter variable.
There are 33 component variables among the 13 separate government growth
models and there are 36 overall in the complete model. The other three are control
variables for Nebraska, Montana, and a variable for each year (Trend). Since data for
the median income voter variable are only available for the years 19S1 to 1990,
estimation of this variable’s effect on state government growth must be tested in a
separate model. The combination of the two dependent variables and median income
voter variables yields four different regression analyses to be discussed in Chapter 5.
The basic model of state government growth is shown on the following page.

The Full Model of State Government Growth
Government Expenditures*. t-i = a + b i(Population,. ,.|) + ^(Logged Income,. ,.|) +
b3 (Population Densityj>t.i) + b4(Urban Population*. m) + b5 (Manufacturingi.t-i) +
b6(Party Control,. t-i) + b7 (Party Tenures. ,.t) + bg(Interparty Competition,. t.|) +
bqflPC * Election Yearj. ,.|) + bio(Tumout) [or bio(Median Income Voter,. ,.i)] +
bu(Tax and Expenditure Limitations,, m) + bi2 (Initiativej.t-i) + bi3(Over 65,.t.i) +
100
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bu(Under 18j. t-i) + bu(Black Population,, ,.|) + bi6(Unemploymenti. ,.|) +
b)7(Inflation,,t-i) + bi8(Economic Growthj,,.i) + b |9(Opinion Liberalism,.t.t) +b2 o(Policy Liberalismi,,.i) + b 2 i(Income Tax*, ,.i) + t>2 2 (Revenue Concentration,. ,.|) +
b2 3 (Deficiti.,-i) + b24(Federal Employees,, n ) + b2 s(State Employees,. m) +
b2 6 (Local Employees,. t-i) + b2 7 (Intergovemmental Grant;. ,.|) + b2 g(Senatej,t.|) +
b2 9 (Housei,,.i) + b3 o(Divided,,,.i) + bji(Divided * Supennajority,. ,.|) +
b32<1965 Dummy,.,.|) + b3 3 (Trend,.t.i) + b3 4( 1965 Counter,. ,.|) +
b35 (Minnesota,. ,.|) + b3 6(Nebraska,. ,.|) + e
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Chapter 4: Patterns of State Growth
As a beginning point, it is useful to examine the patterns of state government
growth over the time period covered in this analysis. In particular, has state
government grown from 1946 to 1997? Table 3 below reports both the undeflated and
deflated measures of government size (1996 = 1). These trends are displayed
graphically in Figures I and 2 respectively. Figures 3 and 4 display government
growth patterns at the federal level, using both the undeflated and deflated measure.
These two graphs are provided for comparison. It is apparent that state government
has exhibited a strong pattern of growth over the 52 year span. This is true for either
measure o f government growth.

Undeflated state government mean size has gone

from 4% of total state economic output in 1947 to almost 14.5% in 1997. Deflated
state government growth is less dramatic with an increase from 7% of state economic
output to over 14%.
State government growth has also tapered off beginning roughly in the early
1980s for both measures of the dependent variable. This trend is more apparent for
deflated state government size. Government size up until the 1980s exhibits a steady
incline, though two bumps in the late 1940s and early 1970s are evident when the
dependent variable is deflated. The primary explanation for the break in the trend in
1947 is based on the difference between the state and local government deflator and
the GDP deflator. In 1947, the state and local government deflator was 10.10 (1996
dollars) and the GDP deflator equaled 16.35. This is a difference of 6.25%, which is
the largest disparity among the years examined here. This margin remains as high as
6% until 1951.
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Table 3. Mean Size of Government in the American States, By Year, 1946-1997
Government Size (Undeflated)

Government Size (Deflated)

Year

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

.0425
.0504
.0571
.0692
.0713
.0653
.0660
.0682
.0687
.0691
.0717
.0745
.0795
.0841
.0832
.0864
.0862
.0896
.0921
.1013
.1048
.1106
.1126
.1131
.1202
.1284
.1286
.1215
.1226
.1346
.1419
.1347
.1285
.1252
.1286

.0121
.0142
.0143
.0198
.0200
.0195
.0193
.0205
.0212
.0198
.0202
.0206
.0216
.0243
.0245
.0262
.0251
.0249
.0267
.0283
.0300
.0305
.0300
.0282
.0295
.0299
.0289
.0296
.0259
.0258
.0279
.0265
.0252
.0248
.0249

.0697
.0816
.0873
.1048
.1083
.0964
.0948
.0972
.0972
.0977
.0983
.1011
.1092
.1142
.1125
.1154
.1132
.1164
.1191
.1299
.1316
.1357
.1368
.1350
.1396
.1463
.1442
.1335
.1324
.1446
.1518
.1442
.1383
.1340
.1350

.0198
.0230
.0218
.0300
.0304
.0288
.0277
.0292
.0300
.0280
.0277
.0280
.0297
.0330
.0331
.0350
.0330
.0323
.0344
.0362
.0377
.0374
.0364
.0337
.0343
.0341
.0324
.0325
.0280
.0277
.0299
.0284
.0271
.0265
.0261
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Table 3. cont.,
Government Size (TJndeflatedt

Government Size fDeflated)

Year

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

.1302
.1302
.1319
.1266
.1272
.1316
.1316
.1296
.1311
.1329
.1381
.1433
.1454
.1444
.1457
.1424
.1438

.0252
.0272
.0284
.0303
.0304
.0320
.0323
.0293
.0290
.0280
.0285
.0292
.0290
.0275
.0285
.0279
.0293

.1360
.1357
.1369
.1304
.1300
.1338
.1321
.1352
.1324
.1335
.1397
.1458
.1477
.1459
.1462
.1424
.1429

.0264
.0284
.0295
.0312
.0311
.0325
.0324
.0306
.0293
.0281
.0288
.0297
.0295
.0278
.0285
.0279
.0291

All years

.1087

.0394

.1250

.0358

The break in the trend line in 1973-74, on the other hand, is apparent in both
the deflated and undeflated measures of government growth. State government
growth drops sharply in these two years. There is also relatively little difference
between the GDP and state government deflator (2.69-3.04%) in these years.
One final note regarding Figures 1 and 2 concerns the reference line at year
196S. This analysis has chosen 1965 as the starting point for both the dummy and
counter variables representing the impact of unfunded mandates on state government
growth. State growth at both points fails to make a sharp incline in either variation of
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Figure 1. Undeflated State Government Growth, 1946-1997
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Figure 2. Deflated State Government Growth, 1946-1997
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Figure 4. Deflated National Government Growth, 1946*1997

1982
1979

1988
1985

1994
1991

1997

the dependent variable, though the effect is modestly more pronounced using the
undeflated measure. Nonetheless, this figure is based on mean values and the impact
o f unfunded mandates may be contingent on a number o f other factors. For instance,
it is probable that state governments in the South bore more of the brunt of the civil
rights reforms passed in the 1960s, given that region’s racial makeup and history.
Table 4 presents data on trends in government size for each o f the American
states from 1946 to 1997. It is clear that there are considerable differences in the size
of government in the individual states. In the undeflated measure o f state government
growth, Hawaii ranks as the largest government with a public sector that consumes
almost 18% o f the state’s total personal income. Close behind Hawaii is New Mexico
with government expenditures approximating 16% of state economic output. These
two states’ respective rankings remain the same in the deflated measure of government
size with little change in the mean share. At the low end o f state government growth
are Missouri, New Jersey, and Texas. Each of these states has an average government
size of less than 8% o f total economic output.
For the undeflated measure, all states exhibit a pattern of growth from 1946 to
1997 and have trend coefficients statistically significant at the .01 level or better.
However, it should be noted that Hawaii is distinguished by a considerably lower tstatistic for its trend coefficient, which implies that its state government size is less
subject to growth as a function of time. The three states with the highest growth are
Rhode Island, West Virginia, and New Hampshire with trend coefficients of .00299,
.00296, and .00291 respectively. These coefficients indicate that these state
governments increase their size by one percent every three years. States that grow
109
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Table 4. Trends in Mean Size of Government in the American States,
By State, 1946-1997
Government Size (Undeflated)

Government Size (Deflated!

State

Mean

a

b

t

Mean

a

b

t

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

.1171
.1077
.1121
.1042
.0936
.0828
.1194
.0819
.0958
.1771
.1153
.0745
.0820
.1018
.0861
.1167
.1434
.1193
.0893
.0971
.1045
.1102
.1353
.0753
.1275
.0792
.1061
.0880
.0781
.1584
.1054
.1064
.1391
.0869
.1193
.1154
.0931

.07351
.07637
.07479
.05237
.07051
.03435
.05846
.06264
.06442
.14132
.06663
.02721
.03520
.04945
.05211
.05461
.11289
.05485
.04589
.03856
.05167
.05443
.09097
.03810
.05450
.03353
.06908
.06153
.01549
.09440
.02842
.07127
.07629
.02318
.09135
.06420
.03781

.00164
.00118
.00141
.00196
.00087
.00183
.00230
.00073
.00118
.00107
.00184
.00179
.00176
.00197
.00128
.00234
.00115
.00243
.00164
.00221
.00199
.00210
.00167
.00141
.00276
.00172
.00140
.00100
.00236
.00242
.00291
.00132
.00237
.00240
.00106
.00193
.00208

12.16
11.05
15.46
18.09
9.66
17.55
15.72
9.64
12.29
2.88
14.94
15.94
37.22
25.07
19.25
17.54
8.37
15.67
12.24
18.61
20.62
17.82
11.50
23.78
25.63
35.38
11.11
6.38
19.37
23.42
19.45
13.78
14.56
26.11
12.15
17.40
13.78

.1194
.1099
.1144
.1062
.0955
.0843
.1217
.0836
.0977
.1802
.1176
.0759
.0835
.1038
.0878
.1190
.1464
.1216
.0911
.0990
.1065
.1123
.1380
.0768
.1210
.0807
.1083
.0898
.0795
.1616
.1074
.1085
.1419
.0884
.1218
.1177
.0948

.11541
.11966
.11877
.08649
.10900
.06002
.09596
.09819
.10069
.20434
.10639
.04833
.06125
.08317
.08447
.09052
.17428
.09200
.07472
.06774
.08697
.09023
.14208
.06342
.09336
.05872
.10846
.09533
.03512
.15238
.05459
.11290
.12414
.04582
.14272
.10399
.06462

.00077
.00024
.00045
.00125
.00003
.00130
.00154
-.0001
.00041
-.0003
.00101
.00136
.00122
.00127
.00058
.00162
-.0002
.00167
.00104
.00161
.00124
.00136
.00058
.00087
.00197
.00120
.00056
.00028
.00197
.00118
.00241
.00042
.00137
.00196
-.0001
.00110
.00155

4.90
1.95
3.90
10.09
0.32
11.01
8.98
-0.76
3.77
-0.81
7.15
11.41
21.71
12.64
6.69
9.70
-1.05
10.42
7.71
13.43
12.27
10.89
3.45
12.95
14.23
22.97
3.96
1.69
14.98
9.00
14.99
3.95
6.10
18.65
-0.70
8.70
9.43
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Table 4. cont,
Government Size (Undeflated)

Government Size (Deflated)

State

Mean

a

b

t

Mean

a

b

t

Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

.1144
.1216
.1081
.0940
.0767
.1291
.1401
.0872
.1241
.1390
.1062
.1569

.03505
.06976
.06670
.06289
.04276
.07315
.07897
.05419
.07807
.06064
.04705
.07188

.00299
.00196
.00156
.00117
.00128
.00211
.00231
.00125
.00174
.00296
.00223
.00321

23.70
21.62
12.07
13.13
20.65
13.90
7.79
12.13
14.20
18.88
17.12
13.43

.1165
.1240
.1102
.0959
.0782
.1316
.1429
.0890
.1266
.1417
.1082
.1599

.06583
.11470
.10512
.09901
.06975
.11747
.12268
.08577
.12461
.10326
.07884
.12045

.00239
.00098
.00076
.00040
.00071
.00119
.00144
.00058
.00074
.00209
.00159
.00223

17.34
10.19
4.60
3.81
8.97
6.77
4.33
5.51
5.41
11.54
11.34
7.53

All States

.1087

.0587

.0019

51.41

.1250

.0957

.0011

26.19

least on a yearly basis are Florida, Colorado, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Hawaii
with trend coefficients of .0073, .0087, .0010, .0011, and .0011 respectively. These
trend coefficient values imply that percentage growth in their state governments is
roughly one-third that of the three highest growth states. Overall, the slope coefficient
calculated for all states is positive and highly significant (b = .0019, t= 51-41, prob(t)
< .00001). This slope coefficient indicates that the percentage of total state income
consumed by state government increases by approximately one percent every five
years.
The positive trend found for all states in the undeflated measure is not found
when deflated state government size is employed. All state trend coefficients are less
in the deflated trend model. In addition, the effect of time as a predictor o f state
government growth is insignificant at the .05 level in six of the forty-nine states.
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Indeed, Hawaii, Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma all exhibit a decline in state
government size from 1946 to 1997. Nevertheless, the overall effect o f time on state
government growth is positive and significant at the .00001 level. The trend slope
coefficient is .0957, which suggests that deflated state government grows by one
percent of total personal income every ten years. Though this still indicates an upward
trend for government growth, it appears that undeflated state government exhibits an
almost double growth rate.
This finding suggests that a considerable proportion o f state government
growth is attributable to the differential inflation rates o f the public and private sector.
Garand (1988b; 1991) has shown that the proportion of increase in the public sector
attributable to a real growth in government goods and services can be determined by
dividing the trend slope coefficient for the deflated indicator by the trend slope
coefficient for the undeflated indicator. The remainder then represents growth in
government as a function o f the differential deflator rate. For example, the trend slope
coefficients for Connecticut are .00183 (for the undeflated measure of government
size) and .00130 (for the deflated measure). It is clear that even after the effects of
differential inflation rates are accounted for, there remains a substantial growth rate for
Connecticut. Based on Garand’s (1988b; 1991) procedure, one can estimate that 71%
o f the growth in the public sector in Connecticut is real growth, i.e. representing
growth in government goods and services. The remaining 29% is due to the fact that
the prices for government goods and services rises at a faster rate than private sector
prices.
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Table 5 presents the growth in state governments that can be attributed to the
differential deflator. The states are ranked by the degree to which their government’s
growth is a function of the expense incurred by the higher inflation rate. It is clear that
there is ample variation for the differential deflator effect among the states. Growth in
Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Oklahoma is entirely a function o f the differential
deflator. These are the same four states that have exhibited a decline in deflated state
government size. Colorado, which had one o f the lowest values o f both the
undeflated and deflated trend coefficients attributes close to 97% o f its growth to the
fact that the inflation rate for the public sector exceeds that o f the private sector.
Deflator-related growth for the remaining state ranges from a high o f 80% for Arizona
to a low of 17% for New York and New Jersey. The average deflator-related growth
for all states is 41%.
Altogether, it is evident that there is extensive variation in the size of state
government, both over time and across the forty-nine states examined here. For the
most part, the size of the public sector has increased over time, though the effects of
time on state government size is more apparent when state expenditures are not
deflated. There is also substantial variation between the states and the rate at which
the different state government grow. Before moving to the multivariate analysis, it is
useful to examine the trends o f growth for the two states that diverge the most in the
size of their governments. The state with the smallest state government is Illinois and
the largest is Hawaii. The comparison chosen here will be with New Mexico, a state
that has data points for the entire length o f the study.1 Growth in these two states is
1The largest state is actually Alaska, which will not be included in this study. Alaska
113
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Table 5. Percent of Growth In State Government Attributable to Differences in
Public and Private Sector Inflation Rates By State, 1946-1997
State

Florida
Hawaii
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Colorado
Arizona
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Arkansas
Tennessee
Georgia
Mississippi
Nevada
Washington
Kansas
Virginia
Alabama
South Dakota
New Mexico
South Carolina
Idaho
Texas
Utah
Oregon
North Dakota
Missouri
Michigan
Vermont
Maryland
California
Iowa
Minnesota
Delaware
Maine

State GovernmentDeflated Coefficient

GDP-Deflated
Coefficient

DeflatorRelated
Growth (%1

-.00007
-.00030
-.00020
-.00008
.00003
.00024
.00028
.00042
.00045
.00040
.00041
.00058
.00056
.00074
.00058
.00058
.00077
.00076
.00118
.00098
.00101
.00071
.00119
.00110
.00137
.00087
.00124
.00144
.00104
.00125
.00127
.00136
.00154
.00167

.00073
.00107
.00115
.00106
.00087
.00118
.00100
.00132
.00141
.00H7
.00118
.00167
.00140
.00174
.00128
.00125
.00164
.00156
.00242
.00196
.00184
.00128
.00211
.00193
.00237
.00141
.00199
.00231
.00164
.00196
.00197
.00210
.00230
.00243

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
96.52
79.64
72.45
68.48
67.73
66.19
65.43
65.17
60.06
57.56
54.46
53.76
53.44
51.50
51.17
49.74
45.10
44.46
43.82
43.12
42.06
37.76
37.56
37.55
36.39
36.16
35.70
35.34
33.17
31.28

has an undeflated state government size of .3220 and a deflated government size of
.3473.
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Table 5. cont,
State

State Government
Deflated Coefficient

GDP Deflated
Coefficient

DeflatorRelated
Growth ( % )

Kentucky
Indiana
Wyoming
Nebraska
West Virginia
Connecticut
Wisconsin
Montana
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Rhode Island
Ohio
New York
New Jersey

.00162
.00122
.00223
.00120
.00209
.00130
.00159
.00197
.00161
.00155
.00136
.00239
.00196
.00241
.00197

.00234
.00176
.00321
.00172
.00296
.00183
.00223
.00276
.00221
.00208
.00179
.00299
.00240
.00291
.00236

30.78
30.66
30.49
30.48
29.37
29.00
28.63
28.56
27.13
25.66
23.79
20.28
18.49
17.21
16.55

All States

.00110

.00188

41.21

.12

.10

.08
.06
.04
.02
1946

1956
1951

1966
1961

1976
1971

1986
1981

1996
1991

Year
Figure 5. Undeflated State Government Growth in Illinois, 1946-1997
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plotted in Figures 5 and 6. South Dakota’s government growth, which exhibits growth
closest to the mean for the states, is presented in Figure 7 for a comparison.
Four essential differences can be noted from a comparison of these three
figures. First, the trend line for New Mexico begins around .07, whereas both Illinois
and South Dakota have government growth in 1946 at roughly .03. Second, the trend
lines for both Illinois and New Mexico are steeper than the trend line for South
Dakota. South Dakota’s rate of government growth is considerably slower over time,
though the slope remains on average positive. On the other hand, the size of South
Dakota’s government demonstrates more volatility than either New Mexico or Illinois.
In the mid-1970s, South Dakota’s government grew from a little over 10% of the
state’s economic output to about 15% by 1976. Government growth subsequently
subsided to about 12% by the late 1970s. This volatility is not seen in New Mexico,
though Illinois’ trend line exhibits volatility also in the 1970s. The difference is that
South Dakota’s government seems to resume earlier levels of spending as illustrated
by the sharpness o f the trend line peaks in comparison to the more rounded trend line
of Illinois.
The tables and graphs presented here indicate that states differ widely in their
both the size of their public sectors and the patterns of growth they have exhibited in
the time period under analysis. A leveling off of state government growth is also
apparent. Since the early 1980s state government growth noticeably declines; this is
particularly so when state government size is deflated. Preliminary evidence that state
public sectors grew in response to federal unfunded mandates is lacking. Neither the
trend line for undeflated or deflated state government growth appears to exhibit any
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appreciable change in the years immediately after 1965. Finally, Table 5 clearly
shows that the differential inflation rate of the public and private sector makes a
difference for state government growth. All state governments are positively affected
by the higher public sector inflation rate, though there is substantial variation. Indeed,
government growth in four o f the states in this study can be entirely attributed to the
effect of the public sector price difference.
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Chapter 5: Multivariate Analysis of Thirteen Models of State
Government Growth
In Chapter 2 ,1 describe a comprehensive theoretical model o f government size,
as well as a pooled cross-sectional time-series design to be used in estimating the
parameters of that model. I noted that there are theoretical and normative
implications of using either deflated or undeflated measures of state government
growth. This debate is resolved by including in this analysis two tests of the model
using both variations of the dependent variable. In addition, the decision to model
government growth using Husted and Kenny’s (1997) data on median income voter
turnout means that the state-years that could be included the model are confined to
1951 - 1990.

Therefore, this is conducted separately using this more precise measure,

rather than the turnout variable used for the full time-series. This yields four separate
models of state government growth. I concentrate on the models using the full timeseries in this chapter and turn to the two models using the Husted and Kenny measure
(1997) in the median income voter section. The model estimates using this measure of
median income voter turnout are found in Appendix 1.
In the following discussion, I examine the undeflated and deflated models of
government growth using the familiar responsive-excessive dichotomy discussed in
preceding chapters. Working within this framework, I focus on each individual
explanation of public sector growth and how each fares in the different time-series
estimations. I first analyze the results obtained using the undeflated measure of state
government growth. Next, I discuss the results for the deflated model, with a focus on
any substantial differences that emerge when state government size is deflated using
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the state and local government price deflator. The chapter concludes with an
estimation of the predicted impact of the thirteen theories in order to determine to
what degree state government is a function of responsive or excessive explanations of
public sector growth. Before investigating the performance of the individual theories
of government growth, it should be noted that both model estimations fit the data well.
Most successful is the model using the undeflated measure of government growth.
The undeflated model, presented in Table 6, explains 91% of the variance in the
dependent variable and thirteen of the coefficients are both statistically significant and
in the expected direction. The deflated model, presented in Table 7, performs well too.
The deflated model explains 85% of state government growth. Once government
expenditures are deflated, there is a small decline in the number of statistically
significant and correctly signed coefficients. However, twelve coefficients in the
deflated model met these criteria.
One last observation before moving to the discussion on the component
theories concerns the control variable, population. The population coefficient is not
significant in either model, though it is positive in the undeflated model (b = .00002, t
= .181) and negative in the deflated model (b = -.00004, t = -.423). As noted in
Chapter 2, it is essential to control for the size of a state’s population when analyzing
the factors behind state government growth. A large population provides an economy
of scale that lowers the per capita expense of certain public goods. Therefore, if the
raison d’etre for state government is to provide public goods, the size o f the population
should have a negative relationship with government size. However, state government
spending devoted to wealth redistribution does not benefit from an economy of scale.
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Table 6. Param eter Estimates for Undeflated Model of Government Growth in
the American States,1946-1997 (OLS with Panel Corrected Standard
Errors)
Government Size fUndeflated)
Variable

b

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error

T

Beta

Intercept

0.06197***

.01214

5.106

Population

0.00002

.00008

.181

.0017

Logged Income

-0.04033***

.00310

-13.000

-.4168

Density

-0.00267

.00192

-1.388

-.0141

Urban

0.01099***

.00318

3.454

.0437

Responsive Theories

Manufacturing

-ao aaaa^

.00440

-5.094

-.0484

Party Control

0.00114*

.00086

1.322

.0108

Party Tenure

0.00219***

.00073

2.976

.0238

Inter-Party Competition (IPC)

0.00485

.00446

1.086

.0079

IPC * Election Year

-0.00046

.00511

-.090

-.0006

Turnout

-0.00007***

.00002

-3.109

-.0272

Tax and Expenditure Limits

0.00205

.00089

2.313

.0167

Initiatives

0.00106*

.00061

1.730

.0133

Over 65

-0.15258***

.02183

-6.989

-.0928

Under 18

0.02637**

.01542

1.711

.0325

Black Population

-0.01000**

.00416

-2.402

-.0253

Unemployment

0.03624**

.01910

1.897

.0125

Inflation

-0.00001

.00009

-.132

-.0010

Economic Growth

-0.05064***

.00556

-9.115

-.0623

.00734

1.412

.0186

.00060

1.986

.1619

npininn Iiti«gn»Kgm

-•>'001037*
it: .i •*""■

PolicyLfteralism
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Table 6., cont
Government Size (Un deflated)
Variable

b

Panel-Corrected
Standard E rror

Excessive Theories
faeomeTax
Revenue Concentration
Deficit
Federal Employees
State Employees
Local Employees
Intergovernmental Grant
Senate
House
Divided Government
Divided * Supermajority
1965 Dummy
Trend
1965 Counter

0.07452***
-0.37404***
2.03131***
-0.08148
is s m * * *
-0.00272
-0.00930***
-0.00261+
0.00445***
0.01332***
0.00109
0.00039***

.00402
.00266
.00564
.05715
.09666
.06335
.03849
.02301
.00321
.00160
.00154
.00115
.00013
.00012

State Dummies
Minnesota
Nebraska

-0.00096
-0.02259

.00238
.00198

0-00320
0 .0 0 2 7 0

N

T

Beta

.795
1.015
13.218
-6.544
21.015
-1.286
41.097
-.118
-2.896
-1.635
2.889
11.610
8.748
3.421

.0063
.0089
.0879
-.0517
.3060
-.0171
.5341
-.0015
-.0249
-.0258
.0440
.1647
.4169
.1084

-.402
-11.392

-.0025
-.0812

2529
26947.18
.0000
.9142

Model F
Prob. > F
Buse R-Square
*** Prob (T) < .01, one-tail test.
** Prob (T) < .05, one-tail test.
* Prob (T) < . 10, one-tail test.
+++ Prob (T) < .01, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
** Prob (T) < .05, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
+ Prob (T) < .10, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
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Table 7. Parameter Estimates for Deflated Model of Government Growth in the
American States,1946-1997 (OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors)
Government Size {Deflated)
Variable

b

Intercept

0.05893

.01456

4.046

Population

-0.00004

.00010

-.423

-.0052

Logged Income

-0 .04042***

.00372

-10.858

-.4590

Density

-O.0O383*

.00231

-1.658

-.0222

Urban

0.01054***

.00382

2.761

.0460

Manufacturing

-0.04417^

.00528

-8.363

-.1048

Party Control

0.00071

.00103

.683

.0073

Party Tenure

0.00280***

.00088

3.182

.0335

Inter-Party Competition (IPC)

0.06216

.00536

.403

.0039

IPC * Election Year

-0.00303

.00613

-.495

-.0042

Turnout

-0.00009***

.00003

-3.147

-.0363

Tax and Expenditure Limits

0.00150

.00106

1.406

.0134

Initiatives

0.00148**

.00074

2.014

.0204

Over 65

-0.11272***

.02620

-4.303

-.0753

Under 18

0.12574***

.01850

6.797

.1703

Black Population

0.00035

.00499

.069

.0010

Unemployment

0.02297

.02292

1.002

.0087

Inflation

-0.00029***

.00010

-2.845

-.0277

Economic Growth

-0.05723***

.00667

-8.585

-.0774

flpnm>I.ihi!BiligM

&02398***

.00881

2.723

.0474

PoficyLibeKaiisat

0.00*16***

.00072

9.941

.1932

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error

T

Beta

Responsive Theories
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Table 7., cont.
Government Size (Deflated)
Variable

b

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error

Excessive Theories
Income Tax
Re«ea»e Concentration
Deficit
Federal Employees
State Employees
Local Employees
Intergovernmental Grant
Senate
House
Divided Government
Divided * Supermajority
1965 Dummy
Trend
1965 Counter

-0 38046+++
1.97533***
-0.19212^
1.75948***
0.00390
-0.00539*
-0.00223
000381**
0.01116***
0.00047
0.00049***

.00483
.00319
.0067(5
.06858
.11599
.07601
.04619
.02761
.00385
.00191
.00185
.00138
.00015
.00014

State Dummies
Minnesota
Nebraska

-0.00102
-0.02604

.00285
.00238

0100740*
&O0216

N

T

Beta

1.532
.677
15.054
-5.548
17.030
-2.527
38.096
.141
-1.400
-1.167
2.061
8.102
3.129
3.552

.0159
.0079
.1320
-.0578
.3270
-.0443
.6529
.0024
-.0158
-.0243
.0414
.1515
.1966
.1484

-.357
-1.945

-.0029
-.1028

2529
14367.73
.0000
.8504

Model F
Prob. > F
Bnse R-Square
*** Prob (T) < .01, one-tail test
** Prob (T) < .05, one-tail test.
* Prob (T) < . 10, one-tail test.
+++ Prob (T) < .01, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
** Prob (T) < .05, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
+ Prob (T) < .10, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
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Responsive Theories
Wagner’s Law
Wagner’s Law suggests that externalities associated with industrialization lead
to an increase in public sector size. Higher levels of industrialization result in greater
urbanization and a need for public services such as police, and fire protection.
Industrialization also requires a substantial infrastructure such as ports, highways, and
mass transit. Finally, Wagner’s Law argues that citizens will demand proportionally
more from government as wages rise with increase industrialization.
Of the four variables used here to test Wagner’s Law, only one has a
coefficient that is correctly signed and significant. The urban population of a state is
in the expected positive direction and highly significant (b = .01099, t = 3.454). The
proportion o f the population living in urban areas is positively related to a larger state
public sector. Presumably, a larger urban population generates more crime, a need for
mass transportation, increased fire hazards, along with other externalities that must be
addressed by state government. The impact of urbanization on state government
growth, when holding the effects of all of the other variables constant at their means,
can be gauged by comparing the predicted values derived using 1) the variable mean,
and 2) the variable mean plus (or minus) one standard deviation.1 This procedure
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in state urbanization yields a
1Mean values and standard deviations used here and elsewhere are found in Appendix
3. This value is obtained by re-estimating the model holding each variable to its mean
value while increasing the variable of interest by one standard deviation. The predicted
value of state government size when holding all variables to their mean is then
subtracted from the predicted value obtained by increasing (or decreasing) the variable
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proportional increase o f .0017, or an almost .17% growth in state government size as a
proportion of total state income, when controlling for the effects of the other variables
in the model (results not shown). The standardized beta coefficient suggests that
urbanization has had a relatively small effect during the period of this study (beta =
.0437).
Interestingly, population density is not a factor in determining the size of state
government. The coefficient is negative, though it never reaches conventional levels
o f statistical significance (b = -.00267, t = -1.388). One possible explanation for this
contradictory finding may be that urban population is a more precise measure to use
for the hypothesized relationship than population density. It may be that density
would have a positive effect if the variable for urban population were excluded from
the model.2 To test for this, I estimate all the models without the urban variable to see
if population density became statistically significant. In none of the parameter
estimates is the density coefficient significant, though with the urban population
removed it is positive.
The effect of per capita income on state government growth is contrary to
expectations. The coefficient for the variable is highly significant and in the negative
direction (b = -04033, t = -13.000). I should note that the negative coefficient for the
income variable is based on a logged transformation of real per capita income and
reflects a slope that is initially static and begins a positive trend once state government

o f interest by one standard deviation. This procedure indicates the relative effect one
variable has on state government growth.
2 The correlation between density and urbanization in this data is .521.
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size reaches a certain size.3 This relationship is shown below in Figures 8 and 9.
Figure 8 plots average real per capita income by average undeflated state size. The
non-linear relationship of per capita income to state government size is apparent. This
dynamic is even more evident in Figure 7, which plots deflated per capita income by
deflated government size. If government expenditures are undeflated, then per capita
income positively affects growth once income reaches roughly 7000 dollars. This
effect is delayed until per capita income reaches about 11,000 dollars when state
government expenditures are deflated.
Given the obvious positive relationship illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, the
negative coefficient reported is perplexing. While cold comfort can be taken from the
fact that this negative relationship is also found by Garand’s (1993) pooled time-series
analysis of state government growth, the results o f a number of other studies reveal a
positive relationship for per capita income (Berry and Lowery 1983; Boix 2001;
Thornton and Ulrich 1999). One reason the coefficient may be negative could be
linked to the lack of a positive relationship, and in a few cases a negative relationship,
at lower levels of per capita income. A second possibility is that at high levels o f per
capita income government growth actually declines. This is a reasonable hypothesis
as wealthier citizens are less likely to support the additional taxes needed to finance an
expansion o f state government. Moreover, the need for public goods and services
diminishes as a population becomes more affluent.
In short, interpretation o f the negative coefficient for per capita income is
problematic for this analysis. The scatter plots in Figures 8 and 9 indicate a positive
3 1 also estimate the model with the untransformed values for per capita income.
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Figure 8. Per Capita Income and Undeflated Government Size
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relationship between the variable and state government growth, though it appears as if
this is conditional on the level o f per capita income. It is clear that the relationship is
non-linear. Despite the difficulty of interpretation, it should be noted that per capita
income exerts a powerful impact on the size of government. The standardized beta
coefficients reported in the right column of Table 6 indicates that the influence of per
capita income on government growth is substantial.4 The magnitude of the
standardized beta coefficients for this variable is the second largest in the model.
Finally, the proportion of total state income derived from manufacturing is
unexpectedly negative and highly significant (b = -.02242, t = -5.094). Controlling for
the effect of the other model variables, a one standard deviation increase in the mean
value of the manufacturing variable translates into a .19% decrease in undeflated state
government growth (results not shown). The magnitude of the standardized beta
coefficient is -.0484. This reveals a relatively modest impact compared to the effect of
some of the other variables in the model.
Wagner’s Law suggests that the externalities that drive government growth are
a function of industrialization. Industry generally requires significant investment in
infrastructure like bridges, highways, and ports. Thus as industry becomes more vital
to a state’s economy, there should be a corresponding increase in public sector
spending. An increased manufacturing presence could also increase the ratio of the
state government and private sector deflators, as predicted by Baumol (1967).
4 STAT A does not provide standardized beta coefficients for Panel-Corrected
Standard Error OLS regression, therefore these values are computed using the
standard equation where if bt is the least squares estimate of the regression coefficient
Pi in a multiple regression equation, then bi = bi(a-hatxi / a-haty) is the estimate of the
standardized regression coefficient bi (Agresti and Finlay 1986).
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However, as Boix (2001) has noted, Wagner ignores the possibility that the presence
of large manufacturing firms also has a positive effect on the state’s tax base. The
increased productivity o f the industrial sector drives up costs for state government, but
the profits engendered by higher productivity precludes state government from
automatically taking a larger proportion of total economic output. In other words, the
efficiency derived from manufacturing increases the denominator in the measure of
state government size faster than the numerator. While Boix (2001) does not include a
measure of industrialization in his study of government growth in 65 nations, his
analysis reveals a negative and significant impact on public sector size for the share of
GDP derived from the agriculture sector.
Only one of the four components of Wagner’s Law finds support in this
analysis. As a state’s population becomes urbanized, there is an accompanying
increase in the size of the public sector. This variable, which taps into the externalities
that emerge from a metropolitan environment, would seem to be related to the
population density of a state. However, population density is negatively related to
public sector size and the coefficient is non-significant. The proportion of income
derived from the manufacturing sector of the state economy exerts a significant and,
contrary to expectations, a negative impact on the size of state government. State
government shrinks in size as per capita income increases, though as Figures 6 and 7
this relationship is nonlinear.
Party Control
The party control theory argues that state government should grow when a leftleaning party is in power. The party control variable reflects the degree to which the
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Democratic Party controls the state’s senate, house, and governorship. While the
coefficient for this variable is in the expected positive direction, it is only weakly
significant (b = .00114, t = 1.322). The second component of the party control theory
suggests that government growth is contingent on a legacy of Democratic Party
domination o f state government. The party tenure variable controls for the impact of
an unchanging Democratically-controlled state government (in the previous five
years). This variable coefficient is correctly signed and highly significant (b = .00219,
t = 2.976).

Using the coefficients reported in Table 6, it may be seen that the

Democratic control o f state government can have a substantial influence on undeflated
public sector size. When the other variables in the model are held constant at their
mean values, complete Democratic control in the previous five years yields a growth
in the undeflated state government measure of .22% (results not shown). Democratic
hegemony, however, has not contributed substantially to state government growth in
this data set. The standardized beta coefficient is only .0238.
Overall, support for the party control theory of state government growth is
strong. Both the coefficients for the component variables are positive. Though the
party control coefficient is only significant at relaxed levels, the coefficient for the
party tenure variable is highly significant.
Interparty Com petition
The interparty competition theory of state government growth does not fare
well in this model. Heightened levels of interparty competition should lead parties
and candidates to expand their base of electoral support through increased public
sector spending. This increased electoral support, it is hypothesized, will come from
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previously unmobilized voters. Because unmobilized voters generally are drawn
from the lower income segments of the population, interparty competition should
drive government expenditures upward, thereby increasing the size of government.
Since the variable is actually a measure o f one party dominance (or safety),
rather than competition, the interparty competition coefficient should be negative.
However, the coefficient is positive, though not significant (b = .00114, t = 1.086).
Because o f the election interaction variable, these regression results imply a positive
relationship between low levels of interparty contribution in non-election years.
The relationship between interparty competition and election year suggested in
Chapter 2 is that the presence of heightened levels of party competition in conjunction
with an election year should lead government to grow in an effort to attract votes from
lower income voters. However, the coefficient for the interaction variable
representing the importance of election timing for interparty competition and
government growth is not significant and unexpectedly negative (b = -.00046, t = 0.090).
Thus, there is no evidence in these analyses that interparty competition is
positively related to state government growth.5 The coefficient is incorrectly signed in
and non-significant. Moreover, the influence of interparty competition as indicated by
the standardized beta coefficient is among the lowest in this analysis (beta = .0079). It
5 1 also test for the possibility that the mere presence o f an election year may spur state
spending, and drive state government growth upward. Including both the interparty
competition variable and the presence of an election year yielded the following
estimates for Interparty Competition: (b = .00469, t = 1.129), and Election Year (b =
.00025, t = .494). I also estimate the model with just the election year variable, this
procedure also indicates little effect for the presence of an election on state
government growth (b = .00025, t = .499).
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appears that heightened levels o f interparty competition do not result in parties and
candidates mobilizing support via state spending increases.
Median Income Voter
The theory described in Chapter 2 suggests that state government will respond
to increased turnout o f lower income voters (or median income voters) by increasing
state expenditures, thus driving state government size upward. However, whether
turnout is employed as proxy for median income voter participation or Husted and
Kenny’s (1997) measure is used, the median income voter theory of state government
growth receives no support in this analysis.
Using turnout levels as a proxy for median income voter turnout fails to
uncover the hypothesized relationship. Indeed, as the proportion of the voting-age
population that votes increases, public sector size decreases. The coefficient for
turnout is negative and highly significant (b = -.00007, t = -3.109). Thus, if higher
levels o f turnout do indicate increased participation by median income voters, then
such participation actually contributes to a decline in the size of government.
Controlling for the other model variables, a one standard deviation increase in turnout
levels yields a decline in public sector size of approximately .12% (results not shown).
However, as noted in preceding chapters, increased turnout may not actually reflect
increased levels of turnout by median income voters.
Estimates of median income voter participation using the more precise Husted
and Kenny (1999) measure, however, reveal similar results. Model estimates using
this variable are found in Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix 1. Again, the coefficient for
this variable indicates a strong and unexpectedly positive relationship between the
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income levels of those voting and the size of undeflated state government (b = .00674,
t = 4.564). Holding the effects of all other variables constant at their means, a one
standard deviation increase in the relative wealth o f those voting to the voting-age
population translates into .12% increase in undeflated state government growth
(results not shown).
Altogether, it appears that median income voter participation is relatively
inconsequential for state government growth. This is the case if one uses either
turnout levels or Husted and Kenny’s (1997) measure of median income voter turnout.
If Husted and Kenny’s measure better captures the income disparity between those
voting and the voting-age population, the results reported here indicate that as more
lower income voters go to the polls, public sector size decreases. The standardized
beta coefficient for this variable, however, indicates that the impact of median voter
participation on government growth is small (beta = .0351).
As for the contrary finding for the turnout variable, higher turnout levels could
be the result of a number of factors. For instance, it may be the case that higher
turnout reflects anger or exasperation with government. Higher turnout, in this
example, may lead to a decline in government activity. Turnout is also a function of
party competition, candidate appeal, campaign spending, registration requirements,
and the education levels of the population (to name just a few of the predictors found
in the literature). Voter participation levels could be a proxy for a better-educated,
more affluent citizenry. This sort of population may be less likely to be lured to the
polls by the promise o f increased government spending than voters with median
incomes or less.
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Fiscal Constraints
The obstacles imposed by state fiscal constraints should curb growth in state
government. However, the coefficients for both state tax and expenditure limitations
and the presence of citizen initiatives are positive. This indicates that states with such
fiscal constraints actually have larger state governments. The coefficient for tax and
expenditure limitations (b = .00205, t = 2.313) and initiative (b = .00106, t = 1.730)
are both significant. Thus, there is an indication that initiatives are positively related
to state government growth.6 However, standardized beta values for both variables are
small.
On first glance, these are curious findings since these fiscal mechanisms were
designed to be obstacles to further state government growth.7 Nevertheless, the
findings here echo those found in a number of other studies that point to the
ineffectiveness of such limitations (Bails 1990; Cox and Lowery 1990; Eribes and
Hall 1981; Joyce and Mullins 1991; Kenyon and Benker 1984). As discussed in the
literature review, this contradiction is likely due to two factors. First, in states subject
to such restraints there has been a concomitant increase in off-budget borrowing
6 Tolbert (1998) argues that tax and expenditure limitations and state citizen initiatives
are often found together. Her analysis reveals that knowing whether a state allows
citizen initiatives is a significant predictor of whether the state has tax and expenditure
limitations. Thus, she claims that including both in a regression model is
inappropriate. Since initiatives precede tax and expenditure limitations, only the
presence of initiative should be incorporated in the model. In light of this, I excluded
tax and expenditure limitations, however there was no difference in the result. Neither
the significance levels nor the direction of the coefficient changed noticeably.
7 I also tested a full range of state policy instruments that have been cited in the
literature as having a constraining effect on fiscal policy. These include line-item veto
power, supermajority tax and spending requirements, legislative term limits, as well as
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(Bennett and DiLorenzo 1982; Bunch 1991). Politicians are able to circumvent tax
and expenditure limitations through such revenue instruments as general obligation
and revenue bonds (Bunch 1991) or by the exemption of certain tax and spending
categories from limitation (Abrams and Dougan 1986; Bails 1990). Second, others
argue that states that have such limitations are also the states with the least fiscally
responsible politicians. Thus, the decision to impose tax and expenditure limitations is
endogenous. Consequently, legislation in these states will be crafted “to minimize the
real world impact o f these limitations” (Bails 1982, 129).
Given the results I report here, it appears that there is little support for the
fiscal constraints theory of state government growth. The positive and statistically
significant results for the coefficients indicate a positive relationship between these
forms o f fiscal restraint and government growth.

Political Needs
The political needs explanation of state government growth suggests that
increases in the size of the public sector are a result of high-demand sub-groups within
the population, such as school-age children and the elderly. Support for this
explanation of state government growth, however is mixed. O f the coefficients for the
six variables used to test whether public sector size is a function of the population
needs o f the state, only three are significant and in the hypothesized direction. The
proportion o f the state under the age of 18, unemployment and economic growth all
exhibit coefficients that are statistically significant and in the expected direction. On

interactions controlling for the signature requirements of citizen initiatives. None of
these policy instruments had a negative effect on government size.
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the other hand, the over 65 and black proportions of the population are associated with
smaller government. A rise in inflation rates is also inversely related to government
growth, though the coefficient is not significant. These disparate results are explored
further below.
The coefficient for the proportion of a state’s under 18 population is significant
and positively related to state government size (b = .02637, t = 1.711). Presumably, a
higher proportion o f residents under 18 requires increased state education
expenditures. Holding all other model variables to their mean, a one standard
deviation increase in the proportion of the population over 18 generates a .13%
increase in undeflated state government size (results not shown). The standardized
beta coefficient suggests that the impact o f this variable is minimal (beta = .0325).
The proportional change in total state personal income from the previous year
is in the expected negative direction and highly significant (b = -.05064, t - -9.115).
The negative coefficient for this variable indicates that those states experiencing gains
in total state personal income have a reduction in government size in the following
year. The effect of a one standard deviation increase for this variable is a decline of
.25% in the size of the state public sector (results not shown). Likewise, a one
standard deviation decrease leads to .25% increase in state government growth (results
not shown). The standardized beta value implies that changes in a state’s total
personal income from year to year exerted only a modest effect on state government
growth from 1946 to 1997 (beta = -.0623).
Contrary to the hypothesis put forth in this analysis, rising inflation is not
associated with variation on the size of the state public sector. The coefficient for
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inflation, measured as the proportional change in the Consumer Price Index, is
negative though not significant.8 Surprisingly, the proportion of the population sixtyfive and older is negatively related to state government growth (b = -. 15258, t = 6.989). This undermines the hypothesis set forth in Chapter 2 that a greater proportion
of elderly citizens should result in greater state health-related expenditures.
Controlling for all other variables in the model, a one standard deviation increase in
the proportion in the state over 65 population yields a .37% decrease in state
government size (results not shown). The inverse relationship between a state’s
elderly population and public sector size could be related to the fact that older people
are generally wealthier than younger people. Thus, states with substantial elderly
populations may have relatively greater total state personal income than those with
populations that are more youthful. Since total state personal income is the
denominator in the formula used for the dependent variable, the presence o f a
relatively more affluent elderly subpopulation would result in a smaller value for state
government size.
The effect o f the change in the unemployment rate from the previous year is in
the expected positive direction and if a one-tailed t-test is used, the coefficient falls
within conventional levels of statistical significance (b = .03624, t = 1.897). The
positive and significant coefficient indicates that rising unemployment leads to greater

8 Because of this contradictory finding, I used a variety of other inflation indices. The
proportional change in the GDP and GNP deflator was used. I also tried lagging the
proportional change by one year under the supposition that there was a delay between
the effect o f inflation and an increased need within the state population. None o f these
alternatives provided different results. Indeed, all were negative and highly
significant.
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state government spending. Overall, the standardized beta coefficients for this
variable suggest a relatively modest effect on state government growth (beta = .0125).
Contrary to the hypothesis set forth here, the black proportion of the state
population is positively related to state government growth. The coefficient is highly
significant (b = -.01000, t = -2.402). A one standard deviation increase in the black
population proportion indicates that state government can be expected to decline by
.10% (results not shown). The standardized beta coefficient value of -.0253 indicates
that the overall negative effect of a state’s black population on state growth is small
for the years in this data set.
The political needs theory o f state government growth finds moderate support
in this analysis. Economic downturns, a positive change in the unemployment rate,
and the proportion of school-age children in a state are all positively related to public
sector growth. The regression results, however, imply that an older population is
negatively related to government size and this may be due to their relatively higher
incomes. Perhaps the most contrary finding is that high inflation is inversely related to
government growth. The possibility discussed here suggested that state government
might postpone large-scale projects with the expectation that borrowing rates will
decline in the future. Little support is found for the hypothesis that the black
proportion of the population has a positive impact on state growth. The results here
suggest that states with large black populations have smaller public sectors.

Political Culture
The political culture explanation of government growth asserts that a larger
public sector is a function of the liberalism of the population, which is reflected in
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public opinion and liberal state legislation. Higher values for these two variables
indicate higher liberalism scores. The two political culture coefficients, for state
opinion liberalism and policy liberalism, are both in the expected positive direction
and significant. States with higher values for the public opinion liberalism measure
have a larger state government than those that are more conservative. The policy
liberalism variable (b = .00660, t = 10.986) performs notably better than the variable
measuring state public opinion liberalism (b = .01037, t = 1.412). The latter variable
achieves a weak level of statistical significance when a one-tailed t-test is used. The
effect of a one standard deviation increase in the value of the state opinion liberalism
measure, when holding the value of the other variables in the model to their mean,
translates into a .07% increase in the size of state government (results not shown).
The standardized beta coefficient of .0186 in the indicates only a modest impact.
Results for the policy liberalism variable indicate very strong support for this
aspect o f the political culture theory of state government growth. Holding other
variables to their mean value, a one standard deviation increase in the value of the
variable results in a .63% increase in undeflated state government size (results not
shown). The standardized beta coefficient, however, suggests that the impact of
policy liberalism on undeflated state government growth is small (beta = .1619) when
compared to some o f the other variables in this model.

Responsive Theories In the Deflated Model
In general, the findings reported in the undeflated model of government growth
are supported when state government size is measure using the deflated measure.
Several variables that are significant in the undeflated model, however, do fall below
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conventional levels of significance in the deflated model. The coefficient for
Democratic control of government (party control) is no longer statistically significant,
though it retains a positive sign (b = .00071, t = 0.683). I should note that the
coefficient for party control is only weakly significant in the undeflated model.
Perhaps more interesting is the effect o f unemployment in the deflated model. While a
rise in unemployment is still positively related to state public sector size, the
coefficient is no longer statistically significant (b = .02297, t = 1.002). Apparently,
changes in state unemployment rates are not associated with real (or deflated) state
government growth.
Unemployment-related costs to state government generally take the form of
transfer payments; therefore, evidence that unemployment rates have more of an
impact on undeflated state growth than deflated state growth is not a wholly
unexpected finding. Since it is only the public sector “basket of goods and purchases”
that is affected by the differing inflation rates, an argument can be made that such
expenditures are more subject to private sector inflation rates.9
On the other hand, the effect o f inflation on state government growth in the
deflated model is substantial and again in the negative direction (b = -.00029,
t = -2.845). These results show that inflation has considerable more effect when
controlling for the differential inflation rates o f the public and private sector.
Increasing the value o f the variable by one standard deviation results in a .10% decline
in deflated state government growth versus a .001% decline when using the undeflated
measure (results not shown).
9 Attempts to distinguish between state government transfer expenditures and non141
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One plausible explanation o f this unexpected finding may lie in public sector
decision-making. The rationale given in this analysis is that higher inflation should
lead to diminished buying power, business closings, and an overall decline in the
health of the economy. These factors should lead to an increased need by citizens for
government welfare spending along with other policies to ameliorate the economic
conditions in the state. However, higher inflation could lead state officials to
postpone expensive public undertakings. For instance, the financing of capital
projects requires significant borrowing by the state. Far-sighted politicians may prefer
to put such endeavors on hold until interest rates, buoyed by inflation, revert to lower
levels. Borrowing at the current high interest rates will constrain future spending.
This interpretation of the effect of inflation on state government growth would then no
longer involve a response to citizen needs, but rather an economically sound political
decision made at elite levels of government.
Two other differences between the undeflated and deflated model estimates
merit attention. The coefficients for a state’s black population proportion is positive in
the deflated model of state government size though not significant (b = .00035, t =
0.069). Second, the under 18 and over 65 proportions of a state population have a
markedly greater impact in the deflated model than in the undeflated model. The
coefficient for the under 18 proportion of the population is also positive in the deflated
model, though the explanatory power of the variable is noticeably better (b = .12574, t
= 6.797). The over 65 population coefficient retains a similar significance level in the
deflated model and is also in the unexpected negative direction.
transfer expenditures in the data collection stage of this analysis proved unsuccessful.
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The chief difference between the two models for the under 18 proportion and
over 65 variables lies in their impact on state government size. Holding all other
variables in the model to their mean values, a one standard deviation increase in the
proportion of the population over 18 generates a .13% increase in undeflated state
government size compared to a .61% increase when a deflated measure of growth is
used (results not shown). The same comparison for the over 65 population variable
indicates a decline of -.37% in the undeflated model and a -.27% in the deflated
model (results not shown). Since deflated state government growth, which reflects the
higher inflation rates incurred by state government, is partly a function of the rising
costs of education, i.e. teacher salaries, buildings, textbooks, the substantial impact
revealed for the under 18 population proportion in the deflated turnout model is likely
due to these education-related expenses. In other words, the under 18 variable
primarily affects real state government growth. One conclusion that can be made from
the smaller negative impact in the deflated model for the over 65 population
proportion is that the purported health costs incurred by state government as a result of
an aging population may be less than what was hypothesized in Chapter 3. Or at least,
the positive impact o f such costs are overshadowed by the affluence of an older
population.

Summary of Responsive Theories
Taken as a whole, the responsive explanations contribute to our understanding
o f state government growth. In particular, the political culture, party control, and
political needs explanations o f state public sector size receive moderate-to-strong
support in both the undeflated and deflated models. Both political culture variables
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have uniformly positive and significant coefficients in the two models o f state
government growth. For the party control explanation, it appears that state government
growth is more likely to grow as the Democratic Party sustains control of government
over a number of years. Indeed, the coefficient reflecting Democratic control of
government in the previous year is not a significant predictor of state public sector size
in the deflated model and only weakly significant in the undeflated model. Interesting
results are obtained for the political needs variables. Surprisingly, increases in
inflation rates and the over 65 proportion o f state population lead to smaller state
government. Black population seems unrelated to government growth. On the other
hand, the under 18 population, state economic growth, and unemployment are related
to an increase in government growth. Moreover, a comparison of the different effects
of the political needs variables in the undeflated and deflated models enriches our
understanding of the dynamics o f state government growth.
On the other hand, several responsive explanations fail to find much support in
these models. Inter-party competition seems to have no relationship with state
government growth, and this is the case whether it is a state election year or not.
Likewise, this analysis confirms the findings of other scholars regarding the effect of
fiscal constraints on state government growth. Neither tax and expenditure limitations
nor the presence of state voter initiatives has the proposed negative effect on public
sector growth. This perplexing finding may be due to the possible endogenous
character o f the variable. Confirmation of the median income voter theory was sought
using two different variables and both variable specifications indicate that increased
median income voter turnout actually depresses state government growth.

144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Finally, I find little support for Wagner’s Law. While this study confirms that
urbanization has a positive impact on state government growth, the results reveal
contrary evidence for the other three component variables. The logged value of per
capita income I use in this study is an improvement over the untransformed version of
the variable; however, like Garand (1993), I find that per capita income has a negative
effect. Moreover, the effect is quite strong. My measure of state industrialization, a
variable heretofore not analyzed in state-level government growth studies, also points
to an unexpected inverse effect. Though this finding contradicts a central hypothesis
o f Wagner’s Law, it does mirror the effect of industrialization found in international
public sector growth studies (Boix 2001). Finally, the effect of density on state public
sector size is in contradiction to Wagner’s Law. Indeed, density may have a modest
positive impact on state government growth, particularly when state government size
is deflated.

Excessive Theories
Fiscal Illusion
The fiscal illusion explanation of state government growth asserts that citizens,
because of the illusionary nature o f the tax system, systematically underestimate the
amount they pay in taxes. Because of this underestimation, state government size is
larger than it would be if citizens were fully aware of their tax burden.
Support for the fiscal illusion explanation of government growth is weak.
Only one of the three component variables o f the fiscal illusion explanation of state
government growth, deficit spending, finds support in the model. There is
considerable evidence that state deficit spending leads to increased government size.
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The state deficit spending coefficient is positive and highly significant (b = .07452, t =
13.218). The effect of deficit spending on state government growth is relatively large.
Holding the value of all other variables in the model to their mean value, a one
standard deviation increase in the proportion of the state budget financed through
deficit spending yields a .35% increase in the undeflated size of state government
(results not shown).
As expected, the proportion of state revenue derived from income tax receipts
is positively related to state government growth, though the coefficient is well below
conventional levels of statistical significance (b = .00320, t = 0.795). Thus, it appears
that if there is any element of fiscal illusion in income taxes, it does not seem to be
related to a corresponding increase in the undeflated size of the state public sector.
The coefficient for the variable measuring the concentration of a state’s
revenue system is unexpectedly positive, though not significant (b = .00270, t =
1.015). Since high values for this variable indicate a more concentrated revenue
system, the expectation is that this coefficient will take a negative sign. The
coefficient’s lack o f significance and negative direction is in contrast to Garand
(1993), who finds a strong positive relationship between revenue system complexity
and state government growth. On the other hand, a positive relationship for revenue
concentration is found in international (Cameron 1978) and national-level (Lowery
and Berry 1983) empirical analyses.
In sum, the fiscal illusion explanation of government growth receives weak
support in this model. One exception is the effect of deficit spending, which is
positively related to state government growth. The standardized beta coefficient
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reported in the undeflated state government growth model suggests that deficit
spending has a relatively strong impact on public sector size (beta = .0879). State
revenue concentration, on the other hand, has no effect on public sector size. The
proportion of state revenue derived from income taxes, while exhibiting a positive
relationship to state government growth in the model, fails to achieve conventional
levels of statistical significance.

Bureau-Voting
The bureau-voting theory suggests that the self-interested voting behavior of
bureaucrats translates into a larger public sector. It is hypothesized that bureaucrats
see an advantage in growth in the size of government. Thus, as the ratio of public
sector workers to private sector workers increases, there should be an attendant growth
in government. Empirical evidence, however, for the bureau-voting theory of state
government growth is mixed. While the proportion of federal and local employees in
a state tends to depress public sector size, the proportion of state employees exerts a
positive impact on state government growth. From a theoretical standpoint, it is the
state employee proportion of the population that benefits the most from an expansion
of the public sector. Thus, the positive and highly significant coefficient for the state
employee coefficient provides substantial support for the bureau-voting model.
The coefficient for the federal employee proportion variable is negative and
highly significant (b = -.37404, t = -6.544). A one standard deviation increase in the
proportion o f federal employees in the previous year, holding other variables to their
mean values, leads to a decline in state government growth of .21% in the following
year (results not shown). The effect o f the local employee proportion of the

147

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

population is similar, though with considerably less impact. The coefficient for this
variable is negative, though not significant (b = -.08148, t = -1.286).
The centerpiece of this model, the proportion of state employees in a state
population, has a strong positive impact on state government size (b = 2.03131, t =
21.015). Holding the effects of all other variables constant at their means, a one
percent increase in the proportion of the state population employed by the state
increases the size of government by .20% (results not shown).10 The effect o f a one
standard increase in this variable, again holding all other variables to their mean
values, is more dramatic, yielding a growth in state government of 1.20% (results not
shown). The value reported for the standardized beta coefficient is also quite high
(beta = .3060). With the exception of intergovernmental grants and per capita income,
this is the strongest positive impact in the study.
The bureau-voting explanation of government growth provides an interesting
insight on the role of self-interest in public sector growth. It was argued in Chapter 3
that given the job similarity o f local, state, and federal workers, an increase in their
respective proportions within a state population should result in an expanded public
sector. Moreover, as Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud (1991) have shown, public
employees are both more liberal than their private sector counterparts and turn out to
10 One important objection to these findings is that the number of state employees in a
state will increase government size because of the state employee wages paid. Thus,
an argument could be made that the proportion o f state employees is actually an
endogenous variable. To account for this possibility, I estimated all the models with
state expenditures - state employee wages in the numerator o f the dependent variable.
The proportion of state employees in a state was still a very powerful predictor of state
government growth. The decision to retain the original dependent variable, unpurged
o f state wages paid, was based on the recognition that state personnel expenditure is a
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vote at higher rates. The results of this analysis demonstrate, however, that it is state
employees that matter most for state government growth. Federal and local employees
actually contribute to a decline in state public sector size. Since state employees are
the principal beneficiaries o f state government growth, the findings reported here
should be taken as confirmatory evidence of the bureau-voting model.

Intergovernmental Grant
Intergovernmental grants are hypothesized to have a positive impact on state
government growth. The theory suggests that while federal aid can substitute for
state-derived revenue, it is also possible that such aid can result in greater spending,
over and above the amount received by the federal government. For instance,
intergovernmental grants are often conditional on state matching requirements. The
model o f state government growth provides abundant empirical evidence that
intergovernmental grants lead to greater state government growth. The
intergovernmental coefficient is positive and highly significant (b = 1.58182, t =
41.097). The coefficient exceeds a value of 1.00, which indicates that
intergovernmental grants increase the size of state government beyond a simple oneto-one ratio. Recall from Chapter 3 that a value greater than I for the
intergovernmental grant coefficient implies that the influx of federal funds increases
state spending more than the amount received from the federal government. For
instance, the model reports a coefficient of 1.58. This means that federal grants to
state government generates additional spending by state government For every dollar

very real component o f state government size. Indeed, it is likely that state wages are
contingent on the voting power of state employees.
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o f federal aid, an additional 58 cents is contributed from a state’s own revenue base.
This represents a substantial impact on state government size. A one standard
deviation increase in the value of the intergovernmental grant variable, when holding
all other variables to their mean values, results in a 2.10% increase in state
government size as a proportion of total state personal income (results not shown).
The value of the standardized beta coefficient indicates that intergovernmental grants
exert the greatest impact on state government growth (beta = .5341).
It is evident that the federal government plays a large role in government
growth at the state level. Rather than substitute or enhance state revenue, federal aid
results in a remarkable increase in public sector expenditures. One dollar of federal
aid translates to 58 cents of state-derived spending, according to the model estimate in
this analysis. O f all the variables tested in this study, the impact of intergovernmental
grants on state government growth is the largest. Thus, it is clear that
intergovernmental aid has an overall positive effect on the size of the state public
sector. The notion that federal aid plays a substitutive role in state budgets is belied by
the results o f this analysis. The positive impact of intergovernmental aid is likely due
to the matching requirements and stipulations that often accompany federal grants.

Constituency Size
The constituency size theory suggests that as the number of constituents per
representative increases there is a corresponding increase in the size of state
government. First, a larger constituency leads to a more heterogeneous district and
weaker constituency signals. This makes trading votes less difficult and legislation
easier to pass. Second, the smaller legislature implied by increased constituency size
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results in an increase in the “price” of a legislator’s vote. This increased price, it is
hypothesizes, makes it more difficult for citizens to compete with the “deep pockets”
of interest groups.
Evidence for the constituency size explanation of government growth is strong
for the effect of house constituency size. The coefficient for the house constituency
size variables is in the expected negative direction and highly significant (b = -.00930,
t = -2.896). The coefficient for the senate constituency ratio, while negative, is not
significant (b = -.00272, t = -0.118). It is noteworthy that the coefficient for the
senate constituency variable is overshadowed by the house constituency coefficient.
The house coefficient is almost four times larger than the senate coefficient. This
finding is in contrast to that of Thornton and Ulrich (1999), who concluded that the
impact o f constituency size is more pronounced for the senate.
An examination of the effect o f a one standard deviation decrease in the ratio
between representative and represented, when holding the values of all other variables
to their mean, confirms that house constituency size has a greater influence on state
government growth than the constituency size of a senate member. Such a decrease in
the value for the house variable suggests that state government increases by .10%,
whereas the same decrease for the senate variable yields only a .001% increase in
public sector growth (results not shown). The effect of house constituency size is
roughly ten times that of senate constituency size. This disparity is reflected in the
standardized beta values for the two variables, beta = -.0249 and beta = -.0015 for the
house and senate respectively. Nevertheless, these values indicate that constituency
size has had a relatively small impact on state public sector growth.
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Overall, the model indicates that as the proportion of the population per
representative increases, government growth declines. While only the coefficient for
the house variable is significant, the coefficient for senate is in the expected negative
direction. It appears that the impact of the representative-constituent ratio on state
public sector size is greater for the house than the senate.

Divided Government
The effect of divided government on state government growth reported in
Table 6 is contrary to the hypothesis set forth in Chapter 3 that a lack of consensus
within state government would result in a compromise in which the opposing parties
would both see their spending preferences satisfied. At first glance, it appears that a
history of divided state government leads to a reduction in state government growth.
The divided government coefficient is negative and weakly significant (b = -.00261, t
= -1.635). The divided government coefficient indicates that a state government
under split control for all of the previous five years leads to a decline in state
government size.
However, a corollary to this hypothesis argues that whether a state government
is able to finance such a spending increase is contingent upon the ability to muster a
coalition within the legislative branch in favor of a tax increase. The absence of
legislative supermajority requirements for tax increases should make such coalitionbuilding comparatively easier.11

111 also estimate a model that does not include the legislative supermajority
interaction variable. These estimates indicate that divided government does lead to
growth in state government, especially when state public sector size is undeflated.
The coefficient for the divided government variable is .00150 (t = 2.082) in the
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The inclusion o f the divided govemment-supermajority requirement interaction
variable suggests that divided government in a state with no such requirements may in
fact result in greater state government growth. The variable coefficient is positive and
highly significant (b = -.00261, t = 2.889).12 An indication of the impact of divided
government in a state with no supermajority requirements can be ascertained by using
the coefficients reported in Table 6. For instance, a state government that is 1) able to
pass a tax increase with only a majority of both houses and 2) has had divided
government for the previous 5 years has a public sector that is proportionally .0018 (or
.18%) larger than a supermajority-state with a five year history of unified control

undeflated model, and .00129 (t = 1.485) in the deflated model. I have chosen to
retain the interaction variable because it demonstrates the importance o f the
supermajority requirement. The positive and significant findings for the model
excluding the interaction variable reflects the fact that the vast majority of the states in
this sample (38 of 49) do not have such supermajority requirements. Computing the
effect o f a completely divided state government delegation in the past five years, while
holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean, indicates that
undeflated state government should grow by .15%. This is comparable to the value of
. 18% given in the text that includes the effect of the interaction variable.
121 hypothesized that the effect of divided government should be more apparent as it
becomes the norm rather than the exception, hence the use of the five-year average.
Moreover, using five years assures at least one intervening gubernatorial election.
However, an argument can be made that if divided government leads to an increase in
state government growth, then this effect should be apparent in the year immediately
following a year of split control. A test for this possibility yielded virtually identical
results as those reported here. The divided government coefficient was negative and
significant in all models with the exception of the deflated turnout model of state
government growth. The supermajority interaction variable coefficient was positive
and significant in all models as well. The divided government coefficient in the
undeflated turnout model was -.0033, and was .0047 for the supermajority interaction
coefficient. These coefficients indicate that a state public sector with divided
government in the past year and no supermajority requirement is .14% larger in the
following year. The cumulative effect is somewhat smaller (.07%) in this divided
government scenario than that under the variable operationalization used in this
analysis. Aside from this difference, there were no changes in the sign or significance
levels for the other variables tested.
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((I * -.00261) + (1 * .00445)) (results not shown). This is an admittedly extreme
example, however, 18% o f the state-years from 1946 to 1997 fall into this very
category.13
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that divided government has a positive
impact on state government size as the passage of tax increases becomes less difficult.
When legislative supermajority requirements in place, divided government results in a
smaller state public sector. Given the fact that so few states have such requirements,
the overall effect of divided government on government growth (.18% increase) is
similar to that of a state with a legacy o f unified Democratic control (.22% increase).14
Unfunded Mandates13
The unfunded mandates explanation of state public sector growth suggests that
the proliferation of unfunded mandates from the mid 1960s onward has placed a
financial burden on state government that has resulted in an overall increase in the size
of government. As noted in Chapter 3, the effect of unfunded mandates on state
government growth can occur in two different ways. First, the increase in unfunded
mandates since 1965 could lead to a break and upward shift in the trend o f state
government growth in the years from 1966 onward. To control for this possibility, I
131also tested for the possibility that the significance of the interaction variable was
due more to the lack o f state supermajority requirements than an interaction with
divided government. Including a dummy variable equal to one if a state had such
requirements did not alter the results reported here. Indeed, the coefficient for this
variable was positive and non-significant.
14 The coefficient values for the party control and divided government variables come
from the undeflated turnout model estimates reported in Table 6.
13 The control variable. Trend, facilitates the interpretation o f the 1965 counter
variable. The variable indicates that state government has grown in the years 1946 to
1997. Since it is a control variable, the significance and direction of its coefficients in
the four models will not be discussed here.
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use a dummy variable that takes the value o f one in all state-years from 1966 to 1997.
This variable operationalization should capture any substantial upward shifts, or
breaks in the overall government growth trend line. That state governments
experienced such an upward shift is evident from the regression results. The model
reveals a positive and highly significant (b = .01332, t = 11.610) coefficient for the
post-1965 dummy variable. A second possibility is that the effect of unfunded
mandates on state public sector growth has led to a steeper slope in the years since
1965. To account for this steeper slope, I created a variable that takes the value of one
in 1966, two in 1967, three in 1968, and so on. This variable coding should reveal
whether the state government growth trend line became steeper in the years following
1965. Again, the coefficient for this counter variable is positive and highly significant
(b = .00039, t = 3.421) in the model estimation.
Therefore, it appears that in 1966 state government size both shifted upward
and grew at a higher rate in the years following the mid-1960s. The coefficient for the
1965 dummy variable indicates that when holding the effects of all other variables
constant at their means, state government became 1.3% larger than would otherwise
be expected as a result o f unfunded federal mandates. The same procedure for the
1965 counter variable implies that state government grew by an additional .04% in
every year since 1965. Multiplying this coefficient by the 22 remaining years in the
data set suggests that .86% of the growth since 1965 is attributable to the proliferation
of unfunded mandates. This accounts for a substantial percentage o f the overall state
growth in this era. Table 4 reports a mean state government size of .1048 in 1965 and
.1438 in 1997, a four percent increase. Depending on the degree to which the 1965
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counter variable is an accurate measure, about a fifth o f this growth may be linked to
unfunded mandates.
As noted in Chapter 3, the ideal measure o f the effect of unfunded mandates
would indicate the financial burden placed upon the states. The use of the post-1965
dummy variables, however, does provide a crude estimate of the impact of such
mandates on the size o f state government. With this caveat in mind, the unfunded
mandate explanation o f state government growth fares well in this analysis. The
coefficients for the 1965 dummy variable and counter variable are positive and highly
significant. The standardized beta coefficients suggest that unfunded mandates have
had a considerable effect on state government growth since the mid-1960s.

Excessive Theories in the Deflated Model
There are only a few differences between the findings reported for the
undeflated model and deflated model when testing the component variables of the
excessive explanations of state government growth. This in contrast to the relatively
large disparities noted in the responsive explanation section.
Perhaps the most notable difference is that intergovernmental grants seem to
have a greater effect on deflated state growth than in the undeflated model. When
government growth is deflated, intergovernmental grants translate into comparatively
larger public sector size. Here, the intergovernmental coefficient equals 1.75948 (t =
38.096). This coefficient value indicates that one federal grant dollar yields state
spending of 1.76 dollars. Every federal dollar results in an additional 76 cents that
comes from a state’s own revenue base. This is 18 cents more than when state
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government size is deflated. The impact of intergovernmental grants on state
government growth is also the single largest impact in the deflated model (beta =
.6529).
Coefficients for two variables are significant in the deflated model that were
not in the undeflated model. The first of these, from the fiscal illusion theory, is the
proportion of state revenue derived from income taxes. The coefficient for this
variable is in the expected positive direction and significant at relaxed levels in a one
tailed test (b = .00740, t = 1.532). The effect of an increase in the income tax
proportion of state revenue, however, is not as dramatic as that found for deficit
spending. Holding the effects of all the other variables constant at their means,
suggests that an increase of one standard deviation for this variable yields only a .06%
increase in state government size (results not shown).
The proportion of local employees in a state population is still negatively
related to state government size in the deflated model; however, the coefficient is
highly significant (b = -.19212, t = -2.527). One conclusion that can be taken from
this finding is unrelated to any notion of self-interested voting behavior. It may be
that devolution of certain responsibilities from state government to local government
results in a decrease in deflated state expenditures. For instance, this may be the statelevel version of unfunded mandates. The state makes local government responsible
for the administration and funding of programs, but does not provide the local
government with any compensation. Thus, the proportion of local workers may be
serving as a proxy for state-level unfunded mandates. On the other hand, local
government in some states may willingly assume a greater role in the provision of
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public goods and services. Thus, states with higher proportions of local employees
may be states with more active local governments.
Two minor differences concern changes in the significance levels of the house
constituency size and divided government coefficients. First, the house constituency
size coefficient retains the expected negative sign, but is only significant at a marginal
level (b = -.00539, t = -1.400). Second, the divided government coefficient, while still
negative, no longer attains conventional levels of statistical significance (b = -.00223, t
= -1.167).

Summary of Excessive Theories
Overall, the excessive explanations do a good job at enlarging our
understanding of the determinants of state government growth. There is substantial
empirical support for the theory that intergovernmental grants dramatically increase
the size of the state public sector. Contrary to the argument that such grants play a
replacement or substitutive role, the result of this analysis demonstrate that there is a
considerable increase in state government size well over the amount received from the
federal government. One dollar of federal aid translates into anywhere from 58 cents
(undeflated model) to 76 cents (deflated model) in additional state spending.
Moreover, the impact of this variable, as measured by the standardized beta
coefficients, is the largest of all variables in the model.
The regression results also indicate that a state’s proportion of state employees
has an important effect on the size of the public sector. The categorization of public
employees by levels o f government is also particularly useful for understanding the
dynamics o f state government growth. Since the basis of the bureau voting theory
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suggests that government growth is a function o f the self-interested voting behavior of
bureaucrats, the findings of this analysis present a refinement of the theory. In
particular, this variable, which has been operationalized by some scholars (Garand
1988; 1993) as the proportion o f state and local employees, seems to be better
measured as just state employees. The negative coefficient reported for the local
employee variable suggests that either an expanded state public sector is not in the
self-interest of local employees or that a larger local employee proportion indicates
that local government has relatively greater responsibility for the administration and
funding of government programs and policies.
The mixed findings for the fiscal illusion theory of state government growth
also suggest that this explanation needs to be refined. The positive effect o f revenue
concentration on state government size may be because a more simplified tax system
actually aids state revenue efforts. On the other hand, it appears that the proportion of
revenue derived from income tax receipts exerts a positive impact on state government
growth, though this hypothesis only finds support in the deflated model. Deficit
spending, however, is an important determinant of state public sector size. Moreover,
the standardized beta coefficients for both models suggest a relatively strong positive
effect.
The effect o f divided government on government size, which has not been
tested at the state level, finds moderate support. The conventional wisdom that
divided government leads to gridlock (e.g. Cutler 1988) does not seem to the case.
While I make no claim regarding the effectiveness of the policies that emerge from a
divided state government, it appear that when there are no legislative supermajority
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requirements, split-controi results in an expansion of the state public sector. I should
note, however, that the impact o f divided government is relatively minor when
compared to some of the other variables in this model.
There is some evidence that constituency size is positively related to state
government size. However, this effect is confined to the house constituency size
variable. This is a noteworthy finding since previous analysis suggests that it is the
senate constituency size ratio that has the most effect on public sector growth.
Finally, empirical support for the notion that unfunded mandates have resulted
in an upward shift in the size o f state public sectors receives some tentative support in
both the undeflated and deflated models. As noted, I would prefer to have a better
estimate of the fiscal impact of unfunded mandates on the states. Nonetheless, the
positive and significant coefficients for both the 1965 dummy and counter variables
provide some indication that such mandates have resulted in increased state
government growth.

Comparing Predicted and Observed Values
Before summarizing the overall results of the analysis, some indication of how
well the model performs for each year and state in the data set is in order. In Tables 8
and 9 ,1 present the predicted and observed values for each year in the data set. The
residual values in the fourth column of the two tables indicate that both the undeflated
and deflated models of government growth do a good job at generating accurate
predictions of mean state government size. For the undeflated measure, the mean
predicted value (.10834) is virtually identical to the actual mean value (.10843).
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Similar results are obtained when the deflated measure o f government growth is used,
though the difference between the two values is modestly greater.
Among the 52 years in the data set, the predicted values fit the actual mean
size of state government best in 1990, with an underestimation of the true proportion
in the undeflated model o f only .00013, or .013%. Similarly, the underestimation in
1969 is just .0034%. The best fit in the deflated model is for 1953, with an
overestimation of only .004%. On the other hand, the years 1976 and 1986, in the
undeflated model, have the worst fit when comparing observed to predicted values.
However, the absolute value of the residuals for these two years is still relatively
small. This value is .00669 and .00642 for 1976 and 1986 respectively, representing
an almost one percent difference in the actual mean size of state government in these
two years. The worst fit in the deflated model of state government size is for 1950.
The model predicts a value of .10051 and the observed value is .10835, a difference of
.00784. The second worst fit in the model is 1949, with an underestimation of .00656.
Tables 10 and 11 contain the predicted and observed values for mean state
government size, broken down by state. Again, my model of state public sector
growth does a good job at explaining government size within the states. Overall, there
is little difference between the observed size of state government and that predicted by
the model. When the undeflated measure is used, the mean predicted value of state
government size is . 10904 compared to an actual size o f . 10918. The difference
between observed and predicted values when using the deflated measure is also small.
Though all the state-by-state residuals are small, it is evident that the model explains
government growth in some states better than in others. Table 11 indicates that
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Table 8. Mean Observed and Predicted Undeflated Government Size in the
American States, By Year, 1946-1997
Year

Observed
Government Size

Predicted
Government Size

Absolute Value of
Residual

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

.04255
.05042
.05708
.06918
.07134
.06531
.06603
.06821
.06872
.06915
.07167
.07448
.07954
.08407
.08322
.08636
.08619
.08959
.09213
.10135
.10477
.11064
.11264
.11311
.12015
.12839
.12860
.12145
.12264
.13459
.14185
.13466
.12854
.12521
.12855
.13017
.13023

.04376
.05343
.05588
.06772
.06692
.06739
.06462
.06728
.06973
.06976
.07125
.07307
.08031
.08709
.08559
.08514
.08331
.08763
.09046
.10441
.10793
.11242
.11400
.11277
.11672
.12612
.12601
.12295
.12393
.13512
.13516
.13323
.13161
.13097
.13404
.13204
.12773

.00121
.00301
.00120
.00146
.00442
.00208
.00141
.00093
.00101
.00061
.00042
.00141
.00077
.00302
.00237
.00122
.00287
.00196
.00167
.00306
.00316
.00179
.00136
.00034
.00343
.00227
.00260
.00150
.00129
.00053
.00669
.00142
.00307
.00576
.00549
.00187
.00250
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Table 8. cont.,
Year

Observed
Government Size

Predicted
Government Size

Absolute Value of
Residual

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

.13192
.12658
.12715
.13162
.13160
.12963
.13106
.13292
.13811
.14330
.14538
.14438
.14575
.14241
.14383

.12810
.12444
.12451
.12519
.12993
.12881
.12937
.13278
.13877
.14194
.14492
.14513
.14668
.14617
.14926

.00382
.00214
.00264
.00642
.00167
.00081
.00169
.00013
.00066
.00136
.00046
.00075
.00094
.00376
.00543

Ail Years

.10843

.10834

.00219

*Note: Predicted values computed from the model coefficients reported in Table 6.
government growth in Idaho is best explained by my model.16 The difference between
the actual mean size of government in Idaho is .11528 compared to a predicted value
o f . 11500. The predicted mean size o f government for Vermont is also quite close to
the observed mean size. The model slightly underestimates the proportion of the total
state economy consumed by Vermont state government by .00036. The model does
worst in predicting government growth in Washington. The error here is an
underestimation o f approximately 2%. Close behind Vermont is Texas. The size of
Texas state government is overestimated by almost 1.5%.

16 Nebraska actually has the lowest residual with all variation explained. This is due
to the inclusion o f the Nebraska dummy variable.
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Table 9. Mean Observed and Predicted Deflated Government Size in the
American States, By Year, 1946-1997
Year

Observed
Government Size

Predicted
Government Size

Absolute Value of
Residual

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

.06975
.08162
.08729
.10484
.10835
.09637
.09476
.09718
.09723
.09770
.09831
.10113
.10921
.11417
.11254
.11543
.11316
.11642
.11907
.12985
.13156
.13566
.13677
.13504
.13961
.14626
.14424
.13353
.13237
.14459
.15179
.14417
.13829
.13395
.13499
.13596
.13572

.07579
.08466
.08459
.09827
.10051
.09868
.09358
.09723
.09905
.10008
.10067
.10161
.10869
.11655
.11414
.11270
.11019
.11464
.11642
.12886
.13165
.13557
.13567
.13295
.13528
.14521
.14296
.13911
.13840
.14815
.14747
.14499
.14142
.13935
.14035
.13698
.13194

.00605
.00303
.00270
.00656
.00784
.00231
.00117
.00004
.00183
.00239
.00237
.00047
.00052
.00237
.00161
.00272
.00297
.00178
.00265
.00099
.00009
.00009
.00110
.00209
.00433
.00106
.00128
.00558
.00603
.00356
.00432
.00082
.00313
.00540
.00536
.00102
.00378
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Table 9. cont.,
Year

Observed
Government Size

Predicted
Government Size

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

.13686
.13038
.13001
.13377
.13214
.13520
.13243
.13346
.13970
.14578
.14767
.14585
.14624
.14241
.14294

.13368
.12961
.12833
.12893
.13359
.13113
.13062
.13311
.13958
.14291
.14599
.14560
.14668
.14509
.14800

.00318
.00076
.00168
.00484
.00145
.00407
.00180
.00034
.00012
.00286
.00168 .
.00025
.00044
.00267
.00506

All Years

.12488

.12475

.00255

Absolute Value of
Residual

*Note: Predicted values computed from the model coefficients reported in Table 7.
In the deflated model, the predicted mean size of state government in North
Carolina is only .007% higher than the observed mean size. The size of deflated state
government in Vermont is only .013% higher than the observe size. On the other
hand, the model does worse for Washington and Montana. The absolute value of the
residual is .02562 and .01686 for Washington and Montana respectively.

Summary
At this point, it is useful to summarize the chief findings o f the preceding
discussion. The thesis of this dissertation is that growth in state government is
primarily a function of public sector responsiveness to citizen needs and demands. On
the other hand, it may be that public sector growth is largely beyond the control of the
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Table 10. Mean Observed and Predicted Undeflated Government Size in the
American States, By State, 1946-1997
State

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

Observed State
Predicted State
Government Size Government Size

.11706
.10771
.11209
.10419
.09359
.08276
.11938
.08191
.09578
.17711
.11528
.07452
.08195
.10178
.08608
.11673
.14336
.11934
.08931
.09713
.10447
.11015
.13526
.07535
.12754
.07921
.10609
.08803
.07810
.15845
.10544
.10636
.13914
.08685
.11932
.11543
.09305

Absolute Value
of Residual

.11454
.09872
.11911
.09995
.10462
.08794
.11529
.08135
.10424
.18531
.11500
.08025
.07718
.10008
.09690
.12036
.13247
.11390
.09391
.09923
.10064
.10378
.13413
.08722
.13915
.07921
.09862
.09031
.08067
.14717
.10378
.10748
.12740
.08551
.11354
.12215
.08677
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.00252
.00900
.00701
.00424
.01103
.00519
.00409
.00056
.00846
.00820
.00029
.00573
.00477
.00170
.01082
.00363
.01089
.00544
.00460
.00209
.00383
.00638
.00112
.01187
.01161
.00000
.00747
.00227
.00257
.01128
.00166
.00112
.01175
.00134
.00578
.00672
.00628

Table 10. cont,
State

Observed State
Predicted State
Government Size Government Size

Absolute Value
of Residual

Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

.11439
.12165
.10806
.09402
.07668
.12906
.14009
.08723
.12414
.13903
.10621
.15687

.11146
.11214
.11879
.10305
.09127
.13261
.13972
.09123
.10364
.13551
.09912
.16342

.00293
.00950
.01073
.00903
.01459
.00355
.00036
.00401
.02050
.00351
.00709
.00655

All States

.10904

.10918

.00014

Note: Predicted values computed from the model coefficients reported in Table 6.
Table 11. Mean Observed and Predicted Deflated Government Size in the
American States, By State, 1946-1997
State

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

Observed State
Predicted State
Government Size Government Size

.13569
.12604
.13081
.11958
.10980
.09439
.13668
.09643
.11153
.19439
.13310
.08439
.09367
.11682
.09994

Absolute Value
of Residual

.13313
.11590
.13891
.11436
.12220
.09855
.12955
.09520
.12230
.19716
.13404
.09222
.08633
.11465
.11097
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.00256
.01014
.00810
.00522
.01239
.00417
.00713
.00122
.01077
.00277
.00094
.00784
.00734
.00217
.01103

Table 11. cont.,
State

Observed State
Predicted State
Government Size Government Size

Absolute Value
of Residual

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

.13352
.16897
.13632
.10234
.11043
.11994
.12626
.15751
.08661
.14553
.09049
.12324
.10263
.08736
.18365
.11836
.12396
.16056
.09772
.14052
.13313
.10569
.12908
.14078
.12518
.10954
.08859
.14888
.16084
.10105
.14416
.15862
.12105
.17953

.13985
.15350
.13064
.11136
.11248
.11388
.11942
.15798
.09990
.16240
.09049
.11500
.10509
.09189
.17038
.11658
.12403
.14869
.09742
.12940
.13858
.09954
.12569
.13102
.13837
.11854
.10588
.15504
.16072
.10708
.11854
.15505
.11285
.18522

.00633
.01547
.00568
.00902
.00205
.00606
.00684
.00047
.01329
.01686
.00000
.00825
.00246
.00452
.01327
.00178
.00007
.01187
.00029
.01112
.00545
.00615
.00339
.00976
.01319
.00901
.01729
.00616
.00013
.00603
.02562
.00358
.00821
.00569

All States

.12541

.12547

.00006

Note: Predicted values computed from the model coefficients reported in Table 7.
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state citizen. From the results discussed above, it seems that growth in state
government is a function of both. Factors identified in both the responsive and
excessive categories are found to positively influence public sector size.
Of the seven responsive theories I test, three fail to explain any o f the growth
in state government. Coefficients for interparty competition, fiscal constraint, and
median voter variables are either non-significant or were wrongly signed. However,
moderate support is found for some o f the component variables of the Wagner’s Law,
party control, and political need explanations of state government growth. Finally,
there is firm evidence that a state’s political culture was an important predictor of
public sector size.
All six theories o f excessive growth are successful at explaining state
government growth, though some more than others. One of the three component
variables, state deficit spending, in the fiscal illusion explanation is identified as
playing a role in public sector size. The proportion of state government employees in
a state and intergovernmental grants both exert a strong positive influence on
government growth. There is some indication that house constituency size is
positively related to public sector growth. Divided government, at least in the absence
o f supermajority requirements, is another important factor. Last, substantial support is
found for the hypothesis that much of state government growth is attributable to an
increase in unfunded mandates.
At this point, it is tempting to conclude that state government growth is due to
both responsive and excessive influences. The explanatory success of both categories
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is roughly even: five for responsive and six for excessive. However, how do the
theories within the two categories compare in the magnitude of their effect? The
answer to this question can be determined by comparing the relative effect of the
different variables as measured by their standardized beta coefficients. Table 12
below presents those variables identified in Tables 6 and 7 as significant predictors of
government growth. The impact of the median income voter variable comes from the
standardized beta coefficient given in Table 13 and 14, both of which are found in
Appendix 1. These variables are listed in descending values so as to compare the
relative effects of the variables found in the responsive and excessive categories.
Overall, there are 13 variables from the responsive category in the table and 11
from the excessive category.17 However, five o f the responsive category variables,
over 65 proportion, state manufacturing income, turnout/median income voter, and
inflation, actually decrease the size o f state government. On the other hand, three
excessive category variables have impacts opposite of what was hypothesized. These
are divided government, the proportion o f federal employees, and the proportion of
local employees.
A review of the top five variables in Table 12 will give some sense of the
degree to which state government grows as a result of the wishes or demands of a
majority of the population (responsive) or whether state government size is beyond
that which would be desired by the state’s citizens (excessive). In the undeflated
model, three o f the top five variables, as measured by their impact, come from the
17There are actually only 12 responsive variables that were significant, the inclusion
of both measures of median income voter turnout means that 13 are included in Table
11.
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excessive category. These are intergovernmental grants, state employee proportion,
and the effect o f the 1965 dummy variable. On the other hand, two responsive
variables, per capita income and state policy liberalism, are represented in the top five.
The deflated model column lists three responsive category variables, per capita
income, policy liberalism, and the under 18 proportion of the population. Common to
both measures of the dependent variable is the finding that intergovernmental grants
have had the greatest impact on state government growth. A close second is the impact
o f per capita income. Third in impact is the proportion of the population employed by
state government.
In sum, it appears that state government growth can not be attributed primarily
to either responsive or excessive explanations. As Table 12 suggests, growth in a
state’s public sector is the result of a wide range of factors. Indeed, several factors
identified as excessive actually contribute to a decline in state government. Likewise,
the state government response to certain citizen demands also results in a diminished
public sector. Ironically, such a contraction of state government size may be more
aptly considered as excessive. State government shrinks despite the apparent needs of
its population.
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Table 12. Estimated Impact of Variables on Undeflated and Deflated State
Government Growth
Undeflated Model Variables

Intergovernmental Grant
Logged Per Capita Income

Beta Deflated Model Variables

.5341

Intergovernmental Grant
-.4168 Logged Per Capita Income

Beta

.6529
-.4590

State Employees

.3060 State Employees

.3270

1965 Dummy

.1647 Policy Liberalism
.1619 Under 18

.1932

.1084

1965 Dummy

.1515

Over 65
Deficit

-.0928

1965 Counter

.1484

Economy
Federal Employees

-.0623 Manufacturing
-.0517 Economy

-.1048

Manufacturing
Divided * Supermajority

-.0484 Over 65

-.0753

Policy Liberalism
1965 Counter

.0879 Deficit

.0440 Federal Employees

Urban

.0437 Opinion Liberalism

Median Income Voter

.0351

Under 18

.0325 Local Employees

Turnout
Divided Government
House
Party Tenure
Opinion Liberalism
Local Employees
Unemployment
Inflation

Urban

-.0272 Divided * Supermajority
-.0258 Turnout
-.0249 Party Tenure
.0238 Inflation
.0186 Divided Government
-.0171

House

.0125 Median Income Voter
-.0010 Unemployment
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.1703

.1320
-.0774
-.0578
.0474
.0460
-.0443
.0414
-.0363
.0335
-.0277
-.0243
-.0158
.0140
.0087

Chapter 6: Conclusion
In this dissertation, I explore the determinants of state government growth in
the American states from 1946 to 1997. The empirical tests I conduct have several
advantages over tests found in much of the literature. First, past research on state
government growth, with some exceptions (e.g. Garand 1993), has typically relied on
either longitudinal or cross-sectional research designs. While both of these
approaches can inform us of the factors driving growth in state public sectors, it
prevents researchers from taking full advantage of the cross-sectional and longitudinal
covariation between government size indicators and various explanatory variables. In
this analysis, I develop and test models o f government growth that utilize pooled data
for the American states for the years 1946 to 1997, and hence allow for consideration
of the full range o f interrelationships between dependent and independent variables.
Second, the considerable time span covered in this analysis (52 years) is one of the
longer time-series studies in the state government growth literature. The inclusion of
these additional years permits 1) greater variation for both the dependent and
independent variables, and, 2) when using the pooling procedure greatly increases the
sample size, thus improving the statistical efficiency o f the resulting estimates.
Finally, my focus on government growth at one level in our federal system, the
American states, rather than on aggregated growth at the local, state, and federal
levels, allows for exploration o f growth patterns specific to state governments. This
disaggregated approach also permits the testing of theories that apply only to sub
national growth, such as unfunded mandates and intergovernmental grants.
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In this analysis, I also test several explanations of state government growth that
have received little or no attention in the previous literature. Though the effect of
divided government on state budget outcomes has received some attention (Alt and
Lowery 1994; Clingermayer and Wood 1995; Garand and Kapeluck 2000), no study
has included it as a determinant of overall public sector size. My conclusion that
divided government is related to state government size enhances our understanding of
the dynamics of split-control on state policy outcomes. A second explanation that has
gone unexamined in the literature relates unfunded mandates to state government
growth. While the measure I use is rudimentary, there seems to be a strong positive
relationship between the increase in unfunded mandates and government growth at the
state level. Finally, state-level empirical analysis of both the median income voter
and interparty competition theories of government growth is relatively lacking in the
literature. My analysis suggests that interparty competition is unrelated to state public
sector growth, and median income voter participation is actually inversely related to
growth in state government.
Finally, this study benefits from the inclusion of certain theoretically important
variables that either for lack o f data or refinements in theory specification have gone
untested in past research. First, the effect of industrialization on state government
growth, an important component of Wagner’s Law, is explored in this analysis. My
findings suggest that state industrialization, measured here as the proportion of total
state income derived from manufacturing income, in fact leads to a decline in the size
of the state public sector. Second, logging per capita income leads to a substantially
better model fit than when using untransformed per capita income. However, here

174

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

again, the empirical evidence is contrary to the hypothesis set forth in Wagner’s Law.
Last, it is apparent from the results o f my models that sustained Democratic control of
state government has a decidedly greater impact than merely control in the previous
year. This modification of the party control theory confirms similar results found in
studies of government growth at the international level (Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993).
Evidence that the size of the public sector varies considerably over time and
across states confirms the findings of past research (Garand 1988b; 1993). However,
the extension of this time series into the late 1990s suggests that, overall, the trend of
state government growth has tapered off. Nevertheless, it is clear that over time the
public sector has grown. This is particularly the case when using a government size
measure in which it component parts are not deflated to account for the different
inflation rates for the public and private sectors. Though all state governments have
grown over time when the undeflated measure is used, growth in four states has
actually declined when accounting for the effect of the public sector price deflator.
The difference in growth rates for the undeflated and deflated measures in all the
states in this analysis indicate that a considerable amount of growth in undeflated size
of state government is due to the effect of the differential inflation rate. Indeed, state
government growth in four states is due entirely to the deflator effect.1
It is also evident that the degree to which states are willing to commit
resources to their respective public sectors varies considerably. Some states, such as
Hawaii and New Mexico, give the public sector a relatively high priority, allocating a
1 State government growth in Colorado is also almost completely a function of the
differential rate. The percent o f Colorado government growth attributable to the
deflator effect as reported in Table 5 is 96.52.
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comparatively high proportion o f total state income to the public sector. On the other
hand, there are states, such as Illinois and Missouri, which allocate substantially lower
amounts o f total income to the government sector.
How does this study of public sector growth fit in the larger corpus of
government growth research? First, the effects o f many of the variables included here
confirm the findings o f previous research, though a number o f several novel findings
emerge from this analysis. The results for the Wagner’s Law explanation of
government growth are in general accord with that found by others. In particular,
findings for density, manufacturing proportion o f state income, and per capita income
are similar to those reported by others (e.g. Berry and Lowery 1987; Boix 2001; and
Garand 1993). However, evidence that an increase in per capita income is related to a
decline in government size is in contrast to other results found at the state (Thornton
and Ulrich 1999), national (Berry and Lowery 1983), and international (Boix 2001)
levels. Finally, evidence that urbanization has a positive effect on state government
growth is more support than has generally been found in previous studies.
Support for the party control theory of government growth receives support in
my model of government growth, which is in general agreement with that of Garand
(1993). Moreover, the Blais, Blake, and Dion (1993) operationalization o f the party
tenure variable confirms their finding that party control of government has a relatively
greater account when accounting for the length o f time the party has been in power.
On the other hand, competition between the parties does not seem to result in a larger
public sector. Whereas past studies have typically focused on the effect o f this
variable on state welfare expenditures, I find that it has no effect on the size of overall
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state government. Indeed, a heightened level of interparty competition is related to a
smaller state public sector.
The median income voter theory, a government growth explanation related to
interparty competition, also fails to uncover the expected relationship in this analysis.
I find that the effect o f an increase in median income voter participation is related to a
smaller public sector. This finding is in stark contrast to that o f Mueller and Murrell
(1986) and Husted and Kenny (1997). The inverse relationship between median
income voter turnout and government growth is strong whether such participation is
measured simply by turnout or Husted and Kenny’s (1997) county-by-county
estimates.
My analysis confirms the findings o f previous analyses regarding the effect of
fiscal constraints and the role o f political culture on government growth. It appears
that fiscal constraints are ineffective in combating pro-spending pressures in state
government. Moreover, it is likely that the variable is endogenous, meaning states
with tax and expenditure limitations and citizen initiatives are probably those with a
history of fiscally irresponsible politicians. As for political culture, both opinion
liberalism and policy liberalism have a strong positive effect on state government size.
The positive effect for policy liberalism confirms earlier work by Garand (1993).
Moreover, the positive relationship between state opinion liberalism and government
growth, an effect not found by Garand (1993), receives moderately strong support
here.
Some of the more interesting, and seemingly contradictory, findings come
from the political needs theory o f state government growth. In contrast to past
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research (Garand 1993; Lewis-Beck and Rice 198S), my models reveal that an
increase in inflation results in a smaller public sector. As I note in Chapter 5, this may
be due to state government postponing expenditures on large capital projects that
would require borrowing at high interest rates. Another surprising finding is that a
relatively high proportion of elderly citizens is related to smaller state government
size. This finding is in stark contrast to results found in previous work on government
growth. Moreover, this finding suggests that the use of median age (e.g. Garand
1993) or the ratio o f young and elderly to total population (Lewis-Beck and Rice
1985) may be flawed measures. When these two population ratios are separated, it is
apparent that it is the under 18 population that is driving state government growth.
On the other hand, past analysis suggesting that unemployment leads to an
increase in the size o f the public sector (Garand 1993; Rice 1986) finds confirmation
in this analysis. Likewise, the proposed negative relationship between state economic
health is empirically supported in my model of government growth. Previous research
that indicates a strong positive relationship between the black proportion of the
population and state government growth finds conditional support here. It appears that
the black population has a positive effect only on deflated state government size.
When government size is undeflated, the relationship is unexpectedly negative. This
in contrast to Garand’s (1993) government growth model that reveals a strong positive
relationship for this variable for both undeflated and deflated state government
growth.
Turning to the excessive theories o f government growth, my results are in
agreement with much o f past research. Among the component variables of the fiscal
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illusion explanation, only deficit spending demonstrates a consistently strong positive
effect on state government growth. The lack o f explanatory power for other two fiscal
illusion variables is not surprising given the generally weak or nonexistent empirical
support revealed in the literature. An important exception concerns the effect of the
revenue concentration measure. While I report a strong and unexpectedly positive
relationship between state revenue concentration, Garand's (1993) analysis indicates
that as a state’s revenue system becomes more complex there is an increase in the size
of state government, particularly when the undeflated government size measure is
utilized.
Evidence for the bureau-voting theory o f government growth, an explanation
with considerable empirical support in the literature (Dye and MacManus 1990; Ferris
and West 1994; Garand 1988; 1993), is strong in this analysis. Perhaps the most
important finding is that public employees are not monolithic in their support of a
larger public sector. I find that it is only the proportion o f state employees that have a
positive effect on state government growth. Moreover, the impact is quite large, the
third largest in both the undeflated and deflated model. Interestingly, past analysis
that relies on a measure of government growth that aggregates public sector size
across federal, state, and local levels indicates a negative relationship between public
employees and overall government growth (Berry and Lowery 1984; Berry and
Lowery 1987; Lowery and Berry 1983). It is likely that the effect of lumping local,
state, and federal workers into one measure conceals the true impact o f public
employees on public sector growth.
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Past analysis revealing a positive relationship for intergovernmental grants on
state public sector size find confirmation here, though it appears that the impact is
noticeably greater than that previously found. For instance, Garand (1993) reports a
coefficient for his intergovernmental grant variable that is less than one. This implies
that though federal aid increases state government spending it also functions as a
substitute for state derived funds. The coefficient I report here is well over one,
indicating that every federal dollar leads to a substantial increase over and above the
amount received from the federal government. Moreover, the impact of
intergovernmental grants on state public sector size is the largest among all the
variables in the model.
I find modest evidence that the ratio of constituents to house members is
related to state government growth. The impact of this variable is relatively small,
however. In contrast to the findings of Thornton and Ulrich (1999), which suggest a
greater impact for senate constituency size, I find only a small effect for this variable
and this effect is confined to the undeflated measure of government growth.
Finally, my study has contributed to the literature by testing two theories that
have yet to receive empirical analysis. The divided government thesis finds moderate
support in this analysis. The results of both the deflated and undeflated models
suggest that divided government does lead to a larger public sector, though this effect
is contingent on the absence of legislative supermajority requirements for the passage
o f new taxes. Second, the hypothesis that state government has grown because of an
increase in unfunded mandates since the mid 1960s receives ample support. Future
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research on the effect of unfunded mandates, however, should use a more precise
measure than the two dummy variables employed here.
What is noteworthy about all o f this is that there is more support for many of
these models than has been found in previous studies. A majority of the studies cited
here have a more circumscribed research design with the empirical analysis focused
on one or two explanatory variables. Rare is the analysis that takes the comprehensive
approach employed in my government growth model. Among the studies that survey
a raft o f government growth explanations and test the theories competitively, this
study yields relatively more support for the component explanations than is generally
found. Representative of such studies are those conducted by Lowery and Berry
(1983) and Berry and Lowery (1987), both of which find comparatively little support
for their models of government growth. While research by Garand (1993) does
generate substantial support for many o f the models I test here, the full model tested
here has more explanatory power. Though much of this improvement in model fit is
due to the longer time-series under examination, a portion of this improvement may be
attributed to the inclusion of theoretically important variables and changes in the
measurement of certain variables.
I hypothesized in Chapter 1 that growth in state government should, from a
normative standpoint, be the result o f the public sector responding to the needs and
wishes o f its population. The broad picture painted here suggests, however, that much
o f the growth in the public sector from 1946 to 1997 can be attributed to factors
beyond the control of the average citizen. In other words, it appears that state
government has grown beyond that demanded by the citizens. The analysis reveals
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that the largest positive impact on state government growth is intergovernmental
grants. The third largest impact is the proportion of state employees. For undeflated
state government growth, the impact of state employees on public sector size is almost
twice the impact of the nearest responsive variable (policy liberalism). The impact of
state employees is similar in the deflated model.
Lewis-Beck and Rice (1986) conclude their analysis of government growth at
the national level with the admonition that efforts to curb the size of government that
focus on a reduction in spending are likely to be ineffective. To a degree, the same
conclusion can be made based on the results I present here. State government growth
is substantially influenced by demand, factors such as a state’s under 18 population,
changes in economic prosperity, opinion and policy liberalism, and urban population
all exert upward pressure on state government size. This is particularly the case when
using the deflated measure of public sector size. On the other hand, it could be
argued, from a conservative standpoint, that a healthy portion of state government
growth could be stemmed through a reduction in spending. First, a reduction in the
monetary amount of intergovernmental grants would lead to a substantial decline in
the size of the state public sector. Second, and somewhat perversely, state government
is acting “responsively” when it reacts to the “demand” of state employees that is
given a greater voice as their population proportion increases. Thus a reduction in
state expenditures, leading to a smaller public sector workforce, would m in im iz e the
power of state bureaucrats to enlarge state government beyond that desired by the
population.
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Where do we go from here? First, this analysis raises several interesting issues
that merit further research. For instance, the negative relationship found between per
capita income and state government size merits additional study. The scatterplots
presented in Figures 8 and 9 suggest that higher per capita income is associated with a
larger public sector, though the regression estimates indicate a strong negative
relationship. Studies on this dynamic could focus on whether this relationship varies
in different time periods. It could be that the negative relationship observed is
contingent on alterations in state liberalism or “public mood’'. A second compelling
avenue of research might investigate more in depth the fiscal effects of a centralized
revenue system on state government size. The relationship found here suggests that a
complex or diversified revenue system may be more cost-effective for state
government. Third, the apparent negative relationship between median income voter
participation and state government growth suggests a number of unanswered questions
and presents a fertile field for assessing the various forces that affect electoral politics
within the states.
Finally, future research should consider the impact of government size on a
range of policy and societal outcomes. For example, Garand and Monroe (1993) find
that divorce rates in the states from 1960 to 1984 are partly a function of growth in the
welfare state. Others have studied the impact of government size on citizen’s attitudes
toward risk (Greene 1973; Hatzinikolaou 1997; Hatzinikolaou and Ahking 199S).
Perhaps more important are attempts to link growth in state government size to
economic development with in the states (Conte and Darrat 1988; Jones 1990). Does
government growth impede private sector economic development in the states? It
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could be that a larger state government creates inefficiencies in the private sector that
hinder economic growth, as many economic conservatives maintain. On the other
hand, a large public sector may benefit the private sector through policies designed to
enhance economic development. In sum, state politics scholars and domestic political
economy ought to begin to think of the public sector size as an independent variable to
explain various social, political, and economic outcomes.
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Appendix 1: Median Voter Models
Table 13. Parameter Estimates for Undeflated Median Voter Model of
Government Growth in the American States,l951-1990 (OLS with Panel
Corrected Standard Errors)

Variable

b

Intercept

0.05251

.01566

3.353

Population

0.00011

.00010

1.078

.0138

.00387

-11.391

-.4314

.00224

-1.701

-.0230

.00402

3537

.0684

.00526

-4353

-.0548

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error

T

Beta

Responsive Theories
Logged Income
Urban

4& W 0S***
a o is a t* * *

Party Control

0.00124*

.00099

1.260

.0133

Party Tenure

0.00011

.00084

.127

.0013

.00535

530

.0083

7;IPG * Bfeetiest Tear

(K W 0»

.00604

.098

.0008

Median Income Voter

0.00674+++

.00148

4.564

.0351

TaatawrfF-xpenrihwml.wmte

0.00176

.00113

1558

.0142

Initiatives

c m

.00069

1.627

.0157

Over 65

-0.16412^

.02661

-6.169

-.0988

Under 18

0.07795***

.02131

3.658

.1010

Black Population

0.00397

.00473

.838

.0112

Unemployment

0.00656

.02269

.289

.0024

Inflation

-0.00016

.00011

-1.371

-.0145

Economic Growth

-0.07298***

.00764

-9.556

-.0807

ja m

1.452

.0247

.00070

9.634
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Table 13. cont,
Government Size (Undeflated)
Variable

Excessive Theories
beom eT K
Revenue Concentration
Deficit
Federal Employees
State Employees
Local Employees
Intergovernmental Grant
Senate
House
Divided Government
Divided * Supermajodty
1965 Dummy
Trend
1965 Counter

b

Panel-Corrected
Standard E rror

-a o e a s i
0.06766***
-0.56055***
2.16093***
-0.08422
1.5480S***
-0.00275
-0.00772**
-6.00654***
0.00811***
0.01244***
0.00105
0.00089***

N
Model F
Prob. > F
Base R-Square

JQ044S
.60314
.00660
.07205
.13860
.08723
.04537
.02760
.00366
.60218
.00214
.00126
.00018
.00019

T

Beta

-.560
3.315
1.258
-7.780
15.591
-.965
34.143
-.100
-2.109
-3.004
3.790
9.897
5.942
4.711

-.0055
.0343
.0804
-.0804
.2870
-.0167
.5489
-.0017
-.0233
-.0706
.0875
.1706
.3450
.2131

1840
16244.11
.0000
.8984

*** Prob (T) < .01, one-tail test.
** Prob (T) < .05, one-tail test.
* Prob (T) < . 10, one-tail test.
Prob (T) < .01, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
++ Prob (T) < .05, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
+ Prob (T) < . 10, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
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Table 14. Parameter Estimates for Deflated Median Voter Model of Government
Growth in the American States,1951-1990 (OLS with Panel Corrected
Standard Errors)
Government Size (Deflated!
Variable

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error

Beta

Intercept

0.05918

.01869

3.167

Population
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-
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Median Income Voter
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Over 65
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Under 18
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Table 14. cont^
Government Size (Deflated!
Variable

b

Excessive Theories
Income Tax
Revenue Concentration
Deficit
Federal Employees
State Employees
Local Employees
Intergovernmental Grant
Senate
House
Divided Government
Divided * Supermajority
1965 Dummy
Trend
1965 Counter

0.60107
0.01104***
0.08470***
-0.58212***
2.13263***
-0.27372*+*
1.74952***
0.01257
-0.00573*
-0.00723***
0.00852***
0.01029***
0.00058
0.00071***

Panel-Corrected
Standard E rror

N
Model F
Prob. > F
Base R-Square

.00534
.00374
.00787
.08597
.16539
.10409
.05413
.03293
.00437
.00260
.00255
.00150
.00021
.00022

T

Beta

.201
2.950
1.760
-6.771
12.895
-2.630
32319
.382
-1.311
-2.785
3.337
6.864
2.737
3.173

.0024
.0380
.1167
-.0871
.2953
-.0565
.6465
.0080
-.0180
-.0815
.0958
.1472
.1977
.1786

1840
9841.82
.0000
.8425

*** Prob (T) < .01, one-tail test.
** Prob (T) < .05, one-tail test.
* Prob (T) <.10, one-tail test.
*** Prob (T) < .01, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
** Prob (T) < .05, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
+ Prob (T) < .10, two-tail test, coefficient in unexpected direction.
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Appendix 2: Description of Variables
Table 15. Description of Variables
Variable

Source

Description

Deflated State
Government Expenditure

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Deflated state government expenditures as a
proportion of total state personal income.
State government expenditures are deflated
using state and local government price
deflator, and total state personal income is
deflated with GDP price deflator.

Undeflated State
Government Expenditure

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Undeflated state government expenditures as
a proportion of undeflated state personal
income.

Population

U.S. Census
Data

State population is the total population of a
state in a given year (in millions)

Logged Per Capita
Income

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Logged state per capita income, 1996 dollars
(untransformed income in 10,000s).

Population Density

Book o f the
States

State population (in 1000s) divided by state
square miles (measured in thousands).

Urban Population

U.S. Census
Data

Proportion of population living in urban areas.

Manufacturing

U.S.
Department of
Commerce

Proportion of total state personal income
derived from manufacturing.

Income Tax

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Income tax is the proportion of state revenue
derived from personal income tax.

Revenue Concentration

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Revenue concentration is based on a
Herfindahl index measuring the complexity of
the state’s revenue system.

Deficit

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This is the absolute value of the deficit as a
percentage of total state expenditures. States
without deficits or running surpluses are given
the value o f 0.
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Table 15., cont.
Variable_______________ Source_________Description
Federal Employees

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Federal employees is the number of full-time
civilian federal government employees as a
proportion o f state citizens 18 years of age
and older.

State Employees

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

State employees is the number of full-time
state government employees as a proportion
o f state citizens 18 years of age and older.

Local Employees

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Local employees is the number of full-time
local government employees as a proportion
of state citizens 18 years of age and older.

Intergovernmental Grant

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

Intergovernmental grant is the total amount of
intergovernmental aid as a proportion of total
state personal income.

Party Control

Book o f the
States

Party control is measured with Democratic
governor equal to .5, and Democratic House
and Senate equal to .25 respectively.
Otherwise, these values are zero.

Party Tenure

Book o f the
States

Party tenure is equal to 1 if the party
composition score for a given state has
changed by .25 or less in the past five years.
Otherwise the variable is zero.

Divided Government

Book o f the
States

This is the percentage of divided state
government delegations (governor, senate,
and house) in the past five years (including
the then-present administration).

Supermajority Tax and
Spending Requirements

Book o f the
States

This variable takes the value of one if a state
does not have supermajority voting
requirements for the passage of a spending or
tax bill. Otherwise the variable is zero.

Divided * Supermajority

Book o f the
States

This variable takes the value of Divided in
states without supermajority voting
requirements for passage of a spending or tax
bill and 0 otherwise.
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Table 15., cont.
Variable____________ Source____________ Description
Interparty
Competition

Book o f the States

This is the average Democratic presidential
election margin from the previous two
elections. It is the absolute value of the
difference between the Democratic vote
percentage minus fifty.

IPC * Election Year

Book o f the States

This variable takes the value of Interparty
Competition in election years and 0 otherwise.

Turnout

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This variable is equal to the highest
proportion of the voting-age population voting
in either the previous presidential, senate, or
house race.

Median Income Voter
Turnout

Husted and Kenny
(1997), U.S. Census
Data, and Statistical
Abstract

This variable is equal to a state’s average
county median family income, weighted by
the turnout in the county, divided by the
average county median family income,
weighted by the county’s voting-age
population.

Tax and Expenditure
Limits

Advisory Council
on
Intergovernmental
Relations (various
years)

This variable equals 1 if a state has tax and
expenditure limits in place and 0 otherwise.

Initiatives

Advisory Council
on
Intergovernmental
Relations (various
years)

This variable equals I if a state permits
initiatives by voters and 0 otherwise.

Opinion Liberalism

Erikson, Wright,
and Mclver (1993)

This variable is a measure of a state’s mass
liberalism. Higher scores indicate a more
liberal population.

Policy Liberalism

Erikson, Wright,
and Mclver (1993)

This variable is a measure of the liberalism of
a state’s policy output. Higher scores indicate
policies that are more liberal.
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Table 15., conL
Variable

Source

Description

Over 65

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This variable is the proportion o f the state’s
population 65 years o f age or older.

Under 18

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This variable is the proportion of the state’s
population 18 years of age or younger.

Black Population

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This is the number of blacks in a state as a
proportion of the total population.

Unemployment

U.S. Statistical
Abstract (and
Bureau of
Economic
Analysis)

This is the proportional change in the state
unemployment rate from the previous year
(current year/previous year). Unemployment
rates from 1945 to 1959, with the exception of
1950, were modeled.

Inflation

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This is the proportional change in the Consumer
Price Index from the past year (current year/
previous year).

Economic Growth

U.S. Statistical
Abstract

This is the proportional change in a state’s total
per capita income from the past year (current
year/previous year).

Senate

Book o f the States

This variable is the number o f senate seats in a
state divided by the state population (in
thousands).

House

Book o f the States

This variable is the number of lower house seats
in a state divided by the state population (in
thousands).

1965 Dummy

Variable equals 1 in 1966 and all following years.

Trend

Variable is 1 in 1947,2 in 1948,3 in 1949, etc.

Count 1965

Variable is 1 in 1966, 2 in 1967,3 in 1968, etc.

*Note: All variables are lagged one year with the exception of the variables
controlling for economic change (unemployment, inflation, and economy), trend, and
deficit spending.
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Appendix 3: Mean Values for Independent Variables
Table 16. Mean Values for Continuous Independent Variables Used in Modeling
State Government Growth*
Variable
Population
Responsive Theories
ReatPer Capita Income
Density
Urban
Manufacturing
Party Control
Party Tenure
interparty Competition
Turnout
Median Income Voter
Over 65
Under IS
flnm iphym wit
Change in Unemployment
niangft in inflation
Economic Growth
Opinion Liberalism
Policy Liberalism

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

4.14287

4.42257

.14300

31.76200

134659
.14351
.63663
.17369
.60142
.33185
.07430
51.13253
1.01575
39150

33062
30810
35644
ossea
.37255
.42793
.06410
14.61443
.18383
jm m

36985
.00130
.23570
.01766
.00000
.00000
.00002
2.49876
.61625
.04496
.21381
.00036
34489
-.10300
-120000
.73204
.72000
-1.54000

3.42218
1.07231
.94351
.43521
1.00000
1.00000
.45357
82.38806
1.57746
.18774
.44148
.47281
18.00000
.07100
14.40000
2.05976
.99200
2.12000

.00000
Jtt«S7
.00009
.00074
.00190
.00345
.00201

32866
1.07303
.42221
.06261
.04508
.05680
.08827

M m
.09165
5.61476
.000468
435192
1.02202
.85400
-.00688

Excessive Theories
income Tax
.09295
B gM M ieQ inaBiutfaiV
*
z tm
- ;
Dtafieaf
it- £ V; *m a-m
* •.
Federal Employees
.01280
State Employees
.01281
Local Employees
.02781
BfaQDmnmiafalGeant
.02609

.09956
2.04790
.0135327
3.42550
.04845
.07074
.96590

.07718
.13056

JM6M
.00545
.00593
.00825
.01329
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Table 16., conL*
Variable
Excessive Theories
Senate
House
Divided Government

Mean

.02189
.06935
.42630

Standard
Deviation

.02184
.10522
.38992

Minimum

Maximum

.00000
.11888
.00252
.86928
.00000 ‘ ‘ TJ0OOOO

*A description of how each variable is measured is found in Appendix 2.
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Appendix 4: Correlations between Independent Variables
Table 17. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables Used in Model
LAGPOP

LOGINC

LDENSITY

LURBAN

LMANUF

PARTY

PARTYINT

LAGPOP

1.000

LOGINC

0.2843

1.000

LDENSITY

0.2363

0.2907

1.000

LURBAN

0.4863

0.5484

0.5219

1.000

LMANUF

0.2009

-0.1807

0.3361

0.0726

1.000

PARTY

0.0259

-0.0516

0.0622

-0.0065

-0.0950

1.000

PARTYINT

-0.0197

-0.2137

0.0091

-0.1101

-0.0802

0.5874

1.000

INTPART

-0.1403

-0.1997

-0.0647

-0.1664

-0.0753

0.0692

0.1683

IPCELECT

-0.0862

-0.1351

-0.0276

-0.1038

-0.0196

0.0095

0.0617

LTURNOUT

-0.1216

0.0682

0.0702

0.1163

0.1096

-0.3763

-0.4070

LTELS

-0.1554

-0.3731

0.0070

-0.2210

0.1438

-0.0453

0.0119

LINIT

-0.0350

0.0790

-0.2325

0.0908

-0.2803

-0.1596

-0.1610
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Table 17., coot.
LCOMPLEX DEFICIT

LFGOVEMP LSGOVEMP LLGOVEMP FEDGRANT LSENATE

LCOMPLEX 1.0000
-0.2278

1.0000

LFGOVEMP 0.0460

-0.0472

1.0000

LSGOVEMP 0.6002

-0.2166

0.1178

1.0000

LLGOVEMP 0.4730

-0.3245

-0.1104

0.4079

1.0000

FEDGRANT 0.4886

-0.3060

0.0817

0.6567

0.5170

1.0000

LSENATE

0.1266

0.0386

0.1602

0.1915

-0.1191

0.3292

1.0000

LHOUSE

0.0055

0.1466

-0.0331

0.0527

-0.1889

0.0887

0.6009

PERCDIV5

0.2134

-0.1023

-0.0164

0.1796

0.2998

0.1370

0.0785

DIVSMAJ

0.1309

-0.0712

-0.0025

0.1047

0.2402

0.1079

0.0997

DEFICIT
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Table 17., cont
LHOUSE
LHOUSE

PERCDIV5 DIVSMAJ

1.0000

PERCDIV5 -0.0257

1.0000

DIVSMAJ

0.9084

0.0029

1.0000

tv>

^

Where model vanable equals the following code:
Policy Liberalism

=

POLLIB

Income Tax

=

LINCTAX

= LTURNOUT Revenue Concentration

=

LCOMPLEX

Tax and Expenditure Limitations

=

Deficit

=

DEFICIT

Initiatives

= LINIT

Federal Employees

=

LFGOVEMP

Over 65

= LOV65

State Employees

=

LSGOVEMP

Under 18

=

Local Employees

=

LLGOVEMP

Interparty Competition

=

IPC * Election Year

= IPCELECT

Turnout

INTPART

LTELS

LUND 18
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Black Population

LBLACK

Intergovernmental Grant

=

FEDGRANT

Unemployment

UNEMP

Senate

=

LSENATE

Inflation

1NFL3

House

=

LHOUSE

Economic Growth

ECON1

Divided Government

=

PERCDIV5

Opinion Liberalism

OPLIB

Divided * Supermajority

=

DIVSMAJ

Vita
Branwell DuBose Ravenel Kapeluck was bom in Manassas, Virginia, on July
11 ,1969. He attended both elementary school and junior high in Columbia, South
Carolina, and then moved with his family to Clemson, South Carolina. He remained
there until graduating from D.W. Daniel High School in 1987. DuBose enlisted in the
Marine Corps Reserve and completed basic training in November of 1987. He then
went to Charleston, South Carolina where he attended the College of Charleston,
receiving a Bachelor o f Arts in history. DuBose subsequently moved to Durham,
North Carolina, and began graduate studies at North Carolina State University. He
was awarded a Master o f Arts degree in political science in 1997. His thesis advisor
was Dr. Andrew Taylor. In 1997, DuBose continued his graduate studies at Louisiana
State University under the direction o f Dr. James Garand. His major field of study is
American politics, with an emphasis on congressional behavior and public policy. His
second field of study is political theory.
DuBose will obtain a degree of Doctor o f Philosophy in August o f 2001. He
has accepted a faculty position at Georgia Southern University where he will have an
appointment with the Political Science Department.

221

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidates

Branwell DuBose Ravenel Kapeluck

Major Field: Political Science
Title of Dissertation:

Testing Theories of Government Growth
in the Fifty States, 1945 to 1998

Approved:

EXAMINING .COMMITTEE:

Date of Sxamination:

Jun e

29.

7001

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

